An Account of VIRTUE: Or, Dr. *Henry More's* ABRIDGMENT of MORALS, Put into Engliſh.

Cicero Tuſc. Quæſt.

O vitæ Philoſophia Dux! O Virtutum Indagatrix, Expultrixq; Vitiorum; Unus Dies benè, & ex Præceptis tuis, actus, peccanti Immortalitati eſt anteponendus.

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An Account
of
VIRTUE:
or
Dr. Henry More's
ABRIDGMENT
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MORALS,
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EXTRACT
OF
Dr. *More*'s EPISTLE
TO HIS
READER.

Setting forth,

THAT he was with difficulty perſuaded by his Friends to a Work of this Nature; as having firſt a very mean Opinion of thoſe Syſtems for Moral Philoſophy, which pretend to overthrow Iniquity by *Definitions* and *Diviſions*. He thought it was *Virtue* alone was fit to enter the Liſt; and ſuch Virtue as could no where be found, but by Faith in God, and a Reverence to his Holy Scriptures. That in them the Senſe and Meaning was wholly

Divine, and that he who ſo believed, and did not willingly abuſe his knowledg therein; would come eaſily to diſcern, what in all things was the *Good*, and what the *Evil*. But that if a Man had no ſuch feeling, and knew not how to put himſelf under the Diſcipline of Self-denial, let him be never ſo vers'd in Definitions and diſtributions of Virtue, he ever would be deſtitute both of Virtue it ſelf, and of all the Fruits and Conſequences of it. Here the Doctor laments to ſee the World ſo abound with Monſters who even deride this Bleſſing of Virtue, and upon all occaſions expoſe it for a mere Imaginary Thing.

That his Friends, even from their Motives and Obſtructions, increaſed their Importunity; Urging on him the greater need of ſuch a Work, as might not only bear down Oppoſition by ſome new Advantage in the

Method, but in carrying Proofs for every Precept, and Conviction for every Rule. They plainly ſhew'd, That the Age was grown ſo captious, that nothing would paſs, or look binding on the Mind of Man, but what Right Reaſon did irreſiſtibly compel him unto. That therefore, if a Treatiſe of this happy Texture might be obtain'd, it would not only gratifie the Good, but perhaps even kindle and ingender ſome Divine Sparks towards Virtue in the Bad.

However, and notwithſtanding all theſe Inſtigations, he at firſt utterly Diſſented, as being then plung'd in Studies of a different kind, which did not only entertain, but even raviſh his Mind with Delight. Yet having but for one Night revolved the Arguments laid before him, and comparing in his Thoughts the difference between Self-Content, and the Hopes

of a Publick Good; (such was the In-
stability of Human resolution) he e-
ven started from the Work he had in
hand, and purpos'd with Ardor to
pursue the New. Indeed the hints o
Conscience, and the Preference due t
a higher Good, grew so much upo
him; that the more he had inclin'd
to the first Work, and shewn Averse
ness to this latter; the more he re-
solv'd to conquer himself in both
and to make herein some Experi-
ment of his own Sincerity.

He owns he had this farther provo
cation, that having long ago employ'd
his Talent, in demonstrating, from th
foundations of Natural Theology,
that there was a God; and that th
Soul of Man was Immortal; he
thought it not incongruous to add
now some third Treatise concern-
ing *Life and good Manners*; such a
might lead Men on to the knowledg
and to the fruition of the rest. Here-

Hereupon he ſays, that as ſoon as the Scheme and Platform of his Work was but ſettled in his Thoughts (which was very ſoon done) he then bent his whole Mind to it, and purſu'd it with one continu'd Heat, till it was all accompliſh'd.

The Doctor then ſets forth, how the true Deſign of all, who write of Morals, is, or ought to be, for amendment of Life. That it was not to Cavil or to Diſpute, or make oſtentation of Science; but that the Work in Hand, was an honeſt Intention to excite the Minds of Men unto Virtue. And that by Reading and Meditating on the Precepts thereof, every Man might purſue and attain ſuch Bleſſing, and compleat his Felicity by it. That this was the whole Scope and the true Motive, of this Manual. But if, in the handling thereof, he had not trod in the path which others

had taken; he had Hopes however
when the whole Mould and Spirit o
it was conſider'd, it might not di
pleaſe the Reader. For as to poin
of Order, he had always put that i
the firſt place, which was moſt clear
and that behind which was more ob
ſcure; This being the utmoſt aim o
what all good Method pretends unto
He does acknowledg to have left ou
(ſince Prudence did ſo adviſe it)
great heap of Rules and Admoniti
ons which others talk of. But having
ſelected thoſe of moſt Concern, a
comprehending in them the Life an
Power of the reſt; and having ever
dived for this purpoſe into the inti
mate Receſſes of his own Soul an
Experience, to furniſh thoſe, whic
might moſt inflame or conjure Men
unto Virtue; He hopes this will no
paſs for leſs, than had he barely tran-
ſcrib'd from Books, and from the Au-
thori-

thorities that went before him.

However he owns, that as to one Branch herein, he had chiefly conformed to what *Des-Cartes* in his *Definitions* of the *Paſſions* had done before him; which yet being but a matter of mere Speculation, is therefore ſubject to the leſs Exceptions.

And altho, as to the reſt, his chief intention was, To pour forth the Senſe and Emanations of his own Mind upon this Subject; Yet that he very often, and moſt reſpectfully, had concurr'd with many of the Ancients: And had even produc'd their very Words and Sentences, that it might the more appear, how by comparing and fortifying them with his own, he had not ſo much affected Singularity in this Undertaking, as a reſtitution of Morals to their priſtin State.

But if, after all, he ſhall be cenſur'd

ſur'd as over-doing this Matter in too Numerous a Citation of ſuch Ancient Authors; he freely owns that herein alſo, he did purpoſely meditate how to expoſe, to the Eyes of the Chriſtian World, What a holy and ſanctifi'd ſenſe of Virtue even the Heathens had; and how, in their frequent Writings, they had ſo Divinely expreſs'd it, That we Chriſtians might be aſhamed to conſider, how few of us either Live ſo well, or Speak ſo wiſely as they did. For (alas) we of this Age, ſcorn to be ſubject, either to the Name or Exerciſe of Virtue! We diſown and vilifie it, as fit only for the more barbarous and unpolliſhed Nations of the World, ſuch as are not enlightned, and whom we think deſpicably of; while in this very preſumption we do not ſo much undervalue their Ignorance, as we diſcover our own. What Rational Creature is there,

there, but muſt acknowledg, That Virtue has a participation with the Divine Nature? And what elſe could make it, as it is, ſo great a part of our Chriſtian Religion? For howbeit thoſe three Names, which among Men ſo often occur, of *Virtue*, *Grace*, and *the Divine Life*, may ſeem diſtinct; Yet, if *rightly* ponder'd, they are all but one and the ſame Thing. For to affirm that the Perfection of Man's Mind makes up the Divine Life, inaſmuch as the Image of God is repreſented in it; This ſurely is no ſlight Notion of Virtue, but rather a ſtrong and comprehenſive Repreſentation thereof. The ſame we might ſay of Grace alſo, as it is God's Munificence towards Man; and of Virtue no leſs, *as it is a powerful Faculty of the Soul, whereby the Paſſions are ſo ſubdu'd, as in every Caſe to be able to proſecute that which is the moſt*

perfect

perfect Good. This is the Definition, the Dr. hath choſen to beſtow on Virtue in his following Tract; Deſigning thereby to rebuke the folly of thoſe Men, who think they can live a Divine Life, without tying themſelves up to the Rules of Morality; and who lay aſide Virtue, while they fanatically pretend unto Grace.

Advertiſement.

IF among many other Faults in this Tranſlation, the Reader finds it not always ſtrict to the *Latin*; It was hard, where the Quotations were Numerous, and in ſuch different Styles, to keep to that Rule, but at the hazard of a much better; Namely, That every Tranſlation ſhould look like an Original. Which is ſomewhat attempted in this Eſſay.

K. W. Septemb. 1688.

The

The Heads of the following Chapters.

Chap. Page

I. *What Ethicks or Morals are?* 1

II. *Of the parts of Ethicks, and of Happiness,* 3

III. *Of Virtue in General, and of Right Reason,* 11

IV. *Certain Axioms, or Intellectual Principles, into which all the Reasons of Morality may be reduced,* 20

V. *As there is something good simply, and of its own Nature; so also to shew by what Faculties the same is found and understood,* 28

VI. *Of the Passions in general, and of the Helps they afford,* 33

VII. *Of Passions properly so call'd, according to their kinds,* 43

VIII. *The*

VIII. *The Use and Interpretation of the Passions; and first of Admiration, with all in that Classis: And of the other five Primitive Passions,* 54

IX. *The Use and Interpretation of Love and Hatred, which are in the Second Classis,* 61

X. *The Use and Interpretation of the Passions of the Third Classis, which fall under the Head of Cupidity,* 65

XI. *The Interpretation and Use of Joy and Grief, which constitute the Fourth Classis,* 69

XII. *That all Passions (properly so call'd) are in themselves Good; And that from a Right Interpretation of them, 'tis manifest there is something Good and Bad in its own Nature. And lastly, to shew what such Nature or Essence, of Good and Bad can be,* 78

XIII. *Of other Passions or Bodily Impressions,* 84

In the Second Book.

I. *OF the Number of the Primitive Virtues,* 92

II. *Of Prudence, the first Primitive Virtue,* 98

III. *Of*

III. *Of the other two Primitive Virtues,* Sincerity *and* Patience. 104

IV. *Of Justice in general, which is the first of the three principal Virtues, which are term'd* Derivative, 111

V. *Of* Piety, 117

VI. *Of* Probity, *or of Justice properly so call'd,* 123

VII. *Of the other two principal Derivative Virtues,* Fortitude *and* Temperance, 130

VIII. *Of the Reductive Virtues,* 134

IX. *Of that Mediocrity, in which Virtue does consist: And of the true measure of such Mediocrity,* 146

X. *Of Good Things, which are External,* 160

In the Third book.

I. OF *Free-Will,* 172

II. *Two principal Objections against Free-Will Propos'd and Answer'd,* 181

III. *Theorems, which are of general Use in the Acquiring of Virtues,* 191

IV. *Things which contribute to the attaining of the Primitive Virtues,* 208

V. *How the three principal Derivative Virtues may be Acquir'd,* 213

VI. *Of Acquiring the Reductive Virtues; And first of those which refer to Justice,* 224

VII. *Of Acquiring those Virtues, which refer to* Fortitude, 230

VIII. *Of Acquiring those Virtues, which refer to* Temperance, *and about exciting the Divine Love,* 235

IX. *Of the Acquisition of External Good,* 242

X. *Of the Good which is External; and of that which is Supreme and Eternal, according to the Mind of the Philosophers.* 255

ERRATA.

PAge 104. line 13. read *from motives of.* p. 107. l. 17. r. *as not to be.* p. 110. l. 3. dele *which.* p. 118. l. 30. r. *is herein.* p. 132. l. 5. r. *with being.* p. 133. l. 22. r. *inferiour Creatures.* p. 151. l. 6. r. *chooser.* p. 157. l. 17. r. *to this.* p. 179. l. 11. r. *of acting.* p. 215. l. 16. r. *hath been.* p. 218. l. 3. r. *drives him.*

THE

AN ACCOUNT OF VIRTUE.

CHAP. I.

What Ethicks or Morals are.

ETHICKS *are defined to be the Art of Living well and happily.*

I. WE understand in this place, by *Art*, a methodical Knowledge of such Precepts as are consentaneous one to another. And therefore, since *Ethicks* are that *Art* we design to treat of, our Precepts must all partake thereof, and all conduce thereunto; for else they would not be *consentaneous*. So that you are not to expect Precepts how to *dispute*, but how to live, and how to be *happy*.

The Reason why in the Definition above we call it, *The Art of Living both well and happily*,

pily, is, because a Man may live *well*, and yet not altogether so *happily*; which two differing kinds of Life the *Pythagoreans* did rightly distinguish; for by their Doctrin, it is one thing to be *perfect according to Nature*, another *according to Life*.

II. Now such men, *are by nature perfect*, who are adorned with Virtue. For, by the Definition of those Philosophers, *Virtue is the top and perfection of every Nature*. They term these men *good only*, and not happy or blest. *But such men are said to be perfect according to life, who are not only good, but also happy*. For they define *happiness* to be the Perfection of human Life; and they define human life to be a Collection or *Chronicle of human Actions*. Wherefore, seeing the Event and Success of such Actions depend on Fortune, no man can, without the Benefits of Fortune, enjoy a perfect State. The wise *Hippodamus Thurius* observed, *That it was Virtue and Fortune together that made Actions perfect*; *Virtue as to the Practice, and Fortune as to the Success*.

III. The Definition of *Felicity* given by *Archytas*, is consonant to what we have said, namely, *That it was the practice of Virtue joyned with good Fortune*. And last of all, *Eudephemus* hath well illustrated the matter in this threefold Similitude: *Just as a General* (saith he) *overcomes by Valour and good Success*; *and as the Pilot gains his Port by true steering, and a favourable Gale*; *and as the Eye beholds by the Power of Vision*,

Viſion, and Help of Light: ſo is our Life then beſt, when accompanied with Virtue and good Fortune. We might add unto all, the Authority of *Ariſtotle* himſelf, who requires *external Goods* to the completing of Happineſs. Now altho the good Things of Fortune, which we here recommend, cannot abſolutely be ſaid to be within our Power; yet we preſume to ſay, that foraſmuch as the Precepts, laid down by *Ethicks*, do admirably ſteer a man to their acquiſition (as in due place it will appear) we muſt conclude, that ſuch Externals are by good title referrable to *Ethicks*. For altho they are ſometimes miſſed of, and not always attained: yet this is only as it happens with *Phyſicians* and *Pilots*; who, tho they often miſcarry, yet no man infers from thence, but that there are ſuch *Arts* in the World, as *Phyſick* and *Navigation* too.

Vide in this Book, *L.* 3. *c.* 10. § 13.

Chap. II.

Of the Parts of Ethicks, and of Happineſs.

I. Ethicks are divided into two Parts, *The Knowledge of Happineſs, and the Acquiſition of it.* The *Knowledge* contains the Doctrine of its Nature, and of ſuch things as the Nature of Happineſs does, in ſome ſort, either comprehend, or elſe refer unto. Whence

in this first Part we shall principally treat of the *Virtues*, and of the *Passions:* and in the last Part add somewhat about the *external Supports* of life.

II. HAPPINESS *is that pleasure which the mind takes in from a Sense of Virtue, and a Conscience of Well-doing; and of conforming in all things to the Rules of both.* Wherefore we say, that *external Comforts*, or some moderate proportion of them, do much conduce to the making happiness complete. Here we call *Happiness* a *Pleasure* of the Mind rather than an *Operation* of it, since all men allow it to be the *best and greatest of human Fruitions.* But as that cannot be the greatest which is subservient to another, so the *Operation* of the mind cannot be said to be its *greatest good*, since it is but in order to *Pleasure.* And it is upon this Account, as *Aristotle* observes, that we often heighten and raise our *Operations*; not that we are pleased with the Operation it self, but because we expect a pleasure from it, which we highly value, and which we look upon as an effect thereof.

Ethic. Eud. lib. 1. *cap.* 7.

III. FURTHERMORE, to come closer to the Mark, this *Pleasure* by which we define *Happiness*, is here considered as the Flower and Master-piece of that very Operation, in the ways of Virtue, which makes up the Excellency of Life. For, in every Action we go about, it is Pleasure that makes the Operation complete; it is as the Soul of the Work which cannot be wanting. And so *Aristotle* says,

That

That it gives Perfection to all our Works, and even to Life it ſelf. Eth. Nic lib. 10. c. 4

It is plain, that each Creature hath its own particular Pleaſure, which is conſtrued to be its ſupreme Happineſs. Whence we may infer, That human Happineſs does alſo conſiſt in human Pleaſure; but ſuch, I mean, as ariſeth from the Senſe of Virtue.

IV. NEXT we ſay, that all ſorts of Men, not the Fools only, but the Philoſophers, have placed *Happineſs* in *Pleaſure*. *Ariſtotle* hath noted in the following Words: *That all People accounted Happineſs to be a Pleaſure, and deſired to live therein, or at leaſt not without it.* Magn. Moral l. 2. c. 7. And again elſewhere he ſays: *That no man can rationally think, but he that is truly happy lives very pleaſantly.* Eud. l. 7. c. 5. And again in his Rhetorick: *That Happineſs is that way of Life which is moſt pleaſant with Security.* Rhet. l. 1. c. 15. So even our own Divines are wont to deſcribe the Celeſtial Happineſs, by an uninterrupted Joy.

V. IN the fifth place it appears, by *Ariſtotle*'s own Definition of *Pleaſure*, that *Happineſs* is of the ſame Affinity. For he defines Pleaſure to be, *A Reſtitution of every Creature from a ſtate imperfect, or preternatural, unto its own proper Nature.* Magn. Moral. l. 2. c. 7. Now a true Feeling and Poſſeſſion of Virtue, is alſo the converſion or bringing a man about, from what is contrary to his Nature, to that which is conformable to it. For tho all Depravity be, according to *Triſmegiſtus*, inbred, and con-

Marcus Imperator, lib. 7. cap. 11.

natural to Brutes, yet in Reality the same is quite contrary to human Nature. *For* (as the Emperor *Marcus Aurelius* observes) *to act according to Nature or according to Reason, is in a rational Creature the same thing.* Wherefore all pravity is repugnant to human Nature. But that Virtue is natural to human Nature, and born as a Twin therewith, is manifest, as well because Man's Soul is a rational Being, as because Righteousness or perfect Virtue (as we are told *by Divine Revelation*) is immortal; and that it was Sin only that brought Death into the World. For since the State of Innocence was to have been eternal, this plainly shews, that such a state was most perfect and most natural. And therefore that Restitution unto such a State must be the most intrinsick and peculiar Pleasure.

V. LASTLY, it must be agreed, that the Desires of the Soul fly not to their Object, as it is intelligible, but as it is good or congruous, or grateful, or at least tending to these ends; and so filling the mind with all the Joys and Pleasure it can comprehend. Hence it is plain, that supreme Happiness is not barely to be placed in the Intellect; but her proper Seat must be called the *Boniform Faculty of the Soul*: namely, a Faculty of that divine Composition, and supernatural Texture, as enables us to distinguish not only what is simply and absolutely the best, but to relish it, and to have pleasure in that alone. Which Faculty much resembles that part of the Will

Vide in this Book, *L.* 3 *c.* 9. § 14, 15, 16.

which

which moves towards that which we judge to be abſolutely the beſt, when, as it were with an unquenchable thirſt and affection it is hurried on towards ſo pleaſing an Object; and being in poſſeſſion of it, is ſwallowed up in ſatisfaction that cannot be expreſt.

VI. He therefore who acts according to this Faculty, conforms to *the beſt and divineſt thing that is in us.* And this, as *Ariſtotle* notes, is neceſſary unto Happineſs. *For whether (* ſaith he *) it be the very mind of man, or ſomething elſe that, according to Nature, ſeems to govern and preſide within us, as having knowledge of what is moſt Lovely and Divine; or whether it be God himſelf that immediately operates; or elſe thoſe Gifts which we derive from above: this is plain, that ſuch inward Working and Conformity to Virtue's Law, is that which denominates true Happineſs.* Here the Philoſopher ſeems doubtful whether it be the *Intellect*, or any other Faculty *(* which yet bears Impreſſion of things *lovely* and *divine)* in whoſe Operation true Happineſs does conſiſt. Yet afterwards he takes part with the *Intellect*, and placeth Happineſs in Contemplation. But we preſume to ſay, this can be no *moral* Happineſs; ſince it would be confined to a few ſpeculative Men and Philoſophers, and ſo ſhut out the Bulk of Mankind, who could never be partakers thereof. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. c. 7.*

VII. Wherefore, we think, Happineſs ſhould be ſeated rather in that *Boniform Faculty* we

have ſpoke of; ſince it is the moſt elevated and moſt divine Faculty of the Soul, and ſeems to ſupply the ſame place in it, as the eſſential Good of the *Platonicks*, is ſaid to do in the Deity. As alſo becauſe the Study and Improvement of it is common to all men. For it is not above the Talent of the meaneſt, to love God, and his Neigbour very heartily. And, if this be done with Prudence and Purity of Life, it is the Completion of this Happineſs, and the very natural Fruit of this *exalted Faculty*.

And let no man think meanly thereof, ſince we are free to aver, that nothing of greater Benediction can betide us, either in the preſent, or in the future life, than ſuch a teſtimony of the *Divine Love*. But we ſhall elſewhere ſpeak more freely thereof.

VIII. We do therefore mention in our Definition of Happineſs, *the pleaſure which the mind enjoys from a ſenſe of Virtue*; becauſe there are ſome kinds of allowable pleaſure, ſuch as *Ariſtotle* calls *pure* and *generous*, and laughs at thoſe who think otherwiſe. *For ſuch* (ſays he) *as will not allow that any Pleaſure can be honeſt, are like thoſe Companions, who, not comprehending what Nectar is, do fanſie that the Gods drink Wine; inaſmuch as they themſelves know nothing better.*

Nicom. lib. 10. *c.* 6. *Magn. Moral. lib.* 2. *c.* 7.

IX. Now I affirm this pleaſure to ariſe from a *Senſe of Virtue*; and it is erroneous to think the Fruit of Virtue ſhould conſiſt in ſuch imaginary

inary knowledge as is gotten by bare Definitions of Virtue: for this amounts to no more, than if a man would pretend to know the Nature of Fire from the bare Picture of Fire, which can afford no Heat. All kind of Vital Goods (as I may take the liberty to call them) are by our Life and Senſes to be judged of, and enjoyed. And Virtue is in it ſelf an inward life, not an outward ſhape, or to be diſcovered by the Eye. According to that memorable Saying of *Plotinus: If you ever were the thing it ſelf, you may then be ſaid to have ſeen it.* But being once transformed into this life of Virtue, then indeed you behold the Beauties, and taſte the Pleaſures thereof; then you grow enamoured, and your Soul is taken up with Joys that cannot be uttered. However till you ſhall attain this State, and while this *Bleſſed Diſpoſition of the Soul* is not as yet awakened in you, 'tis fit you credit thoſe who are in the Fruition of it. Nor can that Saying of *Ariſtotle* be ever more opportunely urged than in this Caſe, *That Learners muſt believe.* For ſhould you venture to make judgment of the Pleaſure that is in Virtue, being as yet void of all Experience, it were to be feared, you would proſecute it ſo faintly, as never to obtain it, but be left to expiate your incredulity in this Life, by a too laſting puniſhment in the other.

Vide in this Book, *L.* 2. *c.* 2. § 5. & *c.* 3. § 1.

X. As to the preceding Words that are annexed to the Definition of Happineſs: Namely, *That it was made perfect by external Comforts:*

Comforts: How could this otherwiſe be? For ſince *Happineſs* conſiſts in that *Pleaſure*, which good men take in the Senſe of Virtue, and a Conſcience of Well-doing; no man can poſſeſs this *Happineſs*, if any pain be ſo intenſe upon him, as to diſtract the Mind, and extinguiſh all preſent Senſe of Pleaſure. Whence it plainly follows, that we muſt not lie under acute Diſeaſes, or want the Food that is needful. For the want of a Sufficiency for Nature; or a State of Captivity; or any Degree of Vaſſalage; are able to depreſs, as well as diſtract, the Mind by Cares and Anxiety. They hinder Happineſs from being in its Perfection, nor can Heroical Virtue produce ſo full a Crop.

Haud facilè emergunt, quorum virtutibus obſtat
Res anguſta domi —— —— ——

Magn. Moral. lib. 2. c. 8.

XI. WHEREFORE (as *Ariſtotle* ſaith) while we are Men, and carry about us the Frailties we are born to, we ſhall ever be wanting of *external Proſperity*. For complete Happineſs cannot be without thoſe two Ingredients, which the *Pythagoreans* termed *Praiſe* and *Comfort*; meaning *Praiſe that reſults from Virtue, and Comfort from good Fortune*. This we ſufficiently noted before to be the *Pythagoreans* Doctrine. And *Ariſtotle*, in his great Morals, ſtrikes again upon the ſame Note; affirming, *That without external Comforts, it was impoſſible to be happy.*

Moral. Nicom. lib. 10. c. 9.

Magn. Moral.

12. How-

XII. However he inclines much to a *Mediocrity* herein, and quotes *Solon* for it: *That a Man may do all things that are fit for him, out of a moderate Estate.* For as to *Excess of Wealth*, it rather choaks up the Way to Virtue, than mends the Path. *Archytas* compares Wealth unto *Wine*, and to *Light*; saying, that one blinded the *Eyes*, and the other turned the *Brains*, of very good Men, when they were in excess. Whence *Aristotle*, when he interprets the Answer of *Anaxagoras*, does not make his happy Man to be either a Potentate, or a Man of overgrown Riches; *But the Man that was full of Innocence, free from Pain, and who had some share of Divine Contemplation.* This was his happy Man. *Moral. Eudem. lib. 1. c. 4.*

Chap. III.

Of Virtue in general: and of Right Reason.

I. Virtue *is an intellectual Power of the Soul, by which it over-rules the animal Impressions or bodily Passions; so as in every Action it easily pursues what is absolutely and simply the best.*

Here it seems fit, in the Definition, to call Virtue rather a *Power* than a *Habit*. First, because the word *Virtue* implies as much, and signifies the same thing as Fortitude. And next *L. 3. c. 1. § 3.*

next because an *Habit* is not essential to Virtue. For if a Man had this *intellectual Power* born in him, he would doubtless be virtuous, tho it came not to him in the way of repeated Actions, such as constitute a Habit. For it is not the external Causes, but the internal, which make the essence of a thing. Besides it is this Idea of Virtue which elevates and inclines the mind to love her, and tread in her ways, and which argues Virtue to be a quick and vigorous heat, by which the mind is easily and irresistibly moved to do things which are good and honorable. So that we esteem this very Notion of Virtue able to rowze up men from Sloth and Lethargy, and make those ashamed, who on a few moderate Performances think to set up for Men of Virtue.

H. We term this a *Power intellectual*, not only because of its situation, which is in the *intellectual* part of the Soul (and not in the *animal* part of it, where that Power resides which governs the Members) but also because it is always excited by some Principle which is *intellectual* or rational. By animal *Impressions* we understand every motion of the Body, which being obtruded with any sort of Violence on the Soul, brings danger of Sin and Error, if not carefully watched.

Therefore all such Delusions and Imaginations, as strongly assault the Mind, may fitly be referred to this Head. By *Actions*, I mean all Motions made by the Soul upon deliberation, which is to say, all such as may properly

properly be termed human Actions; whether they be such as the School-men call *Elicitæ* or *Imperatæ*: that is, whether they do immediately proceed from the Soul it self; or whether they are occasioned from any outward Impressions made upon the Soul. Under which Heads we may rightly comprehend the accepting or refusing any Philosophical Opinion, whether Physical or Metaphysical. And so of any thing else.

III. As to the *Pursuit of the Soul*, we spake of; this was to set off, and more openly express the *intellectual Power*: for if it had not that force to pursue, it would not be Virtue, but only a Disposition towards it. So *Theages* the *Pythagorean* hath it: *That Reason doth not beget in us a Continency and Forbearance, but by putting a forcible Restraint upon Lust and Anger. And that when the Passions do overcome, and put the same forcible restraint upon Reason, she then gives place to Incontinency, and a softness of mind which receives all Impressions; when as bare Dispositions without such a forcible restraint, can only produce imperfect Virtues, and imperfect Vices.*

Wherefore the Philosopher makes these interchangeable Conflicts, and Dispositions of the Soul, to be but Virtues half perfect, as also the Vices but half inveterate.

And whereas we say, the Soul pursues what was *absolutely and simply the best*, this was to manifest that famous distinction of a twofold Good;

Good; one *General*, which was *absolute good*, or *absolutely better*. The other *Particular*, and which in respect of some *single Inclination of any particular person*, was *good or better*: that is to say, either grateful, or more grateful. But what we hold to be the *absolute Good*, or *better thing*, is that which proves grateful, or more grateful, to the *Boniform Faculty of the Soul*, which we have already pronounced to be a *Thing Divine*.

Moral. Nicom. l. 6. c. 13.

IV. ARISTOTLE seems to me, in his Ethics to *Nicomachus*, to point at this very Faculty, saying, *That what is best, in whatever Subject it be, is not apparent, but to a good Man*. By which he means, that men do discover that which is best in every Subject (I mean really and simply best) not as they are *knowing*, but as they are *Good*. So that methinks he had spoken more correctly had he styled this Faculty, *The very Eye of the Soul*, than to call it that sort of Natural *Industry* which seems too much bordering upon Craft. But forasmuch as no man can feel the Motives and Dictates of this Divine Faculty, but one who hath attained to it by diligent application, we must have recourse to some middle Principle to serve as *Mercury* did of old, and be an Interpreter between God and Man. And for this we shall constitute that which we call *Right Reason*. Wherefore that certainly *is absolutely and simply the best*, which according to the Circumstances of the Case in question, comes up closest to *Right Reason*, or is rather consentaneous with it.

V. For *Right Reaſon, which is in Man, is a ſort of Copy or Tranſcript of that Reaſon or Law eternal which is regiſtred in the Mind Divine.* However this Law is not by Nature made otherwiſe known unto us, than as 'tis communicated and reflected on our Minds by the ſame Right Reaſon, and ſo ſhines forth. But by how much it ſhines forth, by ſo much doth it oblige the Conſcience, even as a Law Divine inſcribed in our Hearts. To this very Senſe the *Pythagoreans* pronounced of Virtue: *That it was the Habit of doing what ought to be done.* They did not barely intend, *The doing what was equal, and in a Mean, or doing what needed neither Addition nor Subſtraction, as being already what it ought to be:* But the doing that which was *obligatory*, and of Duty, and according to a Law which was immutable. And ſo alſo did *Epictetus* famouſly pronounce, *What ever appears to be beſt, let that be your inviolable Law.*

VI. The heighth of Virtue is this, conſtantly to purſue that which to Right Reaſon ſeems beſt. For indeed ſhe her ſelf is even abſolutely and ſimply that beſt, not only as ſhe is ſo conſonant to *Divine* Reaſon, which does nothing partially for the ſake of this or that particular: but as ſhe generouſly dictates, like to a common *Parent*, ſuch Laws as tend, in their own Nature, to the Happineſs of all Mankind. Hence *Ariſtotle* calls God, *the Law eternal, as regarding every way with equal Benignity.* So alſo *De Mundo, cap. 6.*

alſo, as well among the *Pythagoreans* as th
Stoicks, it was held, *That to follow God*, or
follow Nature, was juſt the ſame thing as
follow *Right Reaſon*. For this alone is th
which conſtitutes our Nature, and diſtinguiſh
a Man from a Beaſt.

VII. YET after all, as *Ariſtotle* himſelf
fain often to confeſs, tho it be eaſie to agre
this Beſt to be that which to Right Reaſon
conſonant; yet what this Right Reaſon is, o
what is the meaſure of it, ſeems a moſt diffi
cult matter truly to reſolve. The Philoſophe
having (in his great Morals) brought in on
who demands, what Right Reaſon was, an
where to be found? The Anſwer is but darkl
thus, *That unleſs a Man have within himſel
a Senſe of things of this Nature, there is n
thing to be done.* It was indeed the An
ſwer which a Phyſician gave to one who aske
him, how he ſhould diſtinguiſh, which wa
the paleneſs that argued a man to be ill of a
Ague. But the ſame Philoſopher preſently
ſubjoins, *That it was the like Caſe, as t
make no Judgment of the Paſſions; namely
That by ſome Senſe and Feeling of them
the Conjecture was to be made.* So that in
ſhort the final Judgment upon this matter, i
all referred to *inward Senſe*, which I confeſs, I
ſhould rather have called, *The Bonniform Faculty
of the Soul.* However, as *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere
notes, of Men who by a ſort of Violence, and
without Reaſon, are hurried on to good, I
muſt own, that whoever is ſo affected, differs
but

Magn. Moral. lib. 2. c. 10.

Magn. Moral. lib. 2. c. 8.

Lib. 3. c. 12. § 2, 3.

but little from them who are inſpired. And certainly this Principle which I call the *Boniform Faculty*, is the moſt divine thing within us, but hath nothing in it that ſavours of Fanaticiſm.

VIII. THE Philoſopher, in another place, defines *Right Reaſon* thus, *That ſuch Reaſon was right, as was conformable to Prudence.* Now whereas *Prudence* it ſelf is nothing but that natural *Sagacity*, or well cultivated *Diligence* of the Mind; which he elſewhere calls, *The very Eye of the Soul*: This only brings back the ſame anſwer as before; reſolving right Reaſon rather into an *inward Senſe*, or an *inward Faculty* of *Divination*; than into any certain and diſtinct Principles, by which a Man might judge of that which in every thing were the beſt. *Moral. Eudem. l. 5. c. 13.*

IX. HOWEVER, the ſame Philoſopher is at laſt, towards the end of his *Eudemicks*, very clear and very appoſite in this Matter. For when he brings the ſame queſtion on the ſtage, the Reſolution is as follows, '*That we are in this, as in other Occaſions, to regulate our Lives by the Dictates of our internal Regent; that we muſt aſpire to ſuch habits, as may enable us to imitate the high Character of ſuch a Regent, and to conform thereto in all things.*' Which amounts to this, that our Conſciences muſt be kept pure and immaculate. For he adds, *That as human Nature does conſiſt of two parts, the one to command, the other to obey: ſo by inſtitution in all Governments, the inferiors are tyed to be ſubject to the Rulers.* *Moral. Eudem. l. 7. c. 15.*

That alſo this Government is of a double ſort. For juſt as Phyſick requires one thing, and Health another, and that the firſt is but in order to the latter; even ſo it fares in contemplating the Ways of God. He, as the high and ſupreme Governor, firſt ſends his Edicts forth; but the end and deſignation of them is to beget prudence in the heart of Man: and then the work of prudence is to diſtinguiſh what in human affairs is beſt. Now as to God, he already is all-ſufficient, and wants nothing; wherefore we may infer, that whatever choice, or whatever acquiſition of natural Gifts we have, which may moſt contribute to annex the Soul to God by contemplation; this ſurely is the beſt, and this the nobleſt Meaſure for all our Deliberations. As on the other ſide, whatever is ſo deficient, or ſo redundant as to interrupt our Contemplation of God, or of the Homage we owe him, this of all things is the vileſt.

This was the Anſwer given, which, for Truth and Divinity, ſavours not ſo much of the Philoſopher, as of an Oracle.

X. YET let us add what he writes, to the ſame effect, unto *Nicomachus*. He ſays, *That as to the Gods, their whole Being was a continued Series of Happineſs; but as to Man, that he had nothing of it farther, than as he held reſemblance with his Divine Original.* Now he ſhould have remembered, that the Divine Life was not a matter of Sapience only, but was principally to conſiſt in Love, Benignity, and in Beneficence or Well-doing. For theſe are the Fruits of that Celeſtial Particle of the Soul,

Lib. 10. *c.* 8.

Soul, which we term the *Boniform*; and by which, above any other Acceſſions, we are made moſt like unto Almighty God.

XI. PYTHAGORAS, according to what *Elian* ſaid of him, made a happy Conjunction of theſe two things, ſaying, *The Gods had been bountiful to Mortals in two eminent Bleſſings, namely, to ſpeak the truth, and, to act righteouſly: for that both of theſe bore reſemblance unto the Works of the immortal Gods.* Which is to ſay, that the Perfection of Divine Life is made up of *Truth* and *Well-doing*. Wherefore, if men will abide by the Judgment of *Ariſtotle* or *Pythagoras*, or others of the moſt celebrated, they muſt own that the Meaſure of *Right Reaſon* is to imitate the Divine Wiſdom, and the Divine Goodneſs, with all our Might. To which alſo we may refer, and ſo expound, that ſaying of *Theages* the *Pythagorean*: *That the ſource, cauſe and meaſure of human Felicity, does conſiſt in the knowledge of ſuch things as are moſt excellent, and moſt divine.* *Var. Hiſt. l. 12. c. 50.*

Chap. IV.

Certain Axioms or Intellectual Principles; into which almoſt all the Reaſons of Morality may be reduced.

I. BUT ſince there is a Race of Men in the World, who are quite ſeared up as to God, and all that is Divine; who allow no ſuch thing as Superiority in the Faculties, but aſſert Obedience to that Paſſion in particular, which ſhall happen to uſurp above the reſt, and make it the top of human Felicity to fullfil the deſires thereof: To ſuch as theſe, who would injuriouſly paſs for men, which they are not; we muſt proceed by other ſteps than what are already ſet down. For we muſt not talk of our *Boniform Faculty*, as the meaſure of Right Reaſon, and flowing from the divine part of the Soul, but merely inſiſt with them upon what refers to the Intellect: ſince, as *Ariſtotle* notes, *ſome things are intelligible, tho men know not the reaſon why.*

Moral. Eudem. l. 3. c. 8.

II. From this Magazine therefore let us draw forth a ſtock of ſuch Principles, as being immediately and irreſiſtibly true, need no proof; ſuch, I mean, as all Moral Reaſon may in a ſort have reference unto; even as all Mathematical Demonſtrations are found in ſome *firſt undeniable Axioms.* And becauſe theſe

these Principles arise out of that Faculty, which the *Greeks* call Νοῦς, that signifies the Mind or Intellect; and that the Words *Noema* and *Noemata* derive therefrom, and properly signifie Rules intellectual: we do not therefore improperly stile the Rules that hereafter follow, *Moral Noema's*. But, lest any should fansie them to be morose and unpracticable, I must here affirm, they propose nothing for good, which at the same time is not grateful also, and attended with delight.

NOEMA I.

Good is that which is grateful, pleasant, and congruous to any Being, which hath Life and Perception, or that contributes in any degree to the preservation of it.

NOEMA II.

But, on the other side, whatever is ungrateful, unpleasant, or any ways incongruous to any Being which hath Life and Perception, is evil. And if it finally tend to the destruction of that being, it is the worst of evils.

As for example-sake, if any thing should not only offend your Eyes or Ears, but bring also blindness and deafness upon you; this were the worst that could happen. But if the sight and hearing were but only impaired thereby, this were but an inferior Evil. And the Reason holds the same in the other Faculties.

NOEMA III.

Among the several kinds or degrees of sensible Beings which are in the world, some are better and more excellent than others.

NOEMA IV.

One Good may excel another in Quality, or Duration, or in both.

This is self-evident: yet it may be illustrated from this absurdity, that otherwise one Life would not be better, nor one sort of Happiness greater than another: so as Gods, Angels, Men, Horses, and the vilest Worm, would be happy alike; which none but a mad man can fancy. And as to Duration there is no scruple thereof.

NOEMA V.

What is good is to be chosen; what is evil to be avoided: but the more excellent Good is preferable to the less excellent: and a less Evil is to be born, that we may avoid a greater.

NOEMA VI.

In things of which we have no experience, we must believe those who profess themselves to have experience. Provided always that there be no suspicion of fraud or worldly contrivance, but

but that there be a Conformity between their Profeſſions and their Lives.

NOEMA VII.

'Tis more eligible to want a Good, which for weight and duration is very great, than to bear an Evil of the ſame proportion. And by how much any Evil ſhall in weight and duration exceed the Good, by ſo much the more willingly can we be without ſuch Good.

NOEMA VIII.

That which muſt certainly come to paſs, ought to be reputed as preſent; inaſmuch as the future will one day come upon us. And herein ſome proportion of Reaſon holds in things future, which are very probable.

NOEMA IX.

Good things, which excel leſs, are diſtinguiſhed by Weight and Duration, from thoſe things which excel more.

NOEMA X.

A preſent Good is to be rejected or moderated, if there be a future Good of infinite more value, as to weight and duration to be but probably expected: and much more therefore if ſuch expectation be certain.

NOEMA XI.

A present Evil is to be born, if there be probable future Evil infinitely more dangerous as to weight and duration, to be avoided thereby and this is much more strongly incumbent, if the future evil be certain.

NOEMA XII.

A mind which is free from the prejudices that attend passion, judges more uprightly than a mind which by such passions, or any other corporeal Impressions is solicited or disturbed. For even as a cloudy Sky, and turbulent Sea will neither transmit or reflect any Light; so a disturbed mind admits no Reason, tho it come never so plain and clear.

Boethius sets this forth in very elegant Verse, which thus begins,

Nubibus atris Fundere possunt
Condita nullum Sydera Lumen, &c,

The Stars, tho of themselves so bright,
When hid in Clouds can give no light.

III. And these are those Rules or *Noemata*, which almost suffice to engender in the Soul that *Prudence*, *Temperance*, and *Fortitude* which regard the Duties *we owe our selves*. Those which follow regard what we owe *unto others*;

thers; as to *God*, to *Man*, and to *Virtue* it ſelf. And therefore they are the Rules and Principles of *Sincerity*, *Juſtice*, *Gratitude*, *Mercy* and *Piety*. For I account *Piety* among the Moral Virtues, inaſmuch as God may by the Light of Nature be known.

NOEMA XIII.

We muſt purſue the greateſt and moſt perfect Good with the greateſt zeal, and leſſer Goods with a zeal proportionably leſs. Nor muſt we ſubordinate greater Goods to leſs, but leſs to greater.

NOEMA XIV.

The Good, which in any caſe in queſtion, you would have another man do unto you; the ſame you are bound in the like caſe, to do unto him; So far forth as it may be done without prejudice to a Third.

NOEMA XV.

The Evil you would not have done to your ſelf, you muſt abſtain from doing the ſame to another, as far as may be done without prejudice to a Third.

NOEMA XVI.

Return good for good, and not evil for good.

NOEMA

NOEMA XVII.

'Tis good for a man to have wherewithal live well and happily.

NOEMA XVIII.

If it be good for one man to have wherewith to be happy; it evidently follows, 'tis twice good for two men to be happy, thrice for three, thousand times for a thousand; and so of the rest.

NOEMA XIX.

'Tis better that one man be disabled from livi voluptuously, than that another should live in wa and calamity.

NOEMA XX.

'Tis good to obey the Magistrate in things in different, even where there is no penalty to disobe

NOEMA XXI.

'Tis better to obey God than Men, or even ou own Appetites.

NOEMA XXII.

'Tis good and just to give every man what is his due, as also the use and possession thereof without any trouble. NOEMA

NOEMA XXIII.

However 'tis manifeſt, that a man may ſo behave himſelf, as that what was his own by acquiſition or donation, may of right ceaſe to be his own.

IV. THESE and ſuch like *Sayings* may juſtly be called *Moral Axioms* or *Noemas*: for they are ſo clear and evident of themſelves, that, if men conſider impartially, they need no manner of Deduction or Argument, but are agreed to as ſoon as heard. And thus we are prepared, as with ſo many Touchſtones, to let the inquiſitive know what *Right Reaſon* is. For in ſhort, *it is that which by certain and neceſſary Conſequences, is at length reſolved into ſome intellectual Principle which is immediately true.*

And if any ask after Examples in this kind, that are ſuited to Morality, they may have recourſe to ſuch as are above recited.

CHAP.

Chap. V.

To ſhew which are the Faculties whereby we do find and underſtand what is ſimply and in its own nature good.

I. IT is now manifeſt, there is ſomething which is ſimply and abſolutely good, which in all human Actions is to be ſought for. That it's Nature, Eſſence, and Truth are to be judged of by *Right Reaſon*; but that the reliſh and delectation thereof, is to be taken in by the *Boniform Faculty*. Alſo that all Moral Good, properly ſo called, is *Intellectual* and *Divine*: *Intellectual*, as the Truth and Eſſence of it is defined and comprehended by the Intellect: and *Divine*, as the Savour and Complacency thereof, is moſt effectually taſted through that high Faculty, by which we are lifted up and cleave unto God, (that Almighty One, who is the moſt pure and abſolute Good, and who never will any thing but what is tranſcendently the Beſt.) So that for a man thus to know, and thus to aſcend, is not only the higheſt Wiſdom, but the higheſt Felicity. And it is by this Gradation toward things divine, or by this Flower and Perfection of the Soul, that we attain to a ſort of Coalition with what is perfectly the Beſt. So it was ſaid of old;

Objectum quoddam eſt quod mentis flore prehendas.

II. Now

II. Now as to those men who shall either wilfully or advisedly reject the Truth of our Axiom's, 'tis easie to guess by this distrelish, what are the Faculties they consult. Nay, 'tis plain they set up for the *animal Appetite*; and openly declare, that what pleases them most, is only the best. But tho we may here venture to call this a poor brutal delusion, yet these things are most properly referred unto, in the Chapter of *Temperance*.

III. In the mean time, for what relates even to *Justice*, the Sentiments of those Gentlemen are nothing better. They will not allow for the chiefest Good that which is absolutely and in its own nature just; but that which to *themselves* looks well, without any regard to their Neighbors. And if you enquire into the state of this *Good* they so indulge, and so pursue, they make it no secret to tell you plainly, it is what affords best entertainment to their *Senses*. Alas, how deplorable is it, that man should ever value himself upon such an affinity with the Beast! Nay, in human shape to become the very Beast! Whereas he has Title to think higher of himself, and to be one and the same with what is most eminent within him; or what in Dignity stands next thereto: which is doubtless his *Intellect* and *Right Reason*.

IV. For as in Numeration the Sum Total is accounted from the last Unite, so is it in other matters; the last and most perfect essential difference makes a Thing to be what it is,

is, and doth distinguish it from all Thi
else. Wherefore, if any man shall make
sole good to be that, which to himself
grateful, as insisting wholly on the delecta
of his *animal Appetite*, he plainly publi
himself for a Brute. But if he means and
tends such grateful thing, as to the Intelle
or Right Reason, or to the *Boniform Facu*
is suitable: This indeed (as *Plotinus* saith
is the Object of a *perfect Man*, I mean of
intellectual Man, and for such you may p
nounce him.

V. For this is the plain Character of
intellectual Life, that as in the search of Tru
it is not inquired what may seem true to a
one Body of Men, tho ever so numero
much less to any man in particular, but wh
is simply and absolutely the Truth: so neith
doth it set up that for good, which to any o
man, or to any number of men, appears
such; but that which really and absolutely
so; and which, in like Circumstances eve
intellectual Creature is bound to elect,
the animal Nature never so averse. Now
it happens in *specious Arithmetick*, that eve
signal Operation stands afterwards for
Theorem or Conclusion: so in Morals
such preference and election, as we ha
mentioned, stand for an eternal President,
guide our actions in all like cases, when c
cumstances are the same. And let us acquies
therein, and acknowledge the Truth ther
of, tho it prove never so ungrateful to o
Appetite

Appetites, and ſeem quite contrary to our external ſenſe.

VI. WHEREFORE as it is an Error in the Intellect, to reſign it ſelf ſo far to the Imagination, or to the Senſe, as but to waver in the purſuit of *Truth*: So doubtleſs is it an Error in the Will, to be ſo captivated, as to reſign it ſelf to the animal Appetite, and to forſake what is abſolutely good. For if the Will may want at ſome ſeaſons that reliſh of good which it ought to have; this is merely the Will's neglect, in not exciting that divine Faculty, by which we not only know what is beſt, but are elevated, and even raviſhed when we enjoy it. For it is plain, that when we open our Eyes, ſuch are the Charms of this Joy, that a man would rather venture a thouſand deaths, than by any baſe prevarication to hazard his portion in a ſtate of life, which is ſo deſirable and ſo divine.

VII. WHEREFORE as it is now plain, that ſomething there is, which of its own nature, and inconteſtably is *true*: ſo is there ſomewhat which of its own nature is ſimply *good*. Alſo that as the former is comprehended by the Intellect, ſo the ſweetneſs and delight of the latter is reliſhed by the *Boniform Faculty*. Wherefore as to thoſe who pronounce every thing good, ſo far as at any rate it can be grateful, and ſo eſtabliſh it for the ſtandard of human Actions; this is Madneſs it ſelf, inaſmuch as hereby they rank the Wiſe, the Fools, and the Mad-men, all in the

the ſame ſtate. Nay, perhaps they here prefer the Fools and Mad-men before t Wiſe; ſince theſe are the moſt likely to pe ſiſt againſt all Senſe and Reaſon, and to ſhe by that which is *grateful*, let it be never deſtructive, vile or ridiculous.

VIII. Some there are, I confeſs, who ſpea a little more cautiouſly in this Matter, an would have the man they call *wiſe*, have *Sel preſervation* ſtill in his eye, how inordinate ſ ever they allow him in all the reſt. By whic they ſhew, that if their Fool or Mad-man ca but here be ſhot-free; they little conſider o Immortality, or the Fruits of ſolid Wiſdom However it is plain to every man of Senſe that a bare ſelf-preſervation is not a deſirabl thing; for ſuch may be the Scorns and Scourge of this Life, that none but a ſtupid Creatur would in ſuch Circumſtances deſire to live

But laſtly, if according to them, Life an Conſervation be ſo valuable, it muſt alſo follow, that the more durable theſe are, the are ſo much the better, and that the moſt du rable is beſt of all. Furthermore, if ſuch ſelf-conſervation of one man be really good

Noema 18. it is doubly ſo to preſerve two men, an thrice as much to ſave three, and ſo for ward. Whence by the Light of Nature, it is manifeſt, that every intellectual Creature ſtands bound to provide, both in preſent an in future, for his own, and his Neigh bor's Preſervation, ſo far forth as in him lies and as it may conſiſt without doing prejudice

to a third. This is what certainly fulfils not only a great part of *Justice*, but of temperance, and indeed of every other Virtue.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Passions in general, and of the Helps they afford.

I. WHAT *Virtue* is in the general we have already fixed. And now before we descend to the several sorts or Species thereof, it will not be amiss to premise somewhat of the *Passions*, about which such Virtues are conversant; so as to explain their Nature, their Use, or their Disadvantage: and thereby prepare the Mind to take in such an Idea of *Virtue*, as may be *full and adequate*.

II. BUT by *Passions* I do not barely understand such as are commonly handled in Moral Philosophy, but every other corporeal Impression, which hath force enough to blind the Mind, or abuse the Judgment, in discerning what in every case were the best. Wherefore I add hereunto all sorts of fantastick Notions and false Impressions that are grown pertinacious, and which either by ill custom, or the Power of Education, or by *internal Proclivity*, so seise upon the Mind, as to lead us into any apparent Error. For Virtue ought to

reach [illegible] her Authority to the weeding [illegible] even [illegible] these remote Evils, lest the Mind be shaken, when it should judge; or perverted in the Prosecution of that which is simply the best.

Yet first we shall treat of those Passions which are properly so called; such as are *Love*, *Hatred*, *Anger*, and the rest of that kind. Concerning all which we must maintain it against the *Stoicks*, that of their own Nature they are good; and that the Intendments of Divine Providence are not less understood by their Use, than by the Structure of those Organs, which compose every animal Body.

Vide in this Book, *L.* 1. *c.*6. § 2.

III. The Use and Utility of them may in the general be even illustrated thus; that when Passions happen to be joined with a more vehement agitation of the Spirits, they seem to perform in a Man (whom some call *the little World*) what the Winds do in the greater. For as these purge and purifie the Air, so those cleanse and defecate the Blood, and suffer it not by stagnation to corrupt.

IV. Also these Passions play upon the Soul in a thousand shapes, and the Scenes of Fancy are so charming, and so variously obtruded, that they often tempt, and even combat with the Understanding. Yet as we get experience, and are made stronger by this Warfare; so is there a new Joy excited in us to see, that notwithstanding all such assaults or the insolence of those Delusions, yet we are sensible of a divine Principle within us, which

which we call the *Mind*, (that Heavenly Spark, which holds steady in the midst of all such Commotions) by which we bear up and maintain the same sense, stability and judgment we had; and finally and inseparably adhere to that which is simply the best. *L. 1. c. 6. § 8.*

V. BESIDES, from such Conflict and such Victory, it is plain, there is a certain Government or Empire acknowledged to be in the Soul; and that the intellectual part hath something which it doth teach and instruct, as a Father doth his Sons; or which it breeds and trains up, as in a lower instance, a Huntsman doth his Dogs. *Aristotle* intimates something to this purpose, when he makes two parts in the Soul, which do in a manner both partake of Reason: *The one properly of it self, and in its own right; the other as it were a Son obeying his Father.* And here he understands that part of the Soul which exciteth towards Concupiscence and Appetite. For he saith, *That the vegetative part partakes not at all of Reason; but that the concupiscible part, and (more universally) the appetitive part of the Soul, does in a sort partake of Reason: inasmuch as it hearkens to what Reason inculcates, and is subjected to the Commands thereof.* And yet, with favor from so great a Man, it is not plain, but that the very *Plastic Part* of the Soul (I mean the seminal, or formative part) which he here calls the *Vegetative*, does also in some degree submit to Reason. For that all those natural Appetites and Eruptions, which *Ethic. Nicom. lib. 1. c. 13.*

we observe, are not so much the Fruits and Effects of the *Perceptive Part*, as of the *Plastic*.

VI. Doubtless the Source and Fountain of these is in the *Plastic Part*, whose chief Seat is in the *Heart*; but the sense and feeling of them is in the *perceptive part*, whose Seat is in the *Brain*. And whereas both these Parts are essentially, vitally, and inseparably the same; it is no wonder if the perceptive part be solicited and wrought upon, and even hurried away by the Passions. It is true these Passions, are of themselves, but as blind Instincts of Nature, such as perhaps are found in the very Plants; unto whom Youth and and Old Age do also agree. But they are conspicuous in living Creatures, as in Birds, when they build their Nests, or hatch their young Ones. Also in Men these Instincts are not only seen, but are, by distinct and reflex Operation of the Mind, known to proceed from some other Cause: as either from the *Plastic* Part of the Soul alone; or else as it is in conjunction with that universal Plastic Principle, which by us is termed *the Spirit of Nature*. And perhaps the same is pointed at by *Aristotle* himself in that Axiom which he so often repeats, *That Nature does nothing in vain*.

L. 1. *c.* 8. § 1.

L. 1. *c.* 12. § 2.

VII. For as there is a formative or seminal Principle of all Plants, and the like of all animal Bodies; into which Nature hath infused, and then excited, such Operations and

Instincts

inſtincts, as tend to the continuance of every individual production; ſo more eſpecially are thoſe Inſtincts fixed, which tend to the ſupport and preſervation of the Species; as (namely) the act of Generating, and that alſo of a paſſionate Concern in every Creature towards their young. The power of this latter is wonderfully ſeen in the diſſection of a living Bitch with Whelps: for if you but hurt any of the young ones in her ſight, ſhe barks, and is greatly diſquieted; but if you reach them towards her mouth, ſhe forgets her own condition, and falls with a tender kindneſs to the licking of them in the midſt of all her Torments. This ſtrange ſight is reported by *Realdus Columbus*, to have been often expoſed by him in the publick Theatre at his Anatomical Diſſections. *De re anatomicâ, lib.* 14.

VIII. HENCE it appears, that all the animal Inſtincts and Impulſes do belong to the Region of Nature, and are but imperfect Shadows and Footſteps of the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs, which vouchſafes as in this manner to glimmer in the dark. And theſe are thoſe Rudiments and Primordials, againſt which, by the help of a more pure and celeſtial Light, we do contend, as often as they invade the Limits of the ſuperior Law. That is to ſay, the *Intellectual* Part of the Soul ſtrives with the *Plaſtic*; which, tho fiercely abetted and incited by the *Spirit of Nature* in ſome certain Deſires and Appetites; yet on the other ſide, a Divine Power is at hand, *L.* 1. *c.* 12. § 8.

L. 1. c. 6. § 4. urging reſiſtance againſt all ſuch incantations and ſtill aſſerting a preference to what is no honorable, and ſimply the beſt.

IX. THERE is a witty conceit, tho inſu ficiently grounded, as if the Soul ſhould be ſh penn'd up in a certain glandulous part of t Brain, called the *Conarion*. That this gland lous part being thus animated and defended b the Soul on the one hand (as in its proper Ga riſon) ſhould on the other be attacked by th darts and aſſaults of the Spirits (even as it we ſome Pigmy that with a Feather or a Twi were employed in beating of the Winds) an that herein ſhould conſiſt that hoſtility of th inferior part of the Soul with the ſuperior which the Divines call, *The War between th Fleſh and the Spirit.*

X. HOWEVER, thus much is manifeſt that there is within us a certain Principality o Empire, and that our mind is not a mere ſol L. 1. c. 8. § 2. tary Inſpector; but rather as a Regent, which i attended and fortified with numerous Guards and does not barely command over its own Paſſions, but over the *Spirit* of *Nature*; ſo a by a diviner Magick not only to repel, bu even vanquiſh the Temptations and Sorcerie thereof.

XI. FROM all which it is further plain that by the ſervice of the Paſſions, our Life L. 1. c. 8. § 3. and our Senſes are more dilated, and alſo L. 1. c. 12. § 11. quickened: even as *Plato* noted in his *Phæ drus*, *That the Affections were as the Wings an the Chariots of the Mind.*

XII.

XII. Des Cartes also says very happily, that the Passions seem to be a most certain and solid Treasure of the Soul. For altho (says he) we are apt to be deceived by the many other ways of Perception, and cannot be certain if things be the same as they are represented; yet as to the Passions, there is not room for Deception in them, since they are so annexed to the Soul, that it were impossible to feel them, if they were not; and that they must needs have a Being, inasmuch as they are felt. Hence, by a sense of Virtue ariseth a wonderful Peace and Tranquility to the Mind; a permanent sweetness and complacency which is never to be repented of. It surmounts not only all those Pleasures which conclude with Repentance, and Bitterness of the Soul; but excels all Opinions and Philosophical Speculations whatsoever. This certainly upon many other accounts is so, besides that main one, that in those matters a man may almost ever be doubting. But in this, which is Passion, and not Opinion, there can be no room for doubt. *L.* 2 *c.* 9. § 12.

XIII. Last of all, besides this Use of the Passions (which is almost common to all of them) that they strike, or rather ingrave the Soul with a more lively Impression of the Object; there is another use of them deserving notice; as namely, the rating of things that are laudable and just according as we find our Passions excited by them, or as they are felt and relished by a sort of Connexion with

our Souls. For passionate affecting is the most intimate and immediate Fruit of Life; and tho we may adorn the best of things with superficial and imaginary approbation, yet our Souls are not able, without such Passion, to wed the Object, and, as it were, to intermix it with our Sense and Life. Nay, we know not how by any other ways to discover the Union there is between our Souls and those Objects, unless we have an equal antipathy against things vile and ignoble, whether in our selves or others. For this is the nature of true Virtue, to love the best things, and hate the worst, even to abhorrence, in whomsoever they appear. Evil in one man is evil in another, and is detestable as being such. And it is the most perfect state of Life, to love good things, and to hate the bad, at least; to bear them with indignation, whenever they are obtruded upon us. For this gives testimony that the inferior part of the Soul submits, and is overawed by the superior; and that the whole man is as it were in the fiery Chariot of his Affections, *Elias*-like, carried up towards God and Heaven.

XIV. But if any man shall, under a pretended affectation of *Peace*, *Prudence*, or *Tranquillity*, set up for submitting to any lewd usurpation over the common Rights of Mankind, and the eternal Laws of Virtue; and yet, upon every trivial affront to himself, flie out and even burn with indignation and wrath; this were Hypocrisie in such a de-

gree,

gree, as not barely to deſerve Scorn, but Deteſtation.

XV. PASSIONS therefore are not only good, but ſingularly needful to the perfecting of human life. Yet muſt they be with theſe two Conditions. Firſt that our Deſires ſteer towards a proper Object, which may be called, *The true Impulſe:* For thoſe who offend herein are the worſt of ſinners; ſuch as are the malicious, and thoſe that delight in Blood and Tortures, and others of that ſtrain.

The ſecond Rule is, That the Deſires be adequate to the Object, or the End; and that (according to the thirteenth *Noema*) the beſt and greateſt things be purſued with our chiefeſt Paſſion; the middle things with leſs; and the loweſt with the leaſt. But this alſo in ſuch ſort, as never to allow any ſuch violence in the Deſire, as may either eclipſe the Light of Reaſon, or obſtruct that end to which Nature aſpires, by the help of thoſe Affections wherewith ſhe has endowed our Souls. So that this Rule we may call, *A moderate Impulſe of the Paſſions.*

XVI. BUT if any man ſhould propoſe the rooting up of all Deſires, in order to free the Soul from Diſcord; and to end all ſtrife and combuſtion which the Paſſions maintain againſt the Soul, or among themſelves: This to me would ſound no better, than as if one, to prevent Diſcord on the Harp, ſhould let down all the Strings; or than as if another ſhould with Drugs ſet all the Humors of his Body *L. 1. c. 12. § 9.*

Body in a Ferment, for fear of falling sick. Wherefore *Theages* the *Pythagorean* said very elegantly; *That it was not the part of Virtue to discharge the Passions of the Soul, such as Pleasure and Pain; but to temper them aright.* He also after this extends himself in that double similitude we have mentioned, about a due mixture in the Humors of the Body, and a right Harmony in the tuning of the String, which we need not here repeat.

XVII. But what is now to be the Rule and Measure by which the Desires are to be temper'd and rectified, the two Conditions afore-mentioned do set forth. And to one of these, that famous Declaration of the *Orator* may be referred. *He therefore* (says *Tully*) *whoever it be that by Constancy and Moderation is of a quiet Mind, and at peace with himself; who is neither wasted with Troubles, or distracted with Fears, nor burnt up with Thirst of any inordinate Passion, or undoing himself with vain and trivial Delights: This is the wise man whom we long to behold. And he also is the happy Man, to whom nothing can arrive in human Affairs so intolerable, as to depress his mind, or yet so joyful as to transport him. But on the other side, when we see a Man inflamed with Lust, and mad with Ambition, catching at all things with insatiable Avarice, and that the more his Wealth pours in, or his Pleasures abounded, the more ravenous he became: This* (saith *Tully*) *is he whom a wise Man would not scruple to pronounce the most unhappy, and the most perverted of all Men.*

Quæst. Tuscul. lib. 4.

CHAP.

Chap. VII.

Of Paſſions properly ſo called, according to their kinds.

I. Forasmuch as no Man has, in my Opinion, more accurately ſummed up, or diſtinctly defined, the ſeveral kinds or ſpecies of Paſſions, than the renowned Philoſopher *Des Cartes*; I will tread, for the moſt part, in his Footſteps, unleſs upon great Motives to the contrary. But it is not amiſs, in the firſt place, to lay down a larger Definition of Paſſions, and to apply the ſame to the kinds thereof, which follow.

II. Passion *then is a vehement Senſation of the Soul, which refers eſpecially to the Soul it ſelf, and is accompanied with an unwonted motion of the Spirits.*

Here, I ſay, *Paſſion* is rightly called *Senſation*, ſince in Paſſion the Soul is ſenſible that it ſuffers; and with *Vehemence*, becauſe it vehemently ſuffers. That *the Soul it ſelf* is ſaid, in this Senſation, *eſpecially to ſuffer*, is to diſtinguiſh it from other Senſations; whether of Odors, Sounds and Colors, *&c.* which refer to external Objects; or of Hunger, Thirſt, and Pain, *&c.* which regard our Bodies. Next, I ſay, that this Senſation is accompanied *with the Motion of the Spirits*, rather than to ſay that it reſults therefrom; inaſmuch as the

the former evermore happens; but this not always, or very ſeldom, if you but exclude ſuch Motion as reſults from Eating, Drinking, or the Change of Air. For in external Objects, which agitate the Senſe or Imagination, it is the Soul moves the Spirits, and not the Spirits the Soul.

De Paſſion. animæ, part. 2. Art. 69.

III. Des Cartes brings all the Paſſions of the Soul under ſix principal and primitive kinds: Namely, *Admiration*, *Love*, *Hatred*, *Cupidity*, *Joy*, and *Grief*. And that they fall naturally into this Order and Diſtinction does thus appear; For as ſoon as a new Object, or an old one under new Circumſtances, occurs unto us, it ſtops and entertains our Faculty of Conſidering: it ſtrains up the Attention beyond its wonted pitch, and this is called *Admiration*. Now becauſe this may ſo happen, before we comprehend whether ſuch Object will prove grateful or ungrateful to us, it may deſervedly be called the very firſt Paſſion.

IV. Yet after this, when the Soul comes to conſider the *Object* as *grateful* or *ungrateful*, (which is the ſame almoſt as *good* or *evil*) then one of them excites *Love*, and the other *Hatred*. But if this *Good* or *Evil* be conſidered by us as remote and *future*, they kindle in us *Cupidity*; namely, to join with, and enjoy the *firſt*, and to avoid or repel the *latter*. Both which are by the Schools very properly called *Deſiderium* and *Fuga*. But laſtly, if this Good and Evil be looked upon as *preſent*, the firſt begets *Joy*, and the other *Grief*.

V.

V. I WILL not deny but that *Des Cartes* had his Reaſons thus to enumerate the Paſſions; however I think I have as ſufficient Motives to contract them; and that into the three firſt, of *Admiration*, *Love* and *Hatred*. For what is *Deſire* but Love, extending it ſelf towards future Good? And what is *Flight* but *Hatred*, in turning away from the evil at hand, or at leaſt in fortifying againſt it? What is *Joy* but *Love*, which triumphs in poſſeſſing the thing beloved? And what is *Grief* but *Hatred*, to be involv'd and haraſſed by the preſent Evil? So that in all theſe Caſes, it is manifeſt, that either *Love* or *Hatred* lies ſtill at the Root. *L. 2. c. 1. §. 1.*

VI. HENCE it is plain, that the Scholaſtick Reduction of the Paſſions to the two Heads, of *Iraſcible* and *Concupiſcible*, which the very beſt of the old Philoſophers made uſe of, deſerves not to be ſo contemptuouſly exploded, if but interpreted aright. Yet here I ſpeak but of thoſe Paſſions which are properly ſeated in the *Heart*, and not in the *Brain*; where *Admiration* only (as *Des Cartes* hath it) does reſide. As to the reſt they may, in my opinion, be juſtly enough referred to thoſe words of *Pythagoras*, which anſwer to the Schoolmens *Iraſcible* and *Concupiſcible*; which, in proper Terms are *Concupiſcence* and *Indignation*. And this latter *is that Emotion of the Soul, by which it teſtifies wrath againſt every appearance of what is either evil or ungrateful.* Now if herein there be no conſideration either

of

of *present* or *future*, then it is *simple Hatred*: if the Evil be impending it is *Flight*, or else a Cupidity either to resist, or by any expedient to evade it: But if it be actually *present*, then it is *Sorrow*, *Grief*, or *Sickness of the Mind*; which is nothing else but Indignation to suffer, and to stoop under the Tyranny of an Evil, which cannot be shaken off.

VII. The Reason of *Concupiscence* is the same: which if it be fairly accompanied with the appearance of what is good or grateful, and nothing of Time respected, it is called pure and *simple Love*. If the Good be looked on as *future*, it is *Cupidity*, or else *Concupiscence* properly so called; but if it be *present*, then it is *Joy* or *Gladness*.

Yet we must think that it ceaseth to be *Concupiscence*. For unless somewhat that is nauseous and over-cloying supervenes, the Love we mention is naturally prone to a continuation in its own Estate; so as some Ingredient of Concupiscence will still remain.

VIII. Wherefore it is possible there may only be two principal and primitive Passions, which have their proper Residence in the *Heart*. They are called by *Des Cartes Love* and *Hatred*; by the Schools *Irascible* and *Concupiscible*: and by *Pythagoras*, *Lust* and *Anger*; which is somewhat remarkable, as from the Use thereof we may have cause to note.

IX. However, at present, and for a more extended Notion of the Passions, I will

will follow *Des Cartes* in his own Order and Diſtinction, as to the ſix general kinds above-mentioned. I will therefore firſt define them, and then ſubjoin the reſpective Species unto each.

Admiration is the firſt; *And it is a Paſſion of the Soul, which is ſtruck with the Novelty of any Object, and attentively ingaged in the Contemplation thereof.* The firſt Rank of the Paſſions.

Admiration is twofold; the one of *Eſteem*, the other of *Deſpiſing*. *Eſteem is the admiring of the Magnitude or Value of any Object. But Deſpiſing is a contrary Admiration at the Littleneſs or Deſpicableneſs of any Object.*

Hence 'tis underſtood what is *Eſteem*, or *Diſeſteem of a Man's ſelf*; Namely, *when a Man dwells affectedly in the Contemplation of his own Dignity, or is fixed with ſome Reſentment on his own Meanneſs or Diſgrace.* The *Reaſon* is the ſame either as to *Diſeſteem*, or elſe *Regard*, for others: The firſt of which is called *Scorning*, and the laſt *Veneration*. Now *Veneration* is the Value we ſet upon a free Agent, that can, as we believe, do us either good or harm; and joined with a deſire we have of putting our ſelves in ſubjection to it. But *Scorn* is a diſeſteem we put upon a free Agent, which tho capable of doing us either good or hurt, yet we judge ſo meanly of ſuch Agent, as not to be able to put in execution either the one or the other.

X. In the ſecond Rank come *Love* and *Hatred*.

Love

The ſecond Rank of the Paſſions.

Love is a Paſſion of the Soul, by which it is excited willingly to join it ſelf unto Objects which ſeem grateful thereunto. Yet here by the words, *To join it ſelf willingly*, is not meant to covet its being joined; for that appertains to *Luſt*: but it is meant with ſome emotion to acknowledge the thing to be either good or grateful.

Hatred is a Paſſion of the Soul, whereby it is incited willingly to ſeparate it ſelf from Objects which ſeem ingrateful or hurtful thereunto. When he that loves, eſteems the Object leſſer than himſelf, it is called ſimple Inclination, or *good Will*; where equal to himſelf, then is it *Friendſhip*; and where greater, then *Devotion*. *Love* which tends ſingly towards good things, is called *Love*; when towards beautiful things, then *Complacency*.

Alſo *Hatred*, which refers ſimply to evil things, is called *Hatred*; if to deformed things, then *Averſion* or *Horror*.

Nor ought we here to forget that noble and natural ſort of *Love*, which the *Greeks* termed *Storge*, and which we may call *natural Affection*; or that of *Hatred*, called *Antipathy*.

The third Rank of the Paſſions.

XI. THE third Claſſis is *Cupidity*, with all its Tribe or Off-ſpring.

Cupidity is a Paſſion of the Soul, by which it is carried towards good as it is future. And therefore as the Abſence of Evil, and the Preſence of Good, are both of them good, *Cupidity* may ſo far extend to either as they are future. But if any man thinks it more proper, that

that *Cupidity* about the laſt Object ſhould be called *Deſire*, and about the firſt *Flight*, I am indifferent. Only this is plain, from what is gone before, that among the ſorts of *Cupidity*, thoſe of them excel which ſpring up either from *Horror*, or from *Complacency*. For nothing kindles Deſire ſo much as Pulchritude or *Beauty*; and nothing puts ſooner to flight, than any horrid *Deformity*. And the thing which commonly is thought moſt horrible, is *Death*.

XII. To this Paſſion of *Cupidity*, there may firſt be reduced *Hope*, *Fear*, *Jealouſie*, *Security* and *Deſpair*. Then in the next place, *Irreſolution*, *Animoſity*, *Boldneſs*, *Emulation*, *Cowardiſe*, and *Conſternation*. The firſt Sett of theſe agree in this, that the Object of them all preſents it ſelf in the ſhape of what is *eaſie* or *difficult*; yet without any Dependency of the Event upon our ſelves.

The latter Sett agree in this, that the Object of all ſeems to depend upon our ſelves; yet either with difficulty in the choice of Means, whence comes *Irreſolution*; or elſe in the execution, unto which all the reſt refer.

XIII. *Hope is a Paſſion of the Soul, by which it is diſpoſed to believe the Event which it deſires.*

And *Fear is a Paſſion, by which it is diſpoſed to believe, that what it deſires will not happen.*

When *Hope* excludes all *Fear*, it is called *Security*, or *Preſumption*; and *Fear*, when it ſhuts out all *Hope*, *Deſpair*. *Jealouſie* is *Fear* of loſing a Good we highly eſteem, but grounded upon trivial Cauſes.

XIV. IRRESOLUTION *is a Fear of erring in the choice of those Means, which are proper to any certain end.*

Animosity is a Passion which disposes the Mind to act manfully, in the execution of whatever it sets it about. And if this happen in things that are attended with much danger, it is called *Boldness* or *Daring*; if it spring from the Example of what success others have had, then *Emulation*. But *Cowardise* is opposed to *Animosity*, as *Consternation* is to *Daring* or *Boldness*. For *Cowardise* is a certain feeble cold Passion of the Soul, that hinders her from doing those things, which it were otherwise in her Power to do. *Consternation* is *Cowardise*, or *Timorousness*, accompanied with Trouble and Amazement, which disables the Soul from resisting an impending Evil.

The 4th. Rank of the Passions.

XV. THE Fourth Classis is *Joy* and *Grief*, which have respect to the *Good* or *Evil* that is present.

The Passions, which refer to this Head, are chiefly distinguished by these Circumstances. First barely, in respect to our selves, or unto others: For present *Good*, as it regards our selves, begets *Joy*, even as present *Evil* does *Grief*: And if Evil betides another, who has deserved it, it causes *Laughter*, but, if he hath not deserved it, then *Commiseration*. If *Good* happens to an unworthy Man, there follows *Envy*; but *Good* happening to another, and which redounds any way to our Benefit, produceth *Congratulation*.

XVI.

XVI. MOREOVER Good and Evil are conſidered, in the firſt place, in reſpect of the Cauſe, whether as to our ſelves, or unto others: For *Good*, done by our ſelves, begets Satisfaction or Tranquillity of Mind; *Evil* begets Repentance; but the doing a thing which we doubt whether it be good or evil, begets Remorſe of Conſcience. However Good, performed by others, begets *Favor*, altho not done to our ſelves; but if to our ſelves, then *Gratitude*. So *Evil*, committed by others, if not done againſt our ſelves, begets *Indignation* only, but if it touches us, then *Anger*.

Again, in reſpect of the Opinion of others; as the *Good*, which we enjoy, exciteth *Glory* in us; ſo doth *Evil*, *Shame*.

Laſtly, in reſpect of Time. As the Duration of *Good* begets *Satiety*, or a *Loathing*; ſo the Duration of Evil leſſens *Grief*: but from *Good* that is paſt, there ariſes what is properly called *Deſire*, viz. to enjoy it again; as from *Evil* that is paſt, *Mirth*.

XVII. JOY *is a pleaſant Commotion of the Soul; or, a Paſſion, in which does conſiſt the Fruition of Good; which ſhe regards as her own.*

Grief is an ungrateful Paſſion of the Soul, in which does conſiſt the Inconvenience of Evil, or of ſome Deficiency, which ſhe ſenſibly regards as her own.

Deriſion is a Joy, begotten on any ſlight Miſchief happening to one, who is thought to have deſerved it. If this be upon very

great Grounds, and accompanied with Intentions of open Contempt, it is called *Insulting*.

Envy is Grief which ariseth, when Good happens to any that are unworthy of it.

Commiseration is Grief, when Evil happens to any one who has not deserved it.

Congratulation is Joy, arising by Good that happens to another, in which we think we are some way concerned.

Acquiescing, or *Self-satisfaction*, is of all Joys the most pleasing: and it ariseth from the Opinion of some good Work we have lately performed.

Repentance is Grief, and the bitterest that can happen, as arising from the Conviction of some Evil committed by us.

Remorse of Conscience is Grief that ariseth upon doubting, whether what we have done be good or not: For 'tis the effect of Rashness, to attempt any Work, before all Hesitation, or Wavering of the Mind, be quieted.

XVIII. FAVOR is a sort of chearful Good-Will or Benevolence towards those, with whose Well-doing we are delighted.

Gratitude is a kind of pleasing desire to do good to them, who have done good unto us.

Indignation is Grief, that is kindled against those who have done some ill thing.

Anger is Indignation against those who have done us hurt, and for which we have purpose of Revenge.

Glory

Glory is Joy, which ariſeth from Opinion, or from Hope of Praiſe among Men.

Shame is Grief that ariſeth from the Opinion, or Fear, of Reproach.

Satiety is Grief that ariſeth from the ſame Cauſe, from whence Joy did before proceed.

Deſire, properly ſo called, is Grief upon the Loſs of Good, that is never to be recovered.

Mirth is Joy from the Remembrance of paſt Evil.

XIX. THIS is almoſt the ſame Enumeration of the Paſſions that *Des Cartes* has given us; as well of thoſe which are the primitive ones, as of ſuch as are derivative from them, or elſe complicated with them: together with the Definitions of all, as near as we could approach unto that eminent Philoſopher.

As to the Complication it ſelf of thoſe Paſſions that iſſue from the Primitive, I here omit it for Brevity's ſake; as intending elſewhere, and more opportunely, to ſpeak very ſoon thereunto.

But for thoſe deep and *Natural Cauſes* of ſuch *Paſſions*, which lie abſtruſe and remote; as relating either to the *Conarion* (before ſpoken of) or to the Brain; or to certain Motions of the Blood or Spirits; or to the Orifices of the Heart (which are ſometimes more dilated, or more contracted;) or elſe to the Nerves of the Bowels and Stomach; or to the Spleen and Liver; or, finally, to the Heart it ſelf. I do willingly and knowingly paſs them all by; as well for other Reaſons,

as chiefly, that they rather belong to *Natural Philosophy*, than to *Moral*. Yet far be it from me to say, that the *Effects*, the *Uses*, and the *Ends* of *Passions* do not appertain to *Ethicks*. For I should rather affirm, that the knowledge of those things is a very choice and estimable part thereof.

Chap. VIII.

The Use and Interpretation of the Passions; and first of Admiration, with all in that Classis: and of the other five Primitive Passions.

I. AS to what concerns the *Ends* and *Uses* of the *Passions*, it will not be amiss to pursue them a little larger, and faithfully to interpret the Voice of Nature in them all, as far as we are able. For it is not of small moment towards knowing how Passions are rightly to be moderated and used (which surely in Virtue is the greatest part) if we observe the end unto which Nature, or rather God, who is the Parent of Nature, has destined each of them: as also at what Rate he himself esteems his Works, or would have them esteemed by others. For these Natural and Radical Affections, are not from ourselves, as being the result of free Thinking or Speculation;

L. 1. *c.* 6. § 6.
L. 1. *c.* 12. § 12.

Speculation; nor are they to be acquired by Methods, but are really in us antecedent to all Notion and Cogitation whatever. For they are, by God, whom we call Nature's Parent, given and implanted in us, as early as Life it ſelf: ſuch I mean, as are in particular the pleaſure of Eating and Drinking; which Nature, doubtleſs, beſtowed upon all living Creatures, not only for the Conſervation of Life, and Continuance of Health, but as a grateful Exerciſe of the Faculties of Life. Whence it clearly follows, that nothing ſhould raſhly or cauſeleſly be killed; nor ſhould we ſo far indulge the Pleaſure of Eating and Drinking, as to loſe the end of that Pleaſure, and bring upon our ſelves Diſeaſes and Death. *L. 1. c. 6. § 6.*

II. And this is the very thing the *Pythagoreans* adviſed; Namely, *To terminate what is undetermined.* For what they called *undetermined*, or *unbounded*, they placed in the Paſſions; and it was in Vertue and Reaſon that they placed their *Boundaries* or *Determination.* Thus Nature has been the more liberal in beſtowing ſuch ſort of Affections on us, that Reaſon might be truſted with a Power to leſſen, moderate, and circumſcribe, all that is ſuperfluous. And perhaps the Soul, it ſelf, is not ſo wholly intent on her proper intellectual Pleaſure, as totally to neglect the animal Life. From whence we ſee, it is a kind of ſerious and ſettled deſign of Nature, that this animal Station ſhould never be abandoned by the *L. 1. c. 6. § 10.*

Mind of Man. However these Touches are but here by the By, as to those Affections which relate to the Body. Wherefore we shall turn back to the Passions properly so called, and consider their *Ends* and *Uses*, in that order which we before proposed.

III. First then as to *Admiration*, 'tis plain, that it more vigorously imprints in our Memories the observation of new things and *Idea's*; whereby, the Soul being enriched by such Acquisition, we may attain the Knowledge of most Beneficial Truths. And hence it follows, that if any Man be taken up with the Contemplation of new Things, for no other end than for Admiration-sake; he plainly loses the end of this Passion, and becomes a mere *Admirer*. For seeing Nature has given us the Power and Inclination to *esteem*, or to *despise*; it appears thereby that all things are not to be placed by us in the same *Rank*. And as in the kinds of every thing, there is a *better* and a *worse*: so certainly is there something which is the very *best* of all; and which by the Dictates of Nature, we are bound to *aspire* unto.

Lib. 1. *c.* 6. § 11.

IV. The *Esteem of a Man's self is a Passion, mixed of Admiration, Joy, and Love, of his own Condition*: But *the Disesteem of a Man's self is from Admiration, Grief, and Self-love, which is mixed with Hatred for his own Defects.* Each of these Passions make out, that every Man either is, or ought to be, of some Consideration; nay, so to be reputed of, as to be

above

above all Injury and Contempt. For seeing we are so easily led to think well of our selves, when perhaps we have very small *Advantage* of our *Neighbors*; certainly it is but just that we carry some Esteem also towards others, so as to treat them with all Officiousness and Candor. Wherefore even *Nature* points out, by these Passions of *Esteem* and *Disesteem*, how we are to exercise Humanity and *good Breeding* towards others; as well as Diligence and Application in getting what is most beneficial to our selves.

V. As to that sort of valuing a Man's self, which *Des Cartes* calls *Generosity*, whereby a Man does, in the Freedom and Sincerity of his Judgment, so account of himself as, while he steadily aims at vertuous things, and wants no Courage to enterprize what Reason dictates, he will endure no sort of Contempt. Doubtless the Use of this Passion (so implanted by Nature) is of highest Preheminence, as it proves a Spur to the procurement of the highest Felicity. For who can be more corroborated against the Scorns of Men, or the Shocks of Fortune, than he who has Conscience on his side, that his Actions have been sincere. *L.* 1. *c.* 11. § 10.

VI. VENERATION is a Passion complicated of *Admiration* and *Fear*. The Utility thereof is referable to Politick Bodies and Religious Societies: it implies that Obedience is due to Magistrates; and that there is such a Being as God, and such a Government as the Divine Providence.

Disdaining

Disdaining is made up of *Admiration*, and of *Security*, or *Confidence*. This Passion is not altogether unprofitable to the Peace and Acquiescence of the Mind, inasmuch as it suffers not Virtue or Truth to be abandoned, either on the Threats, or on the Temptations of impotent Men. Such was the Contempt of *Socrates* towards *Anytus* and *Melitus*, when he let them know, *That altho they had Power to kill, they had not the Power to hurt him.*

VII. For what concerns the five following *Primitive Passions*, as *Love*, *Hatred*, *Joy*, *Grief*, and *Cupidity*. The Use of these is most manifest. And the first four end always in the Fifth; for whatever falls out grateful, excites Joy or Pleasure; and Pleasure, when felt, draws Love towards that which excited it: And, last of all, *Love* makes *Cupidity*, for the increasing, continuing, and sometimes repeating, of the same Delight.

'Tis in like sort, when any thing happens that is ungrateful, it begets *Sadness* and *Grief*; and this *Grief* again begets *Hatred* for that which was the Cause thereof; and that *Hatred* a *Cupidity* to get free from such Cause. And 'tis in these things alone that the Safety and Preservation of all living Creatures does in a manner consist. Also 'tis worthy of Note, that these Passions which are the most ungrateful, such as *Grief* and *Hatred*, do not perform less of this Duty than the most *grateful*: for that our Life is no less harassed by the Evils that lie upon us, than from the Want

of

of those Benefits which should advantage us.

VIII. It is plain, that Nature seems more solicitous to drive away Evil, than to partake of Pleasure. And this appears in those efficacious sorts of Eloquence, she has bestowed on so many of the Creatures when they are oppressed, for the drawing of Compassion towards them. Such is the querulous and lamenting tone of the Voice, the dejection of the Eyes and Countenance, Groaning, Howling, Sighs, and Tears, and the like. For all these have Power to incline the Mind to Compassion, whether it be to quicken our Help, or to retard the Mischiefs we intended.

IX. Nor is Nature wanting altogether in that part, which concerns the procuring of Pleasure. For every motion of the Eyes and Countenance, when we are pleased, is much more welcome and agreeable to the Lookers on: And even this small Effect of our Joy is by Nature instituted, as a Bait or Allurement, to draw on mutual Complacency, and to create a desire towards the Contentation of each other. Just as those former Effects of Sorrow were to dehort us from afflicting any, who deserved it not, but rather to melt us, and push us on, to a timely succor of all who are oppress'd.

But forasmuch as excessive Joy does sometimes bring on what they call *Extasie*, and even swooning away: I know not if Nature

Nature does not hint hereby, that our Souls are capable of greater Pleaſure, as well as Felicity, than our preſent corporeal and terreſtrial State can bear, or is able to ſupport.

Wherefore as to *Love* and *Hatred*, *Grief* and *Joy*, the *Interpretation* of them is this, That we do, as much as in us lies, purchaſe Good to our ſelves and others; Next, that we hurt no Man, but on the contrary drive away Evil moſt induſtriouſly and affectionately from others as well as our ſelves.

X. All Diligence is animated by *Cupidity*, which is the moſt *Mercurial* and awakened Paſſion, and which agitates the Heart with more violence than any other Affection. It ſends up a greater quantity of Spirits to the Brain, which diffuſing themſelves again into the Members of the Body; not only render it more active and more vigorous, but the Soul alſo is hereby drawn in, and concurs in a grateful and chearful Vivacity. For the Soul, if it want ſuitable Entertainment or Objects that are worthy of it, is but too apt to ruſt, and grow *Lethargick*; even as the Lord *Bacon* has ſomewhere truly admoniſhed, *That the Life of Man, without a propoſed End, is altogether looſe or languiſhing.*

However if we would rightly govern, and make uſe of, this *Cupidity* to good purpoſe; let us beware, that it fly not to Objects that are without our reach, or more impetuouſly to thoſe within it, than our Health and the Frailty of our Condition can bear. For to make more

more haſt after things within our Power, than will conſiſt with our Strength or Ability, is but attempting things that are plainly impoſſible. So that ſuch unadviſed *Cupidity* would end rather in Sorrow and Vexation, than in Contentment.

Laſtly, ſince 'tis ſo manifeſt, what the end of *Cupidity* is; Namely, to excite Vigor in the Execution of our Purpoſes: this Paſſion muſt wholly be laid by, till we are juſt on the Borders of acting what by Counſel we have reſolved. For elſe this Ardor (and eſpecially in weak Conſtitutions) would not only be uſeleſs, but by inflaming the Spirits, would exhauſt our ſtrength, dry the whole Body, and overthrow our Health.

CHAP. IX.

The Uſe and Interpretation of Love and Hatred; which are in the Second Claſſis.

AMONG the Sorts or Species of *Love*, there is principally to be conſidered; not only *Devotion* and *Complacency*, but what the *Greeks* call *Storge* (which is that ſtrong Intercourſe of Filial Parental Sympathy, that is founded in the Bowels of Nature.) So likewiſe,

wise, in the sorts of *Hatred*, there is to be ob-
served *Horror* and *Antipathy*.

By *Devotion* we are taught, as by a lou
Exhortation of Nature, to believe that the
is something which ought to be more dear
us than our selves, and for which we shou
not scruple to lay down our Lives. The Us
therefore of this Passion refers chiefly to P
lity and *Religion*; neither of which can b
without Virtue. So that for the true Use o
this Passion we are accountable to our Prince
our Country, and to our Religion: That i
to say, unto God and true Virtue. Whence
it follows, that those, who place the highes
Wisdom in Self-preservation, and as preferable
at all times to all other things, do *sin* against
the Light of Nature.

II. By *Complacency*, and by *Horror*, we are
admonished, that there are some things *Beau-
tiful*, and some *Deformed*; much contrary
to the sordid Opinion of those, who laugh at
all Distinctions. Nay, their Raillery extends to
the placing of this Indifferency, even in Vice
and Virtue: Whereas Virtue, for the most
part, is but a mere Symmetry of the Passi-
ons, in reference to their Degrees and Ob-
jects. Just as Beauty it self is made up from
a due proportion in the external Parts; and
then animated by a Decorum in the Motion
and Direction of the whole. Which, in a man-
ner, is the same thing that *Tully* noted in
the Fourth Book of his *Tusculane Questions*. For
as in the Body, (says he) *there is a certain apt*
Figuration

Lib. 4.

Figuration of the Members, with a ſweetneſs of Color. All which we call Beauty; ſo in the Mind, an equability and conſtancy in our Opinions and Judgments, joyned to ſuch a firmity and ſettledneſs in them, as we make to be the conſequence of, or even the ſubſtance of Virtue, this alſo is declared beautiful.

Wherefore this Natural Complacency, and Natural Horror, ought to ſpur us on to the Love of Virtue, and an Averſation to Vice: For one is the moſt charming, as the other the moſt deformed thing in the World.

III. But the more peculiar Intent of that Complacency, which is commonly called Love, refers to the Propagation of Children. Which Paſſion, if it be more importunate than the reſt, it ſhews the Care and Anxiety of Nature to preſerve and continue the Race of Mankind. And Nature is herein ſo ſolicitous, ſo artificial, and uſeth ſuch clandeſtine Feats of Negromancy and Prevarication, as if ſhe would rather paſs for an Inchantreſs, or even a Mountebank, than want ſufficient Allurements to that end. But forasmuch as the Intention of this Ardor is made ſo conſpicuous (*as before*) we are thereby admoniſhed how far to reſtrain it, and with what Circumſpection to put all due Boundaries thereunto.

IV. Wherefore as this Love has reference to Propagation; ſo *Storge*, or *Natural Tenderneſs*, referreth chiefly to Children that are begot. And if more of the *Storge* appear in Parents, than what is reciprocal; it ſhews,

ſhews, this Paſſion is implanted by Nature, ſ
others, to a greater Degree, or a leſs, ſuitab
to the Uſe or Want there may be there
For there is greater Utility and Need of t
Parents Affection towards their Childre
than of the Childrens towards the Parent; ſ
theſe excel the other in good Counſel and
ther Aids; and it more rarely happens th
Parents ſtand in need of their Children, th
Children of their Parents. From hence a
we may take Inſtruction how to govern a
attemperate this Paſſion; ſo as neither by e
ceſs of Indulgence to hurt the Living, or
unprofitable Lamentations to over-bewail
Dead.

V. In the laſt place, *Antipathy* (which
a ſort of *Hatred*, tho from Cauſes more o
cult) is thus far of Uſe, that we are, by ſo
private Sentinel, admoniſhed to ſtand of
where Nature has planted between us and a
other, an unaccountable Diſſention. But if t
happen to be exerciſed againſt a good Ma
we are then to ſuſpect our ſelves, and th
the Evil lies at our own Door. In whi
Caſe, we are to contend, if poſſible, to mak
him our Friend, as venturing or loſing n
thing by it, unleſs ſome defect or infirmity
our own.

Cha

Chap. X.

The Use and Interpretation of the Passions of the Third Classis, which fall under the Head of Cupidity.

I. THE Kinds and Species of *Cupidity* are, in the First Rank, *Hope*, *Fear*, *Jealousie*, *Security*, and *Despair*: In the next are *Irresolution*, *Animosity*, *Courage*, *Emulation*, *Cowardise*, and *Consternation*.

II. Hope is compounded of Joy and Cupidity; *Fear* of Cupidity, and somewhat of Grief: For Imagination is, according to *Aristotle*, a sort of a feeble Sense; but 'tis a sense of things present, even as *Grief* and *Joy*. For Events are present to the Mind, altho really not yet happened: And therefore they are both present and absent, and may be as well the Objects of *Joy*, or of *Grief*, as of *Cupidity*.

The Use of *Hope* is to have Delight in acting; and of *Fear* to proceed with Circumspection and Diligence.

III. But there is a more especial Use of this last Passion, which referreth to Political Matters: For, seeing the greatest part of Men are wicked; scarce any City could stand, if, by the Dread of Punishment, they were not kept in aw.

IV. JEALOUSIE is compounded of C*upidity*, *Sorrow*, and *Estimation*. It's prope Use is found in the Care and Defence o Things, which are of greatest Accoun Wherefore to make shew of it upon trivial Oc casions, is but mean and ridiculous.

V. IT appears plain, from what has bee said, which are the Passions that enter int the Composition of *Security* and *Despair* since *Security* is nothing else but Hope di charged of all Fear, and *Despair* is Fear depri tute of all Hope. The Use of the First is a gainst all Care and Diligence that is super fluous. And the Use of the latter to with draw the Mind from Designs unlikely to suc ceed, unto those which are more auspicious and of easie success.

VI. IRRESOLUTION is compounde of Cupidity and Grief. The Use whereof to avoid Error in our Choice. For the Vexa tion, which naturally attends it, does plainly prove, how one thing is much preferable to another; how we are to be extreme watch ful in discovering what is the best, and what tends most to the obtaining, and the retain ing thereof: and finally, that we propose some such settled Rules and Determinations for the conduct of Life, as are never to be de parted from.

VII. ANIMOSITY, and *Courage* are both of them compounded out of Cupidity Joy and Grief: yet herein the Joy does much exceed the Grief; for that Grief, which arises from

from danger in the Object, is trampled down by some excellency in the Object, which outweighs the Danger; and Joy takes place, from an assurance of gaining the end. The principal Use of this Passion is, in defending our Prince and Country from their Enemies; or in bearing testimony to Truth with the utmost hazard of this mortal State: that so we may reap either immortal Glory, or Life eternal.

VIII. EMULATION is compounded of Cupidity, Joy and Esteem. The Use and Force hereof is seen in famous Examples of Virtue, unto whose Imitation Nature does by this Passion invite us.

Cowardise, or Pusillanimity, seems to be a compound of Cupidity, Hope, Fear and Esteem, but of these in a very low degree. The principal use of this refers to Objects which are in truth but of a poor Account, whatever some others may think to the contrary.

Consternation is made up from a vast Admiration, Cupidity and Sorrow. And it seems to be a sort of Schooling or Reprehension cast on us by Nature, for abandoning that presence of Mind, with which we ought always to be girded, against the Surprizes and Incursions of ill Fortune. The use and signification hereof is much the same with that of *Irresolution*; that, by well casting of all things before-hand, we may be in full account what is to be done, and what to be suffered, in every case, and how to maintain our selves within the just limits of both.

IX. It ſeems further more to intimate and admoniſh us, that there is in Nature ſome horrid and ſtupendous danger, lying hid, and to be expected; which is the proper Object of this Paſſion, and againſt which we ought always to be provided. But whether this may be every Man's particular Death, or the Diſſolution of the Univerſe (of which the wiſeſt Men and Philoſophers have ſpoken, as well as Poets,)

Si fractus illabatur Orbis
Impavidos ferient ruinæ.

Were the World's Frame in Ruines laid,
They'd be oppreſs'd, but not afraid.

'Tis probable, that none will be ſo well prepared againſt theſe Shocks, as thoſe, unto whom Nature her ſelf owes a reward for their true Sincerity and Innocence.

And thus much for the Paſſions of the Third Claſſis.

CHAP.

Chap. XI.

The Interpretation and Uſe of Joy and Grief, which conſtitute the Fourth Claſſis.

I. THE Paſſions of this Rank are firſt, *Deriſion*, *Commiſeration*, *Envy*, *Congratulation*; Next, *Satisfaction*, *Repentance*, *Remorſe of Conſcience*; as alſo, *Favor*, *Gratitude*, *Indignation*, *Anger*: Thirdly, *Glory*, and *Shame*: Laſtly, *Loathing*, *Deſire*, and *Mirth*.

II. THE Uſe of *Deriſion* is chiefly applied to the Correction of ſmaller Faults in the ill Manners and Abſurdities of human Life.

From this Fountain ſprung up *Satyrical Poetry*, even as from the Effects of Love and Courage, came the *Epic* and the *Tragic*. Nor does *Satyr* ſo much purſue Vice it ſelf, as it does the Circumſtances thereof, which are the moſt ridiculous.

Deriſion is compounded of Joy and Hatred; and if the Evil, which is the Object of it, happen on a ſudden, it produces *Laughter*. But the Object of *Laughter*, as *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere obſerves, muſt be ſuch a kind of Evil as is not deadly, or deſtructive. And therefore this may frequently happen where there is no intention of Hatred: For it may fall out to be only a Congratulation, or ſort of

Gladneſs, that the Evil was not great; a
that it alſo was quickly, as well as dexterou
overcome.

III. In ſuch Caſes the Object of *Deriſion* d
good; and in ſome meaſure even where
Evil is not overcome. That is to ſay, where
thing cannot be put into the ſame ſtate ag
and provided that the damage be not very c
ſiderable; *For a light Evil may paſs for a G*
For ſeeing there is ſuch frailty and mut
lity in matter, and ſuch a propenſity ther
to great aund unfortunate mutations: *Lu*
ter ſeems but as the Voice of Nature, con
tulating with it ſelf, that Evils which m
have been ſo heavy, have by the Provide
of God, proved to be but light and tolera
Inconveniences. So this being judged a
lliverance, it cannot but end in Mirth. Ho
ever as to ſome ſad Objects; as to thoſe
Fools and mad Folks; if there be any M
that can pleaſe himſelf with their Abſurdi
and Ravings, 'tis to be doubted, (and it dra
Jealouſie on him) he has not reverence
nough for a ſound Mind. For elſe ſuch
Spectacle ſhould diſquiet him no leſs, tha
he ſaw the Carcaſe of any dead Man miſe
bly rent in pieces before him.

IV. COMMISERATION is made up
Love and Sorrow. The Uſe hereof is in h
coring the diſtreſſed, and defending him t
has right. For to take away the Life of
innocent Man, is ſo monſtrous a Crime,
tears the very Bowels of Nature, and forc
ſighs from the Breaſts of all Men. Ev

Envy is compounded of Sorrow and Hatred. And the Uſe thereof reſers chiefly to a right Diſtribution of Rewards and of Honors. For this Paſſion is not that ill Vice, which all Men ſo juſtly reprove; but an excellent Diſpoſition of the Mind given by God. And *Ariſtotle* calls it *Nemeſis*, on the account of a *juſt Diſtribution to every Man*. And in his *Rhetorick* he ſays, As 'tis the proper Office of a good Man to compaſſionate thoſe who ſuffer unjuſtly; ſo is he to envy, and to diſdain ſuch as proſper without a cauſe. He adds, *Whatever exceeds Merit, is unjuſt; whence Indignation, in this behalf, is even attributed to the Gods.* But this, and that *Envy* which we ſpeak of, is but the ſame Paſſion. So that from theſe two of *Commiſeration* and *Envy*, we are admoniſhed, as by the Voice of Nature, that there is a juſt and an unjuſt, a right and a wrong; and that the firſt is to be taken, and the other left. *Lib. 2. c. 9.*

V. CONGRATULATION is compoſed of Love and Joy. And it may ſerve as a Spur unto common Beneficence. For to him, who is frequent in this Virtue, there is due from all Men a Congratulation of his Proſperity.

Satisfaction, or *Self-contentedneſs*, as alſo *Repentance*, and *Remorſe of Conſcience*, do all plainly contribute to the preſerving a good Conſcience. They alſo manifeſtly ſhew, that there is a difference between the Works of good and evil Doers, and that Men are endowed with Free Will. For this *Satisfaction*

and *Acquiescing*, is tantamount to a joyful Ap-plause, or Acclamation of the Soul, from Conscience of Well-doing. And certainly such Passion would be altogether vain, and misplaced, if there were not really a right way and a wrong. Tho we must confess that most Men are most grosly mistaken about the Object of this Passion; and in valuing themselves upon those very Works, for which in Justice they deserve to be defamed.

De Pass. Anim. part. 3. Art. 119.

VI. Of this Madness there is not a greater instance than what *Des Cartes* himself lays in our view, of certain superstitious Hypocrites, who, because they go often to Church, repeat many Prayers, shave their Heads, abstain from some Meats, give Alms, and the like; take themselves to be so very perfect that whatever is suggested to them by their Passion, sounds like the Voice of Heaven. So that if this Passion suggest the betraying of Towns, killing of Princes, and rooting out whole Nations; they think they have Call enough for it, and even Ground sufficient for such *Executions* and such *Passions*, if other Men but differ from them in Matters of mere Opinion.

VII. Now for what relates to *Repentance*. If it were so, that all things are done by *Necessity*, then all Grief upon inward conviction of Sin, would look as ridiculous, as if a Clown should repent that he was not born Noble; or if a Woman should be afflicted that she was not born a Man. The same Reason holds as

to

to *Remorse of Conscience*, which plainly shews, that, if we err in our Election, 'tis our own fault, and that it was in our power to have chosen better.

Favor also, and *Indignation*, signifie almost the same: For these Passions grow up in us, as we regard the Actions of Men, some doing right, and some doing wrong.

VIII. But *Gratitude* seems to be a natural or essential part of commutative Justice; even as *Commiseration*, *Envy*, *Favor* and *Indignation*, may be reputed the natural parts of distributive Justice: But *Anger* may take place in this Rank above the rest. For *Revenge* is a high part of that Justice, which calls for Chastisement: and *Aristotle* says, that the *Pythagoreans* did chiefly place this in *Retaliation*. For *Anger* contributes as much towards *Fortitude*, as either *Boldness* or *Animosity*. And it was the saying of *Theages*, *That Anger, and covetous Desire, were so intended for the service of the Soul, as if the first were to be it's Guard, and a sort of Sentinel to the Body; the other a fit Caterer or Steward for things that were of use.* He also compares this latter to a Providore, and the other to a Soldier. For that *Anger* is a Passion compos'd of *Hatred*, of *Cupidity*, and of *Self-love*; and so is directly opposite to *Gratitude*, just as *Indignation* unto *Favor*. And *Des Cartes* observes, that *Anger* exceeds the other three; as the Desire of Repelling what is noxious, and the taking of Revenge, is more vehement upon us than any other thing.

IX.

IX. Nor ought we to dread this Passion the more, because it is mixed with Hatred. For all the Passions which belong to the *Irascible* Faculty of the Soul are very useful and necessary; seeing it doth more concern us to resist Evil, than to enjoy unnecessary Good. Wherefore he who disposeth himself to obey the Motions of the *concupiscible* part of his Mind, out of a specious pretence of Peace and of a charitable sweetness which we owe to others, let him have a care, lest at the same time he betrays not the Piety which he owes to God, to his Country, and to the rest of Mankind. For he who altogether lays aside the *Irascibility*, is either false or effeminate, and can never deserve the Character of being what *Theages* calls *An able Guard, and a faithful Champion of Virtue.*

L. 1. c. 6. § 8.

As to *Glory*, and *Modesty*, or *Shame*, they are things of excellent use: For the first spurs on to high Attempts, and the latter so deters us from what is vile, that it may pass as it were for a Cittadel or Bulwark to Virtue. *Glory* is made up of Joy, and Self-estimation; *Modesty*, or *Shame*, of Sorrow, and Self-love, yet also mixed with Self-distrust: so as this Passion does not belong either to the best or worst sort of Men. For whoever is conscious that he does, with a generous Free-Will, devote himself to laudable things, knows also that he deserves not for so doing to fall into Contempt: And therefore if the Revilers shoot at him, he has Fortitude of Mind to scorn them

L. 1. c. 8. § 5.

them again. But, on the other ſide, when wicked Men grow ſhameleſs, and become ſcandal-proof, then are they perfectly dangerous: For *Tully* obſerved, *That to bear Ignominy without ſorrow, was even to arrogate a Commiſſion to do evil.* *Tuſculan. Queſt. l. 4.*

XI. WHEREFORE theſe two Paſſions of *Shame* and *Glory* are eaſily underſtood: For both of them make out, that we muſt rather abide by the common Opinion of others, than by our own. And this contributes not a little, as well to good Manners, as to our civil Obedience: for we are inſtructed by this Inſtinct of Nature, that no particular Man is to violate the Laws, or oppoſe his ſingle Judgment to the publick. *Ariſtotle* ſays, in his *Rhetorick*; *That Law is the publick Senſe, and Opinion of the whole People, and made for inſtruction in all Caſes and Events.* And *Cicero*, ſpeaking alſo of *Modeſty*, appeals to that very Shame, which ſome Pleaſures are naturally attended withal: Which, plainly detecting their Vileneſs, ſhews that they ſhould be rejected and contemned by Men, who are born to nobler things. *Rhetor. l. 1. cap. 1.*

XII. BUT ſeeing we are ſtill thus governed by theſe two Inſtincts of *Shame* and *Glory*; and yet behold the whole Bulk of the World, how they magnifie that which is debauched and vile: we may from thence preſume a time will come, in which Mankind ſhall live to better purpoſes, that is, more regularly and correct.

However,

However as things now go, let us content, that neither *Shame* on the one hand, or *popular Fame* on the other, ſeduce or drive us from what is ſubſtantially juſt: For this would utterly ſubvert the Intention of thoſe Gifts. And therefore in all Actions, let your Appeal be to the Judgment-Seat of a good Conſcience; and if we are but well atteſted from thence, let the Sparks of the World rally on, and the whole Crowd reproach us: For, in ſuch caſe, 'tis perfect Heroiſm to deſpiſe them both. Furthermore let thoſe take Shame upon them that deſerve it; not the Well-doers, nor ſuch as are even content to ſuffer for doing well. *For Virtue* (as *Tully* ſaith) *and even Philoſophy her ſelf, muſt be contented with a few Judges. The Mobile was ever ſpiteful and invidious to both, and therefore both have induſtriouſly declin'd all Appeals unto them.* Let us therefore, as he adviſes us, deſpiſe all the Follies of Men, and place the force of living well, in the ſtrength and greatneſs of our Minds, and in the Contempt of this World: and in a word let us believe it to conſiſt in Truth and Virtue, notwithſtanding the vain and miſtaken Opinions of a great part of Mankind.

Tuſculan. Queſt. l. 2.

Tuſculan. Queſt. l. 4.

XIII. LASTLY, as to what concerns *Loathing*, *Mirth*, and *Deſire*. The Benefit of Loathing has Reference unto Temperance; for we uſually loath that which we take in exceſs: And we take notice how much a repeated Uſe of all corporeal things, turns into loathing at laſt. Hence we may be admoniſhed

nished to raise up our Minds to things intellectual, and to place our thoughts upon God.

As for *Mirth*, the Use thereof refers to Patience: For we ought to suffer Hardships the more willingly, as they will at length be compensated with greater Joy. So *Æneas* cheared up his Friends in Distress,

Durate, & vosmet rebus servate secundis.

—— Bear up, and patiently endure,
In time our better Fate will bring the Cure.

XIV. DESIRE is compounded of Sorrow, Love, Despairir, and Cupidity. The Use and Benefit hereof is, to give an edge to our Diligence, in preserving what we have, since the loss thereof would turn to our Vexation. The Force of this Passion is chiefly felt in the loss of Friends; the Death of those who excel in Beauty, or in the Talents of the Mind, or who have eminently serv'd in their Generation. So *Horace*,

Quis desiderio sit Pudor aut Modus *Horat. l. 1. Ode 24.*
Tam chari Capitis? Præcipe lugubres
Cantus, Melpomene, *cui liquidam Pater*
Vocem cum Cithara dedit.

——Sound out, Melpomene,
And tune thy doleful Melody.
Come, let our Sorrows boundless be,
'Twere shame to think of Modesty,
When we must weep, great Man, for thee.

XV.

XV. It was this Passion that, work upon mournful and tender Minds, ſtructed them in the ways of Fun Pomp; and by Songs of Lamentation, gies, and Orations, to perpetuate the Mem of the Dead. Nay, it brought things to pitch of Madneſs at laſt (worſe than M tality it ſelf) that Temples, Altars, and e Prayers, were conſecrated to the Dead: if thoſe, who but juſt now ceas'd to be M were preſently transform'd into Gods. T have they branded, by vile Superſtition Idolatry, our mortal State; which was utmoſt Abuſe this Paſſion was capable of, could be imployed unto.

Chap. XII.

That all Paſſions (properly ſo call'd) in themſelves Good; and that, from right Interpretation of them, 'tis ma feſt, there is ſomething Good and in its own Nature. And laſtly, to what ſuch Nature or Eſſence of Good Bad can be.

I. IT appears by what has been ſaid, t not only the Paſſions we have ſpok of, but all the reſt of them, which are p perly ſo call'd, are Good. Alſo that in Propenſi

Propensity, and strong Inclinations, are not things of Deliberation and Choice; *But*, as *Thoughts* (says) *the very Streaks and Prints of Nature, where Vertue is implanted in us by a sort of Impulse or Enthusiasm.* And *Aristotle* adds, *That the way of Enthusiasm is to be hurried on to action, without any motives of Reason.* Wherefore seeing such Propensities are antecedent to all Choice or Deliberation, 'tis manifest they are from Nature and from God; and that therefore whatever they dictate as Good and Just, is really Good and Just: and we are bound to embrace and prosecute the same, not only towards our selves, but towards others; I mean as far as may consist without any injury to a third. *Magn. Moral.* l. 2. cap. 8.

II. For this Law of Nature, which bears sway in the animal Region, is a sort of confused Muttering, or Whisper of a Divine Law: but indeed the Voice of it is more clear and audible in the intellectual State. And whereas in that inferior Region, the Case is often so uncertain, and so undecided, as to resemble what the *Civilians* call *Casus omissus*; therefore are we obliged frequently to appeal to the Tribunal of Reason, and to consult about Time, Place, and Proportion, and such other Circumstances as our Actions are subjected unto. For Reason has this preheminence, that it does not only more *distinctly* judge, but more *abstractedly*, than what the Animal Light, or any Law of the Passions, can pretend to. 'Tis more distinct, as it can penetrate *L.* 1. *c.* 6. § 6, 8.

penetrate and examine into the Original and Circumstances of Things; whereas Passion is only a blind and determinate Impulse, to do so or so, without knowing any Motive for it. Also 'tis more *abstracted*, and by Nature *separate*: For Reason does not dictate what may be Good for this or that particular Person, but what simply is good or better, and what in such and such Circumstances ought to be more or less preferable.

III. For this is the true Character of every intellectual Faculty (as was noted before) that it cannot stoop, and as it were cringe to particular Cases; but speaks boldly and definitively what is true and good unto all. And hence 'tis plain, that whatever is Intellectual and truely Moral, is also Divine, and partakes of God. And this made *Aristotle* style the Divinity, *A Law that look'd round and had the same uniform Aspect towards every side.*

IV. How unadvised therefore have some been to say, *every thing was lawful, that Passion did persuade*; and to style this a sort of Divine and Intellectual Document, and while taken abstractedly, and in the general, to contend for it, as a very principal Rule of human Actions: whereas none, but such as are mere Slaves unto Passion, can ever think at this Rate. This has been hatched under the Wings of Appetite, not of Reason: For to establish such a Doctrine of human Actions, as must subvert all Actions, is quite irrational.

V.

V. Would it not from such a Principle follow, that every Man might, at his Pleasure, not only fire his own House in the Night, but the Town also? Might he not poison the common Well, or maim and destroy his Wife and Children, if it were lawful to sacrifice to his own Passion? So that this Foundation being against Nature, and utterly pernicious, it plainly follows, that no Man's private Inclinations are the Measures of Good and Evil; but that the Inclinations themselves are to be circumscribed by some Principle which is superior to them.

VI. Now the next Principle, unto which Passion is subjected, and which knows what in every Case is good and bad, is *right Reason*: And therefore that which to Right Reason appears good or bad, ought certainly to be reputed as such in its own Nature. For what a rectified Mind takes in, is really the Essence of the thing it self, painted in the Understanding: and so a Triangle, in its own Nature, is nothing else but what Right Reason conceives to be such.

VII. Hence it plainly follows, that there are some unchangeable Ideas or Impressions of Good and Evil, even as of Figures in the Mathematicks; and that the Mind judges of those, as much as Sense does of these: Yet Reason and the Intellect have Jurisdiction over both. For as those are made up by the Concurrence of several Lines; so are these made up of various and often contrary Circumstances;

cumſtances; which therefore denomina
ſome things to be Good, and ſome things
be Evil. And this confirms what has be
ſaid, that the Principle, whereby to judg
what is either morally good or evil, is an I
tellectual Principle, and in ſome ſort Divine.

VIII. THIS hinders not, but that we
L. 1. *c.* 6. § 8. muſt allow there is ſomething alſo, little le
than Divine, which preſides in the Anim
Law (for this Law has alſo its Source fro
Nature, and from God the Parent of Nature
ſo that we may evermore follow the Indic
tions and Dictates of that Law; unleſs
ſuch Caſes, where Reaſon admoniſheth tha
ſomething may be done, that is better an
more advantageous. And if this one poi
be but granted (which no reaſonable Ma
will deny) you will preſently find numbe
leſs Inſtances of thoſe things, which in the
own Nature may be termed juſt or unju
vile or honeſt; which, by reflecting on tho
principal ſigns of the Paſſions already men
tion'd, will occur unto you. For ſurely tho
things are, in their own Nature juſt, or unju
vile or honeſt, which the Voice of God i
Nature has declared to be ſuch. And th
Corollary is of high value in human Life
and able to trample upon the Impudence o
thoſe, who cry up all things for lawful, whic
they themſelves think fit.

IX. NEVERTHELESS we do not preten
L. 1. *c.* 6. § 2. in the leaſt, to have the Paſſions of the Min
L. 1. *c.* 6. § 16. exterminated. We rather account of the
(whic

(which before was noted) as of the very Organs of the Body, and as distinctly useful: since they are not only the occasion of several Virtues, but the true Characters and Images of Virtue, are made the more resplendent by them. Wherefore if we can but skill our Passions aright, *They are as Lamps or Beacons, to conduct and excite us to our Journey's end.* For tho Reason may cry aloud; yet we walk without Legs, and fly without Wings, if we are not quickened by their Instigations. Hence we may reflect, that *Theages* was not so much out of the way in saying, *That Virtue had its original from the Passions, and did associate with them, and was preserved by them.* For the principal part of Virtue is placed in their due Commixture; *So as no man* (he says) *ought either to be void of Passion, or too highly excited by it. For as Insensibility lays a damp on that Torrent and Enthusiasm of the Soul, by which 'tis push'd forward towards things which are noble and great: so too much emotion discomposes the Mind; and the Understanding is damnified by it.* L. 1. c. 6. § 11.

X. WHEREFORE let us close all with the Counsel of *Archytas* the *Pythagorean. Contend* (says he) *to procure the Use of your Passions in such Moderation, as you may equally shun to appear insensible, or in too high an Agitation: for this often leads to prouder Attempts than our weak Nature can support.* Surely this Temperament sounds better than what the *Stoicks*, and even some *Platonists*, do present us with.

And let it never be forgot, that we are no longer to retain our Paſſions, than as they adminiſter to thoſe ends, for which by Nature they are intended.

And thus much of the Paſſions, which are properly ſtyled ſuch.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the other Paſſions, or Bodily Impreſſions.

I. FOR what concerns the Reſidue of *Corporeal Impreſſions*, the kinds thereof may, in a manner, be referred to theſe two Claſſes. Namely, to

1. *Senſation, Imagination, the particular Temperament of the Body, and to Cuſtom.*

2. *Or to Education, to a ſingular Genius, or to a particular Fancy.*

The Impreſſions of the *firſt Claſſis* agree in this, that they appear without any *Appetite* properly ſo called. But thoſe of the ſecond are attended with ſome *proper Appetite.*

By *Senſation* is here meant, not the very *Act of Feeling*, which is the true meaning of the Word; but rather a *Stain*, or that *perverſe Byaſs* and *Propenſity to error*, which it imprints on the Soul. And ſo almoſt of all the reſt.

II. WHEREFORE *Senſation* is deſin'd, *To be a certain corporeal Impreſſion, by which the Soul is prevailed on to believe, that things are ſuch in their own Natures, as they appear to our external Senſes.* As if a man, finding ſomewhat that was grateful to his own Taſte,

ſhould

should streight conclude, that the same Pleasure and Sweetness were in the thing it self; and therefore that it must equally gratifie the Taste of all other Creatures. We see the same Fallacy obtruded in the Objects of Sight; when a Man shall conclude, that the Light and Colors, which are taken in by the Eye, are also in the things themselves: which is no more true than that Stones feel pain, which wound the bare Feet of those that run over them; or that, when a Man's Hand is burnt by a Coal, that the Coal also should have sense of such Burning. For 'tis plain, that *Heat* is no more in the Coal, or in any such Subject, than is the very Pain; but both arise from the *Agitation* and *Concussion of Particles:* So as if this be very moderate, we feel Heat without any Pain; whereas if our Senses are immoderately struck, then follows Perception both of *Heat* and *Pain* together. Wherefore Heat and Pain are things which differ only in degree; and we our selves are the Subject in which they meet, and wherein their Force and Vigor is exerted. And the like we may pronounce of other the Objects of our external Senses.

III. IMAGINATION *is a corporeal Impression, which inclines the Soul to believe, that such things are, or else may be; which yet never are, nor can ever be.*

As *Sensation* is apt to misguide the Soul, touching the Nature of Things, unless care be taken: so *Imagination* does the like as to their

Existence, whether present, or to come. F
as the vigor of our Sense throws us in
Security, as to the real presence and existe
of any thing; so the torrent of *Imagina*
which seems to equal, or at least to imit
Sense it self, does easily impose a false As
rance on the Soul, that such thing is true,
may be true; tho there be no other Found
tion for it, but that it has been vehemently
imagined. How these insolent *Phantasm*
and such idle Dreams, of Men who sleep
may be detected and dispelled, we have taug
Sect. 51, 52, 53, *&c.* at large in our Book of *Enthusiasm*: to whi
the Reader is referr'd.

IV. As to the peculiar *Temperament* an
Constitution; we define it to be, *A corporeal Im*
pression that results from the whole natural Ma
by which the Soul is obstructed and perverted fro
the Contemplation of some peculiar Things. O
this corporeal Frailty there might be many In
stances given. We have seen how happy, an
even famous, some have been at the *Mathe*
maticks; who, when you turn them to thing
Theological, or into the *Metaphysicks*, they are
quite lame, and stumble at every step. They
will avow they perfectly comprehend what
ever concerns the Nature of a *Body*, but as to
that of a *Spirit*, they cannot figure to them
selves the least Notion or Signification of it.
On the other side, you have others, who are
so full of their Notion about *Spirits*, that they
believe not a corner of the World to be void
or destitute of them. They think they are

present

present at every Thunder and every Rain; and they have mustered and regimented them into such Brigades; that it would make a Man sweat to comprehend the Government and Intrigues that they impose unto this invisible Race.

V. I know not well how otherwise to judge of this *Disease in the Art of Thinking*, than that it grows from a particular Texture of Parts or a *prevalent Byass* in the Frame and Constitution of the Body. In some the Spirits are more stiff, grois and tenacious; in others more volatile, unequal, and even turbulent. So that if a Man had it in his Power (in the Language of the *Chymists*) to *fix the volatile*, and to *volatilize the fix'd*, (by which they promise themselves Golden Mountains.) I mean if he could bring his Spirits to a just proportion of Delicacy and Agility, and could then so totally control their Motion, as to fix and settle them in the Contemplation of any particular Object, he were then certainly Master of the greatest Secret in the World, towards the Knowledge and Contemplation of all Things.

VI. Custom *is a corporeal Impression, by which the Soul is extremely bent to judge of things, as true, good, or amiable, for no other Motive, but because it has been accustomed so to judge, and so to act.* There is an Instance of this Depravity in the *Cannibals*, who eat Man's Flesh without any Ceremony or sort of Qualm whatever. And the Power of *Custom*

is so very strong (as *Tully* observes it from *Aristotle*) that it becomes a *second Nature*. Hence it is, that some inveterate Opinions usurp among Mankind the Name of Principles, or common Notions; and a very ill *Custom of the Country*, passes for *a Law of Nature*. How pernicious a *Fate* therefore is it, when young Men happen to be thus handled? How cautious ought all to be of any false or immoral Custom? And how much does it import us to fly the Society of those, who are over-run with any Habit, either of ill Notions, or ill Manners? *To not to be imagined how a little Familiarity and Conversation with an ingenious Libertine, will insensibly steal away that Sense of Honor, and of Virtue, which we first brought with us, when we fell into his acquaintance.*

VII. EDUCATION *is Custom, with some remarkable Affections annex'd.* For commonly *Teachers* do instil their own Notions also, into the Esteem of their Disciples, as if it highly imported them to the perfecting of their Education. And so it comes often to pass, that the Scholars will not afterwards endure the Correction of some insufferable Errors, but persist and die in them. Happy had it been for such, had they never had any other Tutor than bare Nature: for then the Sparks of Virtue, and of Truth, which were in their tender Minds, had not been (as now by the Perfidy of an ill Master) extinguish'd. *Tully* takes

take occasion (*in his Tusculan Questions*) highly to exclaim hereat; affirming, *That we* Tusc. Quæst. l. 3.
were born with such Elements of Virtue in us as if they were not depress'd, even Nature it self would [illegible] *us to a happy life.* Whereas now we are perverted as soon as born; and our Minds so scribled over with crooked Sentiments, as if they had been even mingled with our Milk. But this Misfortune is so little rectified in riper time by Instructors and Teachers, that Truth is laugh'd out of Countenance, vulgar Errors take place; and even Nature is subdu'd by Opinion.

VIII. As *Education* has Reference unto *Custom*: *so a peculiar Genius or Inclination hath reference to a particular temperament of the Body, and is a corporeal Impression by which a Man is so endowed, and so appropriated to certain ends, that he conceives all human Happiness and Perfection to consist therein; and that all are either miserable, or much to be pitied, who are defective in that particular.* Thus it comes to pass, that whether in *Oratory*, or in *Musick*, or in *War*, *Politicks*, *Poetry*, *Philosophy*, *Geometry*, or *Language*, he that lays hold by a *peculiar Genius* on one of them alone, shall be so intoxicated, as to despise every Man that is addicted to any of the rest. But this surely is a *Sickness of the Mind*, and wholly *Pedantick*; since every other Genius is equally happy, in the different Objects that delight and entertain him.

IX.

IX. WHEREFORE we ought to applaud every Man what is either useful, or but innestly pleasant. And, as to our selves, not any Excellency we attain to, lead us despise other excellent things: for this would be as a Judgment on us; and to be imprison as it were, in our own Tower; when by degree of Knowledge we are blinded and cluded from all the rest. There is no M can truly be happy, but he that has attained share in that, which must make every M happy. So that this does not properly a tain to the *Genius* we speak of; unless a M be so fortunately born, as to have his G set wholly upon Virtue. But if this he Case, then indeed 'tis no more a Confi ment or Captivity, but the most amiable, the most extended Liberty in the World.

X. There are also Inclinations of this peculiar as well to the different *Ages* of M kind, as to the different Objects of L and wherein Men betray the impotenc the Mind; but they are too many to here numbered up.

XI. PECULIAR *Envy is a corporeal pression, whereby the Mind is carried to lo hate, to value or despise any Thing, or any P son, for some external and very trivial Cir stances.*

This is not such a Preference, or Rejecti as comes from any antecedent Passion; rather a Consequence, and that which fo such Impression does ensue. 'Tis not that

here

hereby tax the Wisdom of those Ancients, and of the *Pythagoreans* in particular; who (as *Gellius* relates) did from the Mien, Gesture, and whole Air of the Body, penetrate into the Manners of Men: For this is no idle Speculation, since few Men can conceal their natural Propensities from a curious and diligent Inspector. But the Fault we accuse, is, when Men run headlong to love, or hate, such a thing or such a person, not for any natural Perfection or Imperfection; but so slightly and superficially; that often, upon the bare sound of a Name, we see some passionately inclin'd to one Man more than to another; so that as well Persons as Things are often, upon no better Arguments, either valu'd or despis'd. But alas, how much is the Frailty, the Mutability, and the impotent temper of Man's Soul detected hereby?

Noctes Atticæ, lib. 1. c. 9.

XII. Some will say, that these Observations are too minute; but if they contribute to the making a better Judgment on all things, and such as a good and prudent Man is bound to do, I think the Labor will not be wholly lost.

THE

THE SECOND BOOK

CHAP. I.

Of the Number of the Primitive Virtues.

I. WE have hitherto ſpoken of *Virtue in general*; of *the Paſſions*, and of the reſt of the *Corporeal Impreſſions*.

Now follow the *Virtues* in their *kinds*; and theſe are even, as was ſaid of the *Paſſions*, ſome of them *Primitive*, and others by *Derivation*. Of the firſt ſort there are theſe three, *Prudence*, *Sincerity*, and *Patience*; which do in ſome ſort, anſwer and ſucceed to the three *Primitive Paſſions*, ſo as either to perfect or to correct them: Thus *Prudence* ſtands in balance to *Admiration*; *Sincerity* to *Concupiſcence*, and *Patience* to *Fury*.

And that it may not appear we have raſhly fallen into this Triplicity of Virtues, but that Nature and Right Reaſon have inſtructed us therein, 'twill not be amiſs to expoſe how far the Ancients have beaten the ſame Path. They have frequently pointed

his very Summary of Duties, or of Virtues, ho perhaps not in the very Terms: Yet, while hey concur in the Substance, it goes a great ay to shew, that this threefold Division is ccording to Nature.

II. METOPUS, the *Pythagorean*, intimates hree Virtues from the three parts of the Mind: the first *Rational*; the next *Irascible*: *Which he makes as a Buckler or Defence against ose things, which may more nearly hurt us.* he third he calls the *Appetitive*, or *Concuscible*. And his Words in the beginning of hat Fragment, are thus, *All Vertue must have ese three things: First, Reason. Secondly, trength or Vigor. And thirdly, Appetite or Elion. Reason to judge by; Vigor to resist and vercome; and Appetite for Love and Enjoyment.* o these three do plainly conform to our said *rimitive Virtues.*

III. THEAGES also divides them into the me parts. And adds, *That Prudence is a Virte of the rational part of the Soul, as Fortitude of the Irascible. For the Habit of Resisting, of submitting to Evil, depends on this latter.* nd therefore we term this *Patience, which is a irtue that sustains and conforms to whatever is rievous or ungrateful.* But instead of *Tempeance*, which is a Virtue *derivative*, and but *rticular*, we substitute *Sincerity*; as being a ure and original Virtue, and of the *Appetiive* Soul; such as by whose Power we are led o that which is simply and absolutely the est, and that purely for its own Consideraon.

IV.

IV. So what *Theages* ſays elſewhere, h
more evident reference hereto. As nam
*That the Principles of all Vertue were Knowle
Power, and Appetition: That by Knowledge
conſider things and determine; that Power en
us by bodily Force to bear up and ſuſtain our ſe
in all Accidents that happen; and that Appeti
was as the Hand of the Soul, which is thr
out to catch at this or that Object as occaſion ſer*
To which triple Uſe of the Faculties,
Triumvirate of Virtues; namely, *Prude
Sincerity*, and *Patience*, do moſt exactly c
form.

V. So again *Marcus Aurelius* makes f
quently the ſame Enumeration, and ſays
his Meditations; *That Philoſophy conſiſts of t
three Virtues: Namely, firſt to preſerve the
(which he calls our Domeſtick God) clear
unſpotted from all carnal Temptations, ſo as
ther to be ſubdued by Pleaſure, nor by Pains.* A
this is that true *Patience* which comprehe
both *Continence* and *Long-ſuffering*. Next
adviſes, *That nothing be raſhly done*: Whic
the plain Office of *Prudence*. And laſtly,
be free from all *Hypocriſie* and *Diſſimulati*
Which is the part of *Sincerity*.

Marcus Anton. l. 2. § 17.

VI. AGAIN, in his ſeventh Book, *That it
a fundamental Duty to bear an innate Love to M
kind*, that is, *to reliſh whatever contributed t
more regular Adminiſtration of the World*: Whi
as he often ſhews, is nothing elſe than fra
and entirely to purſue, not what refers
Man's private Intereſt, but what tends moſt

Sect. 55.

VI

the general Laws of Nature, and of Reaſon, and what is purely and eminently the beſt. For his temper of Mind (as he has it elſewhere) *is the true giving up a Man's ſelf in Sacrifice to Reaſon, and to God*; which is the Heighth of *Sincerity*. Next he requires, *That we never yield to corporeal Affections*; and this takes in *Patience*. Laſtly, *Not to precipitate our ſelves in any thing, leſt Error enſue*; which is the Dictate of *Prudence*. The ſame Philoſopher has much more, up and down, to the like effect. *Lib.* 8. § 26.

VII. But particularly in his tenth Book he recommends three things, which much concern the Virtues in hand. As namely, *Intenſion of Mind*, which anſwers *Prudence*: *Contentment* and *Extenſion of the Mind*, which refer to *Sincerity* and *Patience*. For to ſay, the *Mind* is *intent*, is to ſay, it *dwells ſedately on its Object, and accurately ſifts into every part thereof*: which is the Buſineſs of *Prudence*. And for *Sincerity* and *Patience*, how can they better be ſet off than *by placing the Mind in a ſtate of Content? For this teſtifies a thankful, humble Acceptance of what Nature, in her common Diſtribution, hath given, whatever the Portion be.* And thus to acquieſce in Nature's common Law, is, in the Judgment of that wiſeſt Philoſopher, *To obey the common Reaſon, that is in God; nay, which is little leſs than God himſelf. For he is the living Law, in whoſe Adminiſtration the whole Univerſe remains; and he who beſtows on every Man, what he, in his Wiſdom thinks fit and competent for him.* *Sect.* 8. *Marcus Anton. lib.* 10. § 25.

VIII.

VIII. So then he that chearfully acc
and values, not what to his Senſe or Fa
might be more complacent, but what Pr
dence thinks fit to order and impoſe (a
deed ſome things are ſent, which, altho
altogether unwholſom, yet unto Fleſh
Blood their Taſte is extreme bitter) this M
is, by *Antoninus* cry'd up, *As one that*
L. 8. § 52. *cerely cooperates with that intellectual Po*
which guides and comprehends all things.
L. 7. § 9. adds, *That the World is one and the ſam*
every part; that God is every where the ſa
that there is but one Eſſence, and one Law,
is the common ſtandard and meaſure of all
lectual Beings; that there is one Truth, a
one Perfection of all Animals of the ſame k
and but one and the ſame Reaſon among all
Creatures that partake thereof.

IX. Thus it is plainly his Senſe, that
common Rule and Conſtitution runs thro
every Intellectual Subſtance; and that ra
nal Creatures are, in this way, made *a*
L. 2. c. 4. § 4. *of Fellow-Citizens with God*; and that not
can degrade them, but a perverſe Will ag
that Bond and Sanction, by which they
this State. Whereas if they reſign to ev
thing which the Divine Law, and im
table Reaſons, lays on them; and do not
much as covet that things ſhould be other
than as they are: *Such* (ſays he) *are not*
Marcus Antonin. l. 12. § 23. *reputed as bare Conformers, who ſubmit and*
ſentent, but as Men who are drawn, if
caught up, by God himſelf. For they th

he would have them, and they have no other Will, but the Will of their Creator. This therefore is the ſupremeſt Degree of *Sincerity*: For this is not only the purſuit of what is eminently the beſt, but a thirſting and panting after it for it's own ſake, and for it's intrinſick worth.

X. LASTLY, he adviſes, *That we corroborate our Minds to ſuch a degree, as to repel not only the charming, but the rugged Aſſaults of the Fleſh; alſo to be above Vain-Glory, and even Death it ſelf.* This ſurely is enough, whereby to know what *Patience* is: and 'tis by this Virtue of Patience, that we ſurmount the Temptations of either Hand, whether they be ſoft or harſh. Now if it come to this; that neither Infamy nor Death can otherwiſe be ſhun'd, than in ſubmitting to what is vile and contrary to the Laws of Reaſon; we muſt ſtand our ground, and with Patience congratulate them both. Upon the whole matter, we did not inconſiderately ſet down *Prudence*, *Sincerity*, and *Patience*, to be the firſt Fountains of all other Virtues. And this will be further manifeſt, when we ſhall, with a little more Accuracy, conſider and define the Nature of each. *L.* 10. § 8. 10.

Chap. II.

Of Prudence, the first Primitive Virtue

I. Prudence *therefore is a Virtue, by which the Soul has such Dominion over the Passions properly so called, as well as over all sorts of corporeal Impressions, that the mind can receive no Impediment thereby, in rightly observing, and successfully judging of what is absolutely and simply the best.*

The Demonstration of this Virtue is made out by *Noema* the Twelfth. Hence therefore it is that *Prudence* is attended and surrounded by *Knowledge*, *Diligence*, *good Counsel*, *right Determination*, *judicious Conjecture*, *Presence of Mind*, *Sense*, *and the Limits of Right Reason*. Of which in particular. For

II. Knowledge, or *Intelligence*, is the Companion of *Prudence*; because knowledge is nothing else but a right comprehension of those things, whereof we are by others admonished. So *Aristotle* observes, *That 'tis not Prudence we apprehend, but by Knowledge that we judge and determine: so Men are call'd intelligent, only from their Facility of being taught.* Wherefore we may agree, that *prudent Men* are also the most *intelligent*: For as they still keep an open Ear to good Counsel, and are not given up to the Prejudice of any Passion

Eudem. l. 5. c. 10.

of corporeal Impreſſion; ſo are they qualified by this Temperament, ſtill to embrace Truth where ever they find it.

III. DILIGENCE (as is noted by *Ariſtotle*) ſhines moſt in the finding out of fit Mediums, and of applying them to the Mark: But if the Deſign be ill, then is a Man not termed *diligent*, but *ſhrewd* or *buſie*. Wherefore it ſeems there is ſome Sagacity and Subtilty of the Wit, required in *Diligence*, which the prudent Man can ſcarce ever want: For, having both Mind and Body purified, as he hath, from the ſtains of Paſſion or Impreſſion, he has alſo a ſtock of ſubtil and lively Spirits always attending him. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 13.*

Where this *Diligence* preſides, there happy Counſel can never be wanting: For as the Philoſopher places *Rectitude of Counſel in advising that which is good*; ſo the Eſſentials herein are, that the Ends be honeſt, that the Means be lawful, and that the Conſultation be neither ſlow nor precipitate. And all theſe things meet in a prudent Man; as by the Definition of *Prudence* is manifeſt. So alſo *Antoninus* obſerves, *That the prudent Man, being Maſter of his Affections, will never raſhly break out*: That, being aſſiſted by a Purity in his Blood and Spirits, he has no Motions that are either ſluggiſh or violent (for 'tis obſerv'd, that the Fluency and Purification of the Spirits does not a little conduce both to their Gentleneſs and Moderation:) Much leſs (ſays he) will ſuch a prudent Man attempt *Ethic. Eudem. l. 5. c. 9. & ad Nicom. l. 6. c. 10.*

either things dishoneſt, or even the moſt honeſt ones, if the Means be diſhonorable. For nothing of this ſort can happen, but where Paſſion and Appetite carry all before them.

IV. Equal *Determination* is very cloſe of kin to Prudence; *and is as the ſentence given upon Pleadings of Right:* For who can better be qualified to determine about what is Right, and what is Good, than he who is not only above Paſſion, but ſuperior to every Impreſſion and to every Cuſtom (how inveterate ſoever) that were but capable to miſguide him.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 11.

For what concerns *Rectitude of Conjecture*, 'tis plain, that, ſince *Ariſtotle* makes Moral Vertue nothing elſe but, *A fit Habit of pointing or aiming at that juſt Medium which, in acting and in ſuffering, is to be wiſh'd for:* Who but the prudent can rightly calculate that Point? For he is Lord of his Paſſions, and his Spirits are ſo purged and defecated from the Lee, as he not only gets Preſence of Mind thereby, but even a ſort of Divination. 'Tis the ſame Philoſopher notes, that *Right Conjecture* is ſuch an Eruption of the Wit, and flies ſo ſuddenly to the Mark, as there is neither Deliberation or Reaſon imploy'd therein. But where any groſs Paſſions happen to intervene, they make a perfect Gulph between the Mind and Truth: And therefore this Pitch of Sagacity is not attainable, but by the prudent Man. 'Tis likewiſe as true of thoſe who are imprudent, that for what concerns the Senſe of Diſcrimination they have it not.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 1. l. 2. c. 9.

Eudem. l. 3. c. 9.

V.

V. The Philoſopher, ſpeaking about the Rectitude of Conjecture, ſtyles it *Senſe*; Inaſmuch as whatever *Judgment* we make, 'tis *collected from Particulars, and from Senſe*: As he aſſerts in the Caſe of Anger, Grief, and the reſt. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 9.*

The ſame he alſo repeats in his *Great Morals* (which before was hinted) ſaying, *That, if you have not within your ſelf a Senſe and Feeling of theſe Matters, all your Labor after them is but in vain.* This the *Pythagoreans* alſo called *quick and perfect Senſation*; ſaying, *There was a ſort of Feeling in our practical Intellect, by which it came to paſs that we were neither deceived in the ſenſe of what we ſuffered, nor impos'd on by ill reaſoning in what we were to act.* *L. 1. c. 2. § 9.* *Iamblici, protrept. c. 2.*

Thus therefore, by ſubjecting of our Paſſions, and the purifying of our Bodies and Souls, there ſprings up to us, as it were, a new *Senſibility* in the Mind or Spirit, which is only the Portion of the *prudent Man*. For in the Power thereof he finds out, and aſcertains that *Golden Mean* which we have hitherto ſo recommended. That which in every Action is ſo valuable, and whereof the *indiſcreet* or the impure Man can never have any Feeling.

VI. Lastly, the *limiting and defining of Right Reaſon* is every where left, by *Ariſtotle*, to the *prudent Man's* Determination. For whenever the Queſtion is ſtarted by him, what this Right Reaſon ſhould be; he ever refers it thus, *Prout vir prudens definiverit*; 'Tis

ewn what a prudent Man ſhall judge fit. And ſurely this is not ſaid in vain, if but applied to the Man we ſpeak of. For how can there be *Right Reaſon* at all, if not found within the reach of that Prudence which already we have defin'd? And therefore if neither the *Pythagoreans*, the *Platoniſts*, or *Ariſtotle* himſelf, have taken much care in the defining of *Right Reaſon*, 'tis becauſe they finally refer'd it to the Arbitrement of this our Rectified and Prudent Man. For they all preſum'd that the Mind of Man, when effectually purg'd from the Stains of Prejudice and Paſſion, did as naturally diſcern of things what were juſt and true, as an unblemiſh'd Eye does rightfully diſtinguiſh of Colors. So that *Ariſtotle* was well adviſed in pronouncing *Right Reaſon to be that which was conformable to Prudence*; taking *Prudence* in that Latitude we have already ſet forth.

Ethic. Eudem. l. 5. c. 13.

VII. From all that is now ſaid, two things deſerve Obſervation. Firſt, how haughtily, and yet very impertinently, do ſome Men carry it, who while they are deſtitute of all Capacity to judge (as being unacquainted with this *Moral Prudence*) yet are they ſo far from ſubſcribing to what the wiſe and prudent Men of all Ages, and of every Nation, have eſtabliſhed for true and juſt, that they impudently contend there is nothing in its own Nature either the one or the other, nothing right and nothing wrong. But ſurely, this is not leſs abſurd, than if a blind Man ſhould deny all diſtinction

distinction of Colors, when he ought rather to enquire before all other things, what were good for his Eyes.

VIII. NEXT we may note, that *Prudence* is not any particular Science of external things, but rather somewhat above all Science. 'Tis a Skill or Sagacity in the Soul, whereby she steers so clear from those Rocks, which corporeal Passions and Impressions throw commonly in the way, as never to fail of making a true and substantial Judgment in all things. And this is the Gift and Excellency which is peculiar unto *Prudence*, and which attends her in all her ways. But as to the knowledge and sense of things, all this and what appertains thereto we derive it from other Fountains; as either from Experience, or Natural Philosophy, or from Skill in War, or in the Laws, and the like. And hereunto *Aristotle* somewhere refers, in saying, *That the prudent Man had not regard to this or that particular thing, but to those which, in a more general way, appertain'd to the Good of Life.* So that *Prudence* is a sort of general Perfection *of the rational part of the Soul*, even as *Sincerity* is of the *Appetitive*: which from the *Pythagorean* Fragments we had noted before.

Ethic. Eudem. l. 3. c. 3. Ad Nicom. l. 6. c. 5.

Chap. III.

Of the other two Primitive Virtues, Sincerity and Patience.

I. Sincerity *is a Virtue of the Soul, by which the Will is intirely and ſincerely carried on to that which the Mind judgeth to be abſolutely and ſimply the beſt.* When I ſay *intirely* and *ſincerely*, I mean *perfectly* and *adequately*. For what is done *perfectly* is (according to *Antoninus*) *done with the whole Soul, as well in acting juſtly, as in ſpeaking of truth.* And the Meaning of *Adequate* is that no By-conſideration, whether of Profit or of Fame, muſt ever incline us. For the Soul ought ſo to be temper'd and inflam'd to that which is ſimply the beſt, as neither from Hurt or Ignominy to be diverted from it. *For to be oppreſs'd in a good Cauſe, is better than baſe Exemption.* As *Tully* does aſſert.

Lib. 12. § 29.

The Nature of this Virtue is explain'd in *Noema* the third, fourth, fifth, and ſo on to the thirteenth: But the true Beauty and Perfection thereof can hardly enter into the Imagination of any Man, who is not already affected and acquainted with it. And 'tis to a Soul thus rectified, that we may apply that of *Ariſtotle, That neither the Evening or the Morning Star is half ſo charming.* There can

L. I. *c.* 2. § 9.

be

be no exterior Light half ſo bright, or ſo deſirable, as this of the Soul, which is pure, and perfect, and even Divine.

II. To this State of *Simplicity* or *Sincerity* in the *Soul*, is referable that of *Antoninus*, where he thus expoſtulates with himſelf —— *O my beloved Soul, when wilt thou be naked, ſimple, and entirely one?* And again he gives himſelf the Rule, —— *Do not diſcompoſe thy Mind, or excite the Dregs; but purifie thy ſelf to the utmoſt that is poſſible.* L. 10. § 1. L. 4. § 26.

For this *Sincerity* is a Fountain that runs clear, and is perennial; it pours in Conſolation, and fills the Life with internal Joy. This is the ſtate of that Peace, which is ſo conſtant and ineffable, that no Cares, no Croſſes, or ſo much as Jealouſies, can diſtract it. For in that which is ſingle, and but one, there can be no Diverſity: 'tis all Union, profound Love, and perfect Reſt. Wherefore it was not without cauſe, that the *Pythagorean* call'd thoſe bleſſed, who could by this happy *Analyſis, reſolve all things into one and the ſame Principle*; which they plainly meant to be the Unity of God: and did accordingly bind themſelves *both to follow and to obey him.* *Jamblicus Protrept. c. 4.*

III. But to *follow God* conſtantly and ſincerely, is to follow that which is eminently the beſt; tho not that which is moſt grateful to our Appetites. For who, as a mere Creature, can ſincerely and conſtantly proſecute that which is beſt? This muſt be the Gift of God, and the Effect of a Divine Senſe or Spirit.

Spirit. That Perfection does not originally appertain to any created Being, but to God the Creator: He, who is the common Father of us all, and the Legiſlator of the whole World: He, whom *Zeno* in *Laertius* ſtyles, *Right Reaſon penetrating all things; even the ſame Reaſon which is in* Jove *himſelf, the Captain and chief Pilot in the Adminiſtration of the Univerſe.*

L. 8. § 54. IV. HERETO refers that Exhortation of *Antoninus, That we ſhould not any longer perplex our ſelves barely about the circumambient Air; but rather join and combine with that intellectual Power, which comprehends the Univerſe.* Which ſaying amounts to this, *That we ought to be drawn into one and the ſame mind with God.* This is the Paſſion that can only make a Man Divine; *For ſuch the Man is, as his Affections and Inclinations make him.* 'Tis not here enough to have ſimple Intellection; no, it rather calls up and ſummons the *Boniform Faculty*, which is repleniſh'd with that Divine Senſe and Reliſh, which affords the higheſt Pleaſure, the chiefeſt Beauty, and the utmoſt Perfection to the Soul. 'Tis by this ſupreme Faculty that we pant after God, that we adhere unto him, and that (as far as our Nature does admit) we are even like unto him: he, who is Goodneſs it ſelf, perfect Purity, and the moſt exalted Simplicity; he is that pattern whom in theſe Attributes we are to imitate; and this is that ſtate of *Sincerity* we are to aſpire to, as far as Humanity will permit.

Tuſculan. Quæſt. l. 5.

mit. And as in doing hereof the higheſt Perfection of Man's Will is beſt expreſs'd; ſo in the ſtate of *Patience* is there exerciſed that great Faculty, which the *Pythagoreans* have ſtyled, *The Strength and Bulwark of the Soul.*

V. PATIENCE *is a Vertue of the Soul, whereby 'tis enabled, for the ſake of that which is ſimply and abſolutely the beſt, to undergo all things; even that which, to the animal Nature, is totally harſh and ungrateful.*

We do not by *Patience* underſtand a bare paſſive and ſtupid Indolence; but a vigorous and poſitive Firmity of the Mind: ſuch as was before noted from *Metopus* the *Pythagorean*; *And ſuch as ſhrinks not from rugged and dangerous occaſions,* but bears up boldly and invincibly againſt all; ſo as 'tis not in the power of any Mortification whatever to turn the Will from the purſuit of that which is beſt.

VI. OF *Patience* there are two Parts or Species, which are *Continence*, and *Long-ſuffering*. We mean hereby, not thoſe *Demi-Virtues*, which are ſpoken of in the Schools of *Pythagoras* and *Ariſtotle*, but Virtues that are complete. *Continence therefore is that part or ſpecies of Patience, whereby the Soul does, on account of that which is ſimply the beſt, both eaſily and conſtantly endure whatever Grief or Moleſtation can ariſe by denying the ſenſual Appetite thoſe things, which would otherwiſe be grateful to it.*

Suffering is that ſpecies or part of Patience, whereby the Soul does in like manner, for the ſake

of

of that which is simply and absolutely the best, both easily and constantly endure whatever is hard and vexatious unto our natural Life.

VII. The Demonstration of these Virtues will be found in the *Noemas*, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh; But the use of them is of such extent, as to reach to almost all Virtues. Wherefore *Aristotle* every where speaks to the same effect, saying, *That all Moral Virtue has reference either to pleasure or to pain; that 'tis for pleasure we commit what is vile, and for fear of pain withdraw our selves from things that are honest.* So that *Epictetus* thought all Moral Philosophy was summ'd up in this short Precept, *Sustine & abstine:* As one part thereof referr'd to *Suffering*, the other to *Continence*.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 1. c. 2. Magn. Moral. l. 1. c. 6.

VIII. Hence it appears that *Continence*, and *Suffering*, are not barely Virtues, but such as are of a high account. For they both, in their Derivation, have reference to that *Force* and *Power* which is in the *Soul*, either to excite motion, or procure its rest. And to this Faculty refers what *Antoninus* adviseth, *That we cleanse the Imagination, and stop all Motions of the Sense.* Which takes in both the Duty of *Continence*, and of *Suffering*.

L. 7. § 29.

IX. But altho we have here said enough of the *Primitive Virtues*; yet we may further inculcate, that they are so much the true Parents or Patriarchs of all the rest, that in them alone all the Force and Essence of every other Virtue seems to be comprehended. Nor can any Man,

Man, that is poſſeſſed of theſe, find difficulty in acquiring the reſt. This we chuſe to notifie leſt the Mind ſhould be diſtracted after many things, when theſe very few Objects are ſufficient not only for its Exerciſe, but to ſatisfie the moſt zealous ſearch and anxiety after Virtue, and for attaining that Felicity which alone can attend it.

X. We only add, that 'tis impoſſible, if a Man wants theſe, he ſhould have any Real Virtue, whatever he may ſhew of what is counterfeit or caſual. For Virtue muſt not be incumbred with Error, nor can it live but under the Regency of that *Prudence* we have already deſcribed. Yet if a Man ſhall by adventure, and without that Prudence, light upon the doing of ſome brave Action, 'tis not Virtue, but Fortune, that muſt be applauded for ſuch happy chance.

XI. Nor can *Sincerity*, or *Simplicity*, be wanting unto Virtue: For without theſe, 'tis not Virtue, but a ſhadow and pretended Image thereof. And therefore if it ſhall appear even in things well done, that they ſcarce had either been begun or perfected, without ſome extrinſecal and adventitious end; 'tis plain, thoſe events, how proſperous ſoever, loſe both the Name and Nature of *Virtues*. For this was not the proſecuting what was abſolutely and ſimply the beſt; but that which to the Man himſelf, and to his Appetite, was moſt inviting. This is not Virtue's Office, but the Contrivance or Heat of ſome animal Deſign.

Design. 'Tis what is true, simple, and sincere is unto human Nature, as well as to Right Reason, most agreeable. Which, as *Tully* in his *Offices* hath explain'd. *Offic. l. 1.*

XII. But lastly, as for *Patience*, a good Man can less be without it than any of the rest: since there can be no security of the rest without this. For how can the effeminate Man, the ambitious, or he that is a mere Slave to his Appetite, be faithful either to his Prince, his Country, Religion, Friend, or himself. No, he will abandon God above, he will betray all if a Storm arise, and to exempt himself from the Difficulties that affright him, he will not scruple to expose and sell Mankind.

These are the Monsters and reproach of their Race, Men that know not Friendship or Justice, or have any sense of human Society. For the same *Tully* affirms, *That no man can be just, who fears Death, Pain, Banishment, or Want; or who prefers before Justice the things which are contrary to these Evils.* Of such Power is *Patience* for the support and vindication of Honesty. *Offic. l. 2.*

XIII. The same excellent Philosopher, as well as Orator, refers to the like Points, when again, in his *Offices*, he says, —— *That to think meanly of those things which others exalt, and even to spurn at them upon a steady and rational account, was the part of a great Mind. And, on the other side, to bear patiently things that are calamitous, so as not to lose the Decorum*

of

of Nature, or the Dignity of a wise Man, was the Mark of a generous Soul, and of an unshaken Mind. The first part of this Sentence points towards *Continence*, and the latter to *Suffering*. But he adds at last — *That to see a Man bid defiance to all Fears, yet be melted down by his own Desires; to see him invincible against all Labor, and yet to be overcome with his Lusts: this was a most deplorable state.* In this also we have a more plain intimation of those two Branches of *Patience*, namely, *Continence* and *Suffering*. And let this in short be sufficient for the three *Primitive Virtues.*

Chap. IV.

Of Justice in general: which is the first of the three principal Virtues, which are term'd Derivative.

1. THE *principal Derivative* Virtues are also three, as *Justice*, *Fortitude*, *and Temperance.*

Justice is well defin'd, by the Lawyers, to be, *Constans & perpetua Voluntas suum cuique tribuendi, A constant and perpetual Will to give every man his own.* And to this Sense *Aristotle* also conforms. So that this Virtue looks chiefly abroad, and is therefore properly called by the same Philosopher, *The Good of another:* *Ethic. Nicom. l. 5. c. 10.*

ther: and especially if you regard that Branch of it which comprehends our Duty towards our Neighbor. But there is a part hereof, which takes in what we owe to God; altho we are as unable to advantage him by our Offerings, as we are to diminish or damnifie his blessed State by our Demerits. The Principles of Justice are to be found in *Noema* the thirteenth, fourteenth, *&c.* on to the twenty third.

II. That which, in this *Definition*, is called *Suum*, or a *Man's own*; is also frequently termed by the Lawyers, *Jus* or *Right*: and they say every thing is truly so styled, which by a sort of Fit, and congruous Habitude (that is, by Custom, Sanction, or Constitution) appertains to any Man. Now this Habitude, or Title of Property, takes its Rise from somewhat founded in the person, to whom such Right is owing or accrews; whether it be by some Quality, or Action, or even any Passion, as understood in the largest Sense. For the Man, who falls into Poverty, but yet is Honest, has a sort of Right or Title to receive Alms: and he, who has gotten any thing by Lawful Industry, has Right to keep it; and the same, if it come to him by Donation: And so of the rest.

III. But altho all Right is founded in, and ariseth from things themselves (as they are the Object or Subject matter of personal Right) yet is not such Right always clear or intelligible, without reference to some *Law*, which

which must explain it. So *Andronicus Rhodius*, in his Commentary upon *Aristotle*, says, —— *In those things the Right is placed, in which the Law is also placed: For Law and Judgment is that which separates and discriminates Right from Wrong, and Just from Unjust.* However, as all Law is not of one and the same Nature; so neither all Right: For there is *Right Natural*, and *Right Legal*; and there is also *Law Natural*, and *Law Positive*. The first produceth those Sanctions, which are *immovable* and *permanent*; as from the latter come such as are *temporary* or *mutable*. These last do not obtain in every place; since they were made and fitted to those places only that stood in need of them. *Lib.* 5. *c.* 9.

IV. As to this *Law of Nature*, *Cicero* does in very apt, tho lofty, Terms, set it off in his First Book *de Legibus* —— *Let us* (says he) *for determining and constituting of Right, take our beginning from the supreme Law, which did in all Ages subsist both before any Law was written, or any City or Society of Men were in being.* But afterwards when he prescribes, that whatever partakes of Divine Nature (as he plainly owns our Souls to do) should be governed and directed by the Nature of God, by his Reason, Mind, Power, and Influence; in this he discovers, and reveals unto us, the Fountain and Original from whence proceeds the best and the most perfect Law of all.

For what (says he) *either among Men below, or in Heaven above, or in Earth, can be divinor*

than Reaſon? This is the Faculty, which, being matur'd and come to its Perfection, is by a more exalted Name call'd true Sapience. *Wherefore* (ſays he) *ſince nothing is preferable to this Reaſon, which is conſpicuous in man, as well as in God; we may conclude, it was Reaſon that made the firſt Bond of Society between God and Man.* *And this Bond being a Law, we may preſume that Men are conſociated to the Gods by Law.* Lib. 2. c. 1. § 9. which he plainly intimates, that this ſupreme Law, which was equally referable to Gods and Men, was *Right Reaſon:* and from thence deculcates a ſimilitude of Man with God.

V. AGAIN in his ſecond Book, where he Lib. 2. c. 4. § 3. deſcribes this *natural Law*, he calls it, Reaſon which reſulteth from the nature of things and which did not (as he ſays) then begin to be a Law, when firſt it was written, but when it firſt had being; and that ſuch Being it had from Eternity in the Divine Will. So that Law, which is eminent and truly ſuch, fit to command, and fit to reſtrain, is the *Right Reaſon* of *Jupiter* himſelf. (This Sentence Cap. 3. § 3. Cap. 1. § 7, 8, 9. correſponds with what was cited before from *Zeno*, and from *Antoninus.*)

VI. The truth is, all Men do agree, that the ſupreme Law is *Right Reaſon:* and that Reaſon, being alſo a Divine Thing, is therefore immutable, always conſtant and like unto it ſelf. But as it is placed in ſo mutable a Subject, as is human Nature, we ſee ſometimes how this Reaſon is not ſo much altered as even deſtroy'd and extinguiſh'd; But in God,

God, and among the number of Bleſſed Spirits (which are, by *Antoninus*, called immortal Gods) the ſame Reaſon flouriſhes everlaſtingly. This ſeems alſo to be the very mind of *Andronicus*, that beſt Interpreter of *Ariſtotle*. *For altho* (ſays he) *among Men all Laws were mutable; yet 'tis of neceſſity, that with the Gods they ſhould be immutable, and that Right ſhould therefore be ſome natural Thing. Nay even among Men who are of ſound mind, and under any conſtitution, there is that immutable Law which is called Natural. For it does not much import, that Men of depraved minds do not comprehend what is juſt: ſince Honey is ſtill ſweet, tho to the ſick, who have loſt their reliſh, it may appear otherwiſe.* L. 5. c. 10.

There is therefore a Law, which is eternal and immutable, and in ſome ſort common both to God and Men; namely *Right Reaſon*: which altho it enters not into the minds of Men wholly vitiated and profligate, yet ſtill is preſent, and always manifeſt to the ſound and prudent; which we have ſufficiently expos'd before. Cap. 2. §. 1, 6, 7.

VII. Now 'tis from this immutable and ſupreme Law, that all other Laws and Ordinances are drawn; even thoſe which are term'd mutable, and which would have no validity in them, unleſs by virtue of that high and eternal Law. And of this kind, the keeping of Faith in Contracts is a principal part. So *Virgil*,

— *At tu dictis*, Albane, *maneres.* *Virgil. Æneid. 4.* 8.

Wherefore, inasmuch as every man is bound to stand to his Promise or Compact; he is not to those Ordinances, which are not such by Nature, but by Law. Nay, Law it self is but a Compact, and, as such, must bind, where nothing is enacted by it against the supreme and immutable Law: But against this there is no Compact or Authority big enough to make any thing binding. For what is unjust in its own Nature, cannot by any external Consideration be made just. On which occasion Cicero says remarkably thus —— *If Laws were only to be constituted by the Command of the People, by the Decrees of the Prince, or by the Sentence of the Judges; it might be lawful to rob, to commit Adulteries, and to forge Wills, by procuring the Votes and Suffrage of the Multitude thereunto. And if such and so great a Power, could reside in the Votes of unruly Men, so as to alter the very Nature of things; 'tis strange to me how they forbear enacting, that the most pernicious things be not presently made both laudable and just.* This is the Raillery wherewith that great Man treated so weak and so fantastick a Paradox.

De Legibus, lib. 1.

VIII. Thus it appears; That, as from the Supreme Law, which is termed *Right Reason*, all perfect Knowledge of *Right* takes its original: so from the Observation of *Right* proceeds all Exercise of Justice.

CHAP.

Chap. V.

Of Piety.

I. Justice comprehends the two parts of *Piety* and *Probity*. For Piety it self is a ſort of *Juſtice*, by which we render to God the thing which is God's; that is to ſay, the thing which of Right appertaineth to him. And this Right of God's is very commonly term'd *Worſhip*: Which principally conſiſts in this, that we preſs vehemently to know him truly, as the infallible Means to love and honor him entirely. For as we are ſprung from him, and wholly depend upon his Will, ſo ought we to conſecrate all the Faculties of Soul and Body to his good Pleaſure, and to have our affiance in his Providence. And as to his holy Commands, whether thoſe that are writ in Books, or inſcribed inwardly in our Hearts; we muſt ſo fervently hearken and adhere thereto, as rather to bear all Infamy, Poverty, Oppreſſion, and even Death it ſelf, than quit our Integrity, or violate a good Conſcience. Theſe are God's Rights; and he that dares to derogate from them, or to infringe them, does as much as in him lies defraud and injure God himſelf.

II. 'Tis very obvious, that in theſe ſorts of things, the true Worſhip of God does conſiſt,

ſeeing all Men do by *Worſhip*, underſtand the Honor which is paid to God. Now 'tis plain that thoſe, of all others, do pay moſt Honor to God, who (knowing the excellency of the Divine Nature, and alſo what Affinity the Mind of Man holds therewith) do moſt ardently contend to have that part of the Soul which is ſo ally'd, preſerve its ſimilitude to the great Original; and do renounce all things, even life it ſelf, rather, than to damnifie that holy Reſemblance.

III. THERE can be no proof ſo convincing as this, of the Love, Honor, and Eſteem we pay to God. For while we reverence that poor Extract we bear of him; to the degree of ſpurning, not only the Pleaſures of Life, but even Life it ſelf, in compariſon of thoſe Conſolations, which in true Virtue and Right Reaſon can only be found: We do therein openly avow, that as God is infinitely more excellent than his poor Image; ſo is he by infinite Degrees both honor'd and valu'd by us above our ſelves. And to do otherwiſe, or to be negligent and languiſhing in his holy Worſhip, were either to be ignorant of a God, or elſe not to know that Reverence, which the Divine Nature both deſerves and demands from us.

IV. Now that Virtue is a thing Divine, and God's true Image, is therein manifeſt, that 'tis defin'd to be not what is moſt grateful to the Animal Life, but that which is abſolutely and ſimply the beſt. It was in this high ſenſe the

the ancient Philosophers understood it: where *Plato* (teaching that Miseries would then have an end, when we fled from this mortal state unto the Gods) he says, —— *That such Flight was our Translation into the similitude of God, and that such similitude (so far as it was possible) did consist in our being holy, just, and prudent.*

V. He adds in another place, that the Divine Nature was the Law and Boundary to all temperate Men *For* (says he) *to the honest, and to the prudent, God is the Law; but to the unadvised, there was no Law, but their Appetites.* And again he adds, —— *That God was the true Measure of all things, and not Man a Measure to himself.* And again, —— *That whoever was wise and honest was God's Friend, as being like unto him.* By all which *Plato* inculcates, how divine a thing Virtue was, and how much ally'd, and resembling unto God himself.

VI. Hence it is that *Cicero* in his *Tusculan Questions*, has such magnificent Words touching human Souls; —— *As if*, says he, *the mind of man were but extracted from the mind divine; and to be compar'd with no other but God himself, if it were not arrogance so to speak.* And then explaining, in his first Book *de Legibus*, that saying from the *Delphick* Oracle of *Nosce teipsum*, ; he adds, — *That whoever knows himself, must presently feel within him something which is divine; That he must conclude the Understanding given him, ought to be but as some* *Tusculan: Quest. 6. l. 5.*

De Legib.

Image dedicated to God; and that he ſtands bound both to ſay and act ſuch things as are worthy of ſo Heavenly a Gift.

Lib. 12. § 19. VII. Conſonant hereto are the frequent Sayings of *Marcus Antoninus*, —— *That we muſt confeſs we have ſomewhat within us more excellent and divine than what ſubmits to the Controlment of our Paſſions, or than can be agitated by them as it were a mere Puppet.* He adds a little after, —— *That every Man's Mind is a God, and had its Original from him.* And again, —— *Why ſeek we farther than the immediate buſineſs of a Creature intellectual? One that loves Society, and partakes in thoſe Laws which are common to God!*

Sect. 2.

Sect. 22. It were endleſs to name all he ſays: yet, where he teaches in brief what it was to be converſant with the Gods, he ſays thus, *That every Man lives with the Gods, who does what is dictated by the God, which* Jupiter *has given him for his Captain and Director.* Meaning hereby, *That every Man's own Reaſon, and his Intellect, was that Director or inferior God.* Nay, ſo ally'd he thinks the Soul unto God, as to call it a diſmembred *Parcel* of him: altho herein he ſpoke but little as a Philoſopher.

VIII. SINCE therefore there is ſo much of Divinity interwoven in a virtuous Mind; 'tis plain, that if we cultivate Virtue, as it has reference to God, and as 'tis his moſt viſible Image, we manifeſtly worſhip the great God himſelf. And whereas other Rituals have been ſubject to Mutation, and ſhall not be laſting; this one Right of Adoration, which

which is God's Right, muſt be immutable and everlaſting.

Wherefore the Sum of all natural *Religion* ſeems to conſiſt in that Precept of *Antoninus*, *To remember God, and to know that he abhors all Hypocriſie, and will not be ſerv'd but with what is rational and like to himſelf.* Or, as he elſewhere ſpeaks, *That a Man ſhould not rejoice, or acquieſce in any thing, but in paſſing from one good action to another; ſuch as had reference to God's Glory, and to the publick Good.* For God's moſt *immovable* and *immutable Right* is this, that we love him for his wonderful Perfections, and then imitate him as much as we can. *Lib.* 10. *Lib.* 6. § 7.

IX. THIS however is not ſaid to the excluſion of other Rights; which have either been reveal'd by holy Oracles, or injoin'd by the Decree of the ſupreme Magiſtrate. For there may be various Ceremonies, and other Circumſtances of Divine Worſhip, which, in Virtue of a Law, may be eſtabliſh'd as of Divine Right, and ſuch as may not be violated, till by Legal Authority they are revok'd. But ſtill theſe muſt have no Repugnancy in them, either to the Oracles of God, or to the ſupreme Laws of Virtue.

X. Now from all that has been ſaid, 'tis eaſie to comprehend what *Piety* is; For according to *Plato*'s Definition, *Holineſs is a part of Juſtice*; and ſo *Andronicus Rhodius* (almoſt to the ſame ſenſe) defines it to be, *A Science that makes us faithful and obedient unto the Laws Divine.* Whence 'tis manifeſt what Impiety muſt

muſt be: and how fitly it may be divided into theſe ſeveral kinds, namely, *Superſtition*, *Profaneneſs*, *Enthuſiaſm*, and *Rituality*.

XI. Now *Superſtition* is a ſort or mode of Impiety, in faſtening upon God (by way of Worſhip) thoſe things which are contumelious to him: which is plainly to be injurious to the Deity. Wherefore, *Superſtition is that Impiety, by which a man conſiders God to be ſo light, or ſo paſſionate, as with trivial things either to be appeas'd, or elſe mov'd to wrath.*

Prophaneneſs alſo is that Impiety, by which a Man does with Impudence and Imprudence violate all Divine Rights, whether temporary, or immutable. And this Diſeaſe does ſometimes ripen into downright *Atheiſm*; than which no ſtate of the Soul can be more ſad and deplorable.

XII. ENTHUSIASM is that Impiety, by which a Man does boldly violate, and kick under foot, all external Rights; while yet he drives on, with Heat and Ardor of Mind, to ſome internal and ſpiritual Worſhip of God.

But *Rituality* is that Impiety, by which a Man, while he is obſerving thoſe exterior Rights of God, and adheres with a ſort of Conſcience to things ceremonial; does in the mean time freeze, as to any ſpiritual Feeling, or internal Worſhip of God.

XIII. THESE in a manner are thoſe Offences in Religion, which are moſt obvious: but if others increaſe the number, I ſhall not gainſay it. I confeſs it was our intention to treat

treat rather of the Virtues than of the Vices: But, as *Ariſtotle* ſays, the one may be known by compariſon with the other. *And the Rule or Law is Judge unto both.* *De Anima, l. 1. c. 5.*

However the Demonſtration of the preſent Virtue of Piety is particularly explain'd in *Noema* the thirteenth, ſixteenth, and twenty firſt: As alſo in the fifth, eighth, tenth, *&c.* For as to the Being of a God, and that our Souls are immortal; we have ſufficiently prov'd theſe in our Writings *againſt Atheiſm, and of the Souls immortality:* unto which we therefore refer.

CHAP. VI.

Of Probity: Or of Juſtice, properly ſo called.

I. THE other part of *Juſtice* is *Probity*, by which we give to every Man what is his own. And this may be divided into three parts, *Political*, *Oeconomical*, and *Moral*.

The firſt contains the Offices of the Magiſtrate towards the People, and of the People to the Magiſtrate.

The ſecond refers to the Duties of a Father towards Children, Wife, and Family; and of each of theſe towards their Maſter, Father, and Husband.

The

The third refers to the Duties of private Men, or at leaſt of equals, each to other. Of all which to ſpeak in particular would be too tedious.

II. But this in ſhort may be ſaid, that 'tis not the part of a Magiſtrate to act againſt Reaſon, or to be ſwayed by his own paſſion, but in all things to adhere to what is preſcribed by Law and by Right Reaſon. For as *Ariſtotle* calls the Magiſtrate, *The very Soul and Spirit of the Law*; ſo *Tully* on the other hand holds, *That a Magiſtrate ſhould not only be directed, but even animated by the Laws.* This (ſays he) *is the Power and Duty of a Magiſtrate who preſides, that he direct things profitable and juſt, and ſuch as hold conformity with the Laws. For as the Magiſtrate is above the People, ſo are the Laws above the Magiſtrate.* Now the Peoples Duty is, to obey the Magiſtrate, to contribute chearfully and liberally to the publick Charge; not to contend about things indifferent, ſuch as have by Cuſtom paſs'd into Right, but to preſerve Peace, Society and good Order.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 5.

De Legibus, lib. 3.

III. The Father of a Family ſhould be careful, to look about; to provide all things neceſſary; to treat with Gentleneſs his Wife, Children, and Servants: Above all, to avoid either giving pernicious example, or permitting it in others, but rather early to ſuppreſs, or expel it from the Houſe. On the other hand, 'tis the Duty of each of theſe reſpectively, to give the other all fit Obſervance; and, tho he ſhould at times be out of humor, or a little

little in the wrong, yet were it not wise or proper hastily to contend or dispute with him. For as *Pittacus* advised, *'Tis not seemly to be wrangling with your Parents, altho what you speak be the right.* And indeed this Rule may well take place in respect of Magistrates, and even all that are superior to us, either in Age or in Relation: And, even to our Uncles in particular, whom the Ancients called Parents.

IV. Lastly, the Duty of private Men towards their Equals, and indeed towards all, is, ever to be aiding either in Help or Counsel, when it is in our power to do it. Much more are we tied to observe all our Compacts and Promises; but never to seek our own Benefit by another Man's Hurt.

V. Now as to that celebrated Division of Justice into *Distributive* and *Corrective*, it has chiefly reference to the Politicks. And in that Division it is where *Aristotle*'s Observation takes place, namely, that *Justice* was a sort of *Equality*. But the *Equality* whereto Justice inclines, and which it seems to affect, is of that sort which shews it self in the ways of *Proportion*. For Proportion is a *Rationum Æqualitas*, which *Ratio* (in the Language of Geometry) is that Relative Correspondence which one Quantity or Number has to another; or by which it appears, how often one Quantity or Number does comprehend, or is comprehended in another.

VI.

VI. But as to Proportion or Analogy, this is either *Geometrical* or *Arithmetical.*

The *Geometrical Proportion* is when four Magnitudes, or four Numbers are so compar'd, namely, 2, 6; 4, 12; or 6, 2; 12, 4. As that the third (namely 12) in this latter Example, doth as often contain the Fourth (which is 4,) as the first (namely 6) does contain the second (which is 2;) And thus the third in the first Example (namely 4) is as often contain'd in the fourth (which is 12) as is the first (namely 2) in the second (which is 6.)

This is the Proportion that refers to *Distributive Justice.* For as one person is to another, suppose *Ajax* to *Achilles*, so also, in judicial Determinations, ought there to be had a due consideration of Honor to Honor. This is that which is call'd the Equality of *Proportion.* For if the Merits of several Men shall happen to have the same Circumstances and Reasons of Equality; 'tis fit that not only in *Reason*, but even in *Magnitude*, their Rewards should be also equal.

VII. As for *Arithmetical Proportion* 'tis when four Numbers, or Magnitudes, are so compar'd, as in 5, 7: 9, 11. That the same Excess or Defect attends the two first each to other, as is in one of the latter to the other. Namely, that in each of them there be the same Equality, both of Excess, and of Defect, as in the Numbers above. And this has reference to *Corrective Justice.*

But

But here we must ingenuously confess, that it seems hard to find in the Measures of *Corrective Justice* any sufficient or competent Image of such *Arithmetical Proportion* as in this Distinction of the said four Terms is express'd. For whatever *Andronicus* thought to the contrary, 'tis plain, that the Excesses and Defects which arise from the Terms before enumerated, are not equal. 'Tis true, that two and two, as to the *Ratio* are equal. But to take two from seven, and but two from eleven, is as to *Proportion* unequal. So also to add two to seven, and but two to five is not equal. Wherefore if we should humour *Andronicus* in his own way, and venture to suppose or invent a Case of four Terms, it would seem fit to make the two first of them to be (as for example) the Party who bears the Injury, and then the Party who gave it, which however is so to be understood, that as yet no Appeal is made to any Judge, or Sentence given against the Wrong-doer. But when afterwards the offended Party takes on him the Name of Plaintiff, and the offending Party that of Defendant; here two other new Terms are started up, and then it follows, after Sentence given by the Judge; that the Excess or Difference, which before appear'd between him that did the wrong, and him that bore it, is quite inverted. For what the Doer or Defendant injuriously took, is now by Sentence commanded back; and by how much he first over- *Lib. 5. c. 5.*

overcame the Sufferer or Plaintiff by what he took away; by ſo much is he now pulled back, and damnified by what he is forced to refund. And this is true *Arithmetical Proportion.*

L. 5. c. 5. VIII. The ſame *Andronicus* ſeems to level at the like thing in what he thus adds, *That as it the Wrong-doer to the Sufferer, ſo is the Judge to the Wrong-doer: For what this Man did againſt the other, the Judge does the ſame againſt him; and ſo makes them equal.* And this ought to refer as well to the Defect, as to the Excels, of what is equal; for Injuries, whether great or ſmall, ought to have proportionable Reparation. But he that is curious after ſuch Niceties as theſe, may, if he think fit, conſult that Author, who dwells (as we conceive) too long on this Piece of Subtilty. For 'tis plainly our Opinion, that a Man may very well adminiſter *Corrective Juſtice*, tho he never heard, in his life, the Meaning of *Arithmetical Proportion.*

IX. It would make more to our purpoſe, if as well that Diſtinction, as that Relation, between *Juſtice* and *Equity*, were obſerv'd, L. 5. c. 16. which *Andronicus* notes in theſe words; *That* (ſays he) *which we call equal, is juſt; and ſome Caſes more excellent than what is only juſt. Not that Equity excels Juſtice; or that it is another kind, and ſo more excellent in its nature; but only by being of a greater extent. For* (as he adds) *Equity is that which ſupplies the Defects of the Law; And, ſince all Events could not be particularly foreſeen, Equity not only corrects Errors, but ſuperadds Reſtrictions and*

Limitation,

limitations, which were omitted at the making of the Law.

X. Now it seems worth our while to reflect on this Definition of *Equity*, as it plainly ſatisfies there is ſomething, which in its own Nature is juſt. For if nothing were juſt, but in virtue of ſome written Law; what need then would there be of Emendation; ſuppoſing the Law (whatever it were) made every thing juſt? But 'tis the part and Province of *Equity*, to over-rule and correct the very Law (even as the Intellect does the Will;) and, as *Ariſtotle* ſays, *To eſtabliſh ſuch things in ſuch Caſes, as the Legiſlator himſelf had not failed to have provided for, had he but foreſeen the event.* But this Saying of his had been very ridiculous, if the Nature of *Juſt* and *Unjuſt*, had not been grounded on the Nature of things, and the various Circumſtances that attend them; but depended merely on the Will and Pleaſure of a Legiſlator.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 5. c. 14.

L. 2. c. 4. §. 3.

And thus much of *Juſtice*.

Chap. VII.

Of the other two principal Derivative Virtues, Fortitude and Temperance.

I. Fortitude and *Temperance* herein agree, that they relate more immediately to our selves: yet the Benefit of these, as of every other Virtue, redounds some way unto our Neighbour; and hence we style them *Universal Justice*. So *Rhodius* the Paraphrast has it: *This is Justice, when we turn every Virtue to the Use and Advantage of another.* So to abstain from another Man's Wife is *Justice* as well as *Temperance*; and to repel the Enemies of our Country, is *Justice* and *Fortitude* both; for as this is a Debt we owe our Country, so without Fortitude we could not discharge it.

L. 5. c. 1.

II. But what *Fortitude* is, both *Tully* and *Aristotle* inform us, in their Descriptions of a *courageous Man*. The first tells us; *That the Man of a steady and couragious mind, is not to be shaken at cross events; he must not fall from his Character, and shew Confusion; he must have presence of mind to direct what stands with Reason: and 'tis the mark of a high Capacity to foresee all that may fall out, and to provide accordingly for it. Herein consists the chief Renown, to overcome by Prudence and good Advice: for to rush headlong into a Battel, or to fall to hand-blows with an Enemy, this alone is a poor and brutal thing. 'Tis true, when the time is come,*

De Officiis, l. 1.

and

and that neceſſity requires it, then we muſt ſtrike luſtily, and prefer death before any thing that is ſervile or baſe. But as we muſt not paſs for Cowards by an induſtrious ſhunning of Dangers; ſo 'tis not neceſſary, and it were even ridiculous, to expoſe our ſelves, when there is no Cauſe that requires it.

III. YET *Andronicus*, in Conformity with his *Ariſtotle*, makes it one part of a *valiant Man*, that he dares intrepidly advance towards any danger: *So that his ſtout Man is he that fears nothing.* And *Tully* elſewhere ſays, *That the two great Gifts of Fortitude, are the Contempt of Pain and Death.* But *Andronicus* is more accurate in Circumſtances: adding, that the Dangers attending his Hero ſhould be, *Such as allow'd him to exert the Power of an inflexible Mind, and the Dint of his Will; or elſe to have before him the Contemplation of a noble Death: For that he was properly valiant, who could frankly ſubmit to any excellent way of dying.* L. 3. c. 7. L. 3. c. 8.

He has it alſo elſewhere, *That whoever is valiant, moves ſteadily towards a glorious Death.* But this ſort of Death can only be purchaſed in the Cauſe and Quarrel of Virtue. *For not thoſe, who paſſionately rage and lay about them, are the Men we ſpeak of: they are Fighters indeed, but not valiant. Whence we may conclude, that Fortitude is a Virtue, by which a Man may, with Conſtancy of Mind, bear up againſt all the Dangers of Life, and even Death it ſelf. And this either for the Cauſe of Honeſty, or the ſake of that which is ſimply and abſolutely the beſt.*

IV. I mention here *Constancy of Mind*, and not *Indolence* or *Insensibility*. For as *Andronicus*, according to the Mind of *Aristotle*, has it, L. 3. c. 9. *To be gnaw'd with sorrow upon cross events, is not at all inconsistent which being courageous. For by how much a Man is oppress'd with Grief, and yet bears up for Virtues sake, by so much the more deserves he the Reputation of being valiant.* But here I also mention a *virtuous Cause*: For a Mind that is dispos'd to Dangers, not for common Utility, but for private Ends, this must rather pass for *Boldness* than for *Fortitude*.

V. CICERO saith, *A Mind that is great and valiant has these two Marks. The first is a light* De Offic. l. 1. *esteem of outward things; for it will plainly appear, that a Man ought neither to admire, or wish for, any thing, but what is just and suitable. Nor ought he ever to submit servilely to any Man, or be subjected to the Perturbations of Mind or Fortune. The other is, when a Mind is so fram'd and constituted, as to undergo great things; I mean, publick Services, full of Difficulty, Labor, and Danger: and particularly with reference to life, and all the Conveniencies of living.* This excellent Sentence of *Cicero*, may serve as a Paraphrase on the Definition we have mention'd before.

VI. BUT as for the Cause of Honesty or Virtue, the greatest Dangers are to be undertaken; so on the same account are corporeal Pleasures to be renounced. Else it were only so much *Temperance*, as a certain Morosene[ss] or Stupidity of the Mind. For there can be no

no Virtue, where the end is other than what is honeſt and ſimply good. Wherefore *Temperance* may be defin'd to be, *A Virtue, by which a Man forbids himſelf corporeal Pleaſures; to the end he may enjoy that Pleaſure, which reſults from a Conſcience of well-doing, both more conſtantly and more entirely.* For to obſerve great Rules of *Temperance* merely for Health's ſake, may alſo be the Virtue of a Beaſt; This does not mount up to that point, which makes us Men, but is a thing in common with inferior Animals.

VII. By *bodily Pleaſures*, I here underſtand not thoſe thin and purer ones, which come by *Seeing*, *Hearing*, or *Smelling*; but (as *Ariſtotle* notes) thoſe groſſer ones of the *Taſte*, and the *Touch*; which relate to *Senſuality*, and to the Companions and Inflamers of it, namely, to Wine, and high Feeding. *Temperance* is, almoſt by all the Writers, confin'd to the Boundaries we here ſet down: Whence 'tis plain, that 'tis but a Branch or Parcel of that Primitive Virtue, which we have call'd *Continence*, even as *Fortitude* is a Branch of *Patience*. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 3. c. 13.*

The Reaſons of *Temperance* and *Fortitude*, may be had from *Noema* the fifth, ſixth, ſeventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth. As of *Probity*, from the fourteenth, fifteenth, ſixteenth, ſeventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, two and twentieth, and three and twentieth. Which unto all who think fit to examine them will ſoon appear.

Chap. VIII.

Of the Reductive Virtues.

I. WE have explain'd the nature of the principal *Derivative Virtues*; and the Reasons of them are, from their *Noemata*, briefly expos'd.

To these three Virtues, all that remain may not unfitly be reduced, so as we venture to call them all Reductive Virtues: And the reason of each will be found in those *Noemata*, unto which their Principles are referr'd.

II. Now such of this kind as are reducible unto *Justice*, are as follow, *Liberality*, *Magnificence*, *Veracity*, *Gratitude*, *Candor*, *Urbanity*, *Fidelity*, *Modesty*, *Humanity* (or a Love to Mankind) and *Hospitality*. Lastly, *Friendship* it self, and such others as comprize good Will towards our Neighbors; namely, *Affability*, *Courtesie*, or *Officiousness*, which are also Branches of *Humanity*. For since the Effects of all these Virtues have reference to our Neighbor; and that all are dictated from right Reason, which has the power of a Law; 'Tis but fit to rank them as Parts and Parcels of *Justice*.

Unto *Fortitude* we refer *Magnanimity* and its Dependents; as *Generosity*, *Lenity*, *Constancy*, and also *Diligence*. *Andronicus* adds unto them *Vivacity*, *Presence of Mind*, *Vigor*, and *Manhood*.

Lastly,

Lastly, unto *Temperance* we refer *Frugality*, *Humility*, *Modesty*, *Austerity*, and those other Adherents which *Andronicus* adds, namely, *A slender and uncompounded Diet*, *Unblamableness in Behaviour*, and *a contented Mind*.

These are the Names of the most remarkable of the Reductive Virtues; for we ravel not into every small thing, nor involve our selves in their strict and minute Definitions; since the Nature of such Dependents, may enough be known from those *Principal* or *Primitive Virtues*, unto which they refer.

III. However, it will not be amiss to touch a little on each of those above, and especially on such of them as have reference unto *Justice*, because they are Branches of that *Justice*, which *Rhodius* calls and defines to be *Voluntary Justice*. For the Probity of every Man is more conspicuous, where no Penalty compels him, than where he is liable to Law, or else to Defamation, for what he does.

IV. Liberality has reference to the Use of Mony: *And there is no other Use thereof, than spending and bestowing it.* So that he who, according to his Fortune, does chearfully and willingly spend upon fit Persons, and in things convenient, and in proper place; he may justly be stiled *Liberal*; he that keeps no Measures, is a *Prodigal*; and he that falls short in these, is a *Niggard*. *Andronicus*, l. 4. c. 1.

V. Magnificence has also reference to Expence; but then it must be in things singular and great, as the Name it self de-

notes. And here, in like manner, three Considerations must enter, of the *Person*, of the *Work*, and of its *End* or *Use*. For it behoves not every Man to make large Expence; and is he that does it properly *Magnificent*, unless what he splendidly lays out, is also dedicated to some very great End. Wherefore *Aristotle* notes, That things of this Rate and denomination, are commonly for *Divine Use*, or for the *Publick*.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 4. c. 5.

VI. GRATITUDE is an excellent and cheerful part of *Justice*; by which he that receives a Benefit, does impatiently, and as soon as possibly he can, repay it with Advantage.

VII. VERACITY is a Virtue which leads a Man to shew, both in word and deed, what really he is, without Simulation or Dissimulation in any thing. However, the latter of these two Faults is more excusable, if moderately performed, and only done to avoid shew of Vanity or Pride. But, if it exceed Bounds, it favors of Arrogance; just as *Aristotle* observed in the *Laconic* Garment, saying, *He that is too affected in his own dimension, as well as he who is Pragmatical in his own Praises, is guilty of Ostentation.* But tho that of *Aristotle's* be an elegant Care, in his opposing two Vices to every Virtue; yet to me it would seem more profitable, if we opposed unto Truth that single Vice, by which one Man takes on him the Guise of another to conceal his own; and which we do most significantly term *Hypocrisie*. Thus is an Evil in the

Nicom. Ethic. l. 4. c. 13.

Lib. 2. c. 9. § 1.

the World, which is the Mother of much Mischief; and many are involved in great Disappointments and Tribulations by it, as well as the *Hypocrite* himself.

VIII. CANDOR is that which guides us to interpret with Benignity the Words and Actions of all Men: But when they are such as cannot well be born; then, with an honest and decent Liberty, to check and reprehend them. The Opposites to this Virtue are called *Moroseness* on the one hand, as of *Caressing* on the other: But when it tends to our Lucre or Advantage, then 'tis called *Cajoling* or *Adulation*.

IX. URBANITY is when either we pleasantly and inoffensively play upon others, or bear the like from them: And those, who will agree to neither of these ways, are by *Aristotle* call'd *Clowns* and *Rusticks*. But for such as spare none, and keep neither Bounds nor Decorum in their Jesting, they are termed *Scurrilous*. *Ethic. Nicom.* l. 4. c. 14.

X. FIDELITY is seen, when we stand to our Promises, and in restoring back what has been deposited with us, where no written Law can compel it.

XI. MODESTY is a constant and perpetual Observance of what belongs to *Decorum*: Therefore it seems as the very Flower of *Justice*, or rather somewhat more delicate, or paramount unto it. For *Justice* commands us to do Violence to no Man; but *Modesty* says, do not so much as displease a Man. And in this

De Offic. l. 1. this (says *Cicero*) is the Power of *Decor* chiefly seen. For he defines it to be, *A th which conforms to that Superiority in Man, by wh his Nature has distinguish'd him from other Cr tures.* And surely this is enough to admonish against yielding to any thing that is brutal, against the Dignity of our Composition.

But we are further to know, that, besi general *Decorum*, there are also some speci Acts therein, which are suited to every Ran Age, and Condition of Life: As to th Prince and to the Priest; the Philosopher a the Plebeian; Men and Women; the Ag and the Young, and the like. But let th be the Rule for all, That we pay to ever one what by custom they may expect; a that which, by the common Opinion of a Men, is establish'd and approv'd. Thus w shall give Disappointment to none, nor d spise the Judgment of the Publick. But f any single Man to set up in defiance of a his Companions, and to despise whatever th Neighborhood shall say of him; this look not only arrogant, but as if he were stupid or growing profligate.

Wherefore to observe a degree of Rev rence towards all Men, is part of *Justi* neither should we by ill Gestures, or by immo derate Talking, offend the Sight, or overl the Hearing of any one.

XII. HUMANITY is a Virtue, which from the sense of that Excellency that is human Nature and the common Affinity we

hav

have with all Mankind, leads us to be officious and benevolent to every one.

Hospitality is a Virtue, which moves us to be kind to Strangers, not only as they are Men, but as destitute perhaps, while abroad, of those Conveniencies they had at home.

XIII. CIVILITY is a Virtue that minds us of our Tye to all Men in the common Link of Humanity; and bids us with such Chearfulness of Voice, Countenance, and Gesture, to salute whom we meet; as that when we ask them How they do, they may think themselves even the better for our asking.

Affability is when we, being met and spoken to by others, do with Gentleness and good Expressions entertain them.

But *Officiousness* is where a Man stoops to every little Service towards his Superiors, or at least his Equals; and is flying to do every small thing that the Company seems to want.

All these Virtues are fitly referable to *Humanity*.

But hereto is opposed, not only what is plain *Inhumanity*, but that fond and affected Humor of some, who will needs pretend to oblige the whole World, and so to caress some Men in particular, as if presently they would adopt them, and make their Fortunes; while in reality, they mind nothing they say, or intend more by those enormous Civilities, than the pleasure of supposing they are just credited while they speak.

This

This we call a manifeſt Infraction of *Juſtice*, becauſe by ſuch deluſion, an honeſt He is often rob'd of his ſincereſt Affections; th which he has not a more valuable Treaſure beſtow, where he is really willing to obli or to be grateful: So that we juſtly make no leſs criminal, than any other Rape Felony.

XIV. Lastly, *True Friendſhip* ſtands in rank of Virtue. But for that which is vulgar ſo called, 'tis, for the moſt part, nothing el but the Combination of a few cunning M againſt the reſt of their Neighbors, to ſer the Turn of each other. They award unju ly, and bear falſe witneſs; and call this mu tual good Will and Friendſhip among them ſelves, while they undo the reſt. This is th more vile and abject piece of *Injuſtice*, as i is mixed with *Hypocriſie*: For they ſatisf themſelves, in that the Injury is not done wi intention to hurt their Neighbor, but only t gratifie a Friend.

But as for that which is real *Friendſhip* doubtleſs, there is nothing more Holy, o more Divine; 'tis not leſs a Virtue, than *Humanity* or *Hoſpitality*: And 'tis only to b found with ſuch as are poſſeſs'd of all o ther Virtues. It comprehends thoſe Duties which are not only owing to good Men in general, but to thoſe eſpecially, whoſe long Converſation, whoſe try'd Sincerity, whoſe Uſefulneſs and good Turns, have obliged u to diſtinguiſh and place them above the reſt of Mortals. Howeve

However the best Fruit of Friendship is a mutual Stimulation unto Virtue. Thus it was noted of old among the *Pythagoreans*: *for* (says *Iamblichus*) *they did frequently admonish each other, never to separate from him, who was one with them in God. For all their applications to Friendship, both in word and deed, tended but to an Union and Communion with God; and that all might be, as it were, incorporated together into a Divine Life.* To which he presently adds, *Than which, nothing better can be found, either in their Discourses, or in their practice of Living. And I do likewise believe, that it comprehends all the Duties of true Friendship.* *Aristotle* is not much different from this sense, where he notes, that the principal Fruit and Pleasure of Friendship, did consist in those things which are proper to us as Men, namely, as we were rational and discoursive: *For the Society of Men at a Table, was not as the business of Cattle feeding in the same Pasture, but for Ratiocination and Intercourse of Speech.* And thus much, in short, of those Virtues which are reducible to *Justice*.

Iamblichus de Vitâ Pythagoricâ, c. 33.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 9. c. 8.

XV. MAGNANIMITY is the first of those Virtues, which have reference to *Fortitude*, or rather unto *Sufferance*. But it is sufficiently understood from *Aristotle*'s Character of one that is *Magnanimous*. *He is one* (says he) *who strives to do great Things, or what may be for great Ends, and by which he may acquire great Honor. He is not therefore so apt to run into frequent Dangers, as into great ones;*

Ethic. Nicom. l. 4. c. 7, 8.

ones; not prompt for every Turn, but rather slow and deliberate; he will not rashly undertake even great Matters, but with Counsel and good Caution; he is not much taken up with the Care of worldly Concerns, as not thinking them either great enough, or of much account. But Honor is in his esteem, as the highest of human-external Benefits, inasmuch as he observes, 'tis the highest thing we have to pay, even to the Gods.

Here we suppose our magnanimous Man to be so perfectly endowed; as that knowing his own Virtue, which is a Heavenly Gift, he believes he ought not to be deprived by Men of the Honour which should attend it.

Yet if Men shall ungratefully refuse to do their Parts herein, he makes no Idol of this Honor, or of their popular Incense: For, being conscious of his own single Virtue, he can there sit down as at a Feast. And thus the Learned Paraphrast adds to his Character, *That he is a Man who has greater consideration for Truth, and for his Duty than for Fame.* And as *Ennius* also notes, *He is one that carries Friendship and Enmity in an open Breast.* For who need fly to Corners, or be asham'd of Truth, that being satisfied of his own Goodness, and ravish'd with the Joys of such a Blessing, must needs have Contempt for inferior Matters, and can sooner part with his Life, than renounce Virtue, or any Branch thereof?

These are the chief Marks and Characters, that *Aristotle* gives the *Magnanimous*. And 'tis with good reason that *Magnanimity*

ity is referr'd to *Fortitude*, and to *Sufferance*: for we cannot possibly undertake great Things, without much Labor and great Vexation, and those who voluntarily decline Honour and publick Office, do it for the most part upon the score of Ease.

XVI. LENITY also is fitly referr'd to *Fortitude*, and to *Sufferance*; inasmuch as to bear Injuries is an Act of *Patience*, and to despise them, the property of a great Mind: So that from both or either of them, results *Lenity*; by which, tho injur'd, we are not easily provok'd to Resentments, at least, we can easily abstain from Revenge. And hereto refers that excellent Advice of *Antoninus*: *That it was highly estimable to live benignly, and to practise Truth and Justice, even among Men of no Truth, and of no Justice.* For indeed nothing does more naturally try or stir up the Indignation of a generous Mind, than to see Men given over to Falshood and Imposture. *Lib. 6. Sect. 47.*

XVII. GENEROSITY differs herein from *Magnanimity*, that it seems to be a more common Virtue, and is not only restrained to great Honors, or to great Enterprises, but consists in this, That a Man exercise his own freedom and liberty of Thinking in the best manner he can; that he rest contented herein; and as to Fortune, and the World's Opinion, to look on them as things of indifferency; yet still to regard all Men with Civility, and to suppose them what they ought to be, till the contrary be made manifest.

XVIII.

XVIII. CONSTANCY is a Virtue, by which we are taught to be just and conformable to our selves, in all things we do or say.

Diligence is a Virtue, by which we prosecute indefatigably whatever we had good cause to undertake.

Lib. de Passionibus.

Vivacity is defin'd by *Andronicus*, *To be a firm and lively Aptitude in the Soul to perfist whatever is begun.*

But *Presence of Mind* seems to intimate a certain Promptitude of the Soul, to undertake what it ought, and therein to perfist: So that it seems to differ but little from *Diligence*. He names also *Strenuousness*, which he makes to be an Habit that enables us to hold out in the laborious Searches of Virtue.

Lastly, *Manhood* or *Virility*, is by him defin'd to be, *A Vertue, by which a Man carries himself stoutly, and with Circumspection through publick Affairs.* And he makes the principal Functions hereof to consist, in being Intrepid as to Death, Bold in all Dangers, and to prefer an Honorable Exit before Shameful Living. These indeed are the Parts of *Fortitude* also.

XIX. THERE now only remain those Vertues, which appertain to *Temperance*, or (if you will) to *Continence*.

Such as *Frugality*, that is a Virtue, by which a Man, consulting both Temperance and his own Condition, becomes more sparing in his Expence, yet so as not to be quite Parsimonious. From which Definition

is plain, that *Frugality* is fitly referr'd unto *Temperance*, as is *Liberality* unto *Justice*: For this latter appertains to the Benefit of others, whereas the former has reference to our selves.

XX. HUMILITY is a Vertue, by which we easily suppress and extinguish all inordinate Desires of Honor, Rule, and the Splendor of Riches; that so we may be able to fix our Minds upon better things. This conforms to the Mind of *Marcus* the Emperor, who advises a Man, *In every Occasion that presents, to demonstrate himself just, prudent, and a plain follower of God.* *Marcus*, l. 12. § 27.

XXI. AUSTERITY is defin'd, by *Andronicus Rhodius*, to be, *An Habit of the Soul that cannot bear any Lewdness either in Speech or Pleasure.* *Modesty* seems nearly ally'd, as being a Vertue in the Soul, which chaseth early away all the Preparations to Sin; nay it cannot easily bear any thing that looks but suspiciously naught.

XXII. As to the *Slenderness of Diet* in point of *Quantity*, and the *plainness* of it in reference to *Cost*, this seems something stricter than *Frugality* it self. *Andronicus* calls this latter, *An habit of being content with any thing*: And the first, *An habit void of Desire to see Charge or Preparation in any thing.* *De Passionibus.*

For the *Inoffensiveness of Gesture*, it does consist, in Ordering the Figure and Motion of the Body, according to Decorum; and this makes it to be a part of *Modesty*.

Contentment of Mind is an habit of being eaſily ſatisfied with the common Conveniences of Life. For, according to the old Obſervation, *Nature is content with a very little.*

XXIII. Thus have we treated of the *Reflective Vertues*, with what Brevity we could. But as we dwelt not long upon them, ſo we judge it leſs needful to enumerate every Vice, ſince their Natures are known enough from the Doctrine of thoſe Vertues which they contradict.

However, as we ſtill reſolve not to go far, or meddle with every Vice, which ſome ſuppoſe to be as ſo many Extremes to Vertue; yet we ſhall preſume to examin that *Mediocrity* which *Ariſtotle* treats of, and in which the Nature of Vertue is made to conſiſt.

Much Contention is made herein; yet we ſhall venture to ſpeak our Senſe in the *Chapter* following.

Chap. IX.

Of that Mediocrity, in which Vertue does conſiſt: And of the true meaſure of ſuch Mediocrity.

I. That Vertue lies in a *Mediocrity* is not quite untrue, if rightly underſtood: Yet as ſome introduce Vertue attended, on each

L. 2. c. 8. §. 7.

each hand, with oppoſite Vices; and juſt as it were a Roſe placed between two Nettles: This, we do confeſs, were a pretty Show, but it cannot poſſibly hold in every Caſe.

II. For in the Caſe of *Juſtice*, where a Man takes no more than what is of right his due; this is plainly oppoſite to that part which is vicious, and where a Man takes more than what is his due. But here if a Man takes leſs; this ſurely ſeems no Vice, but rather a ſort of *Generoſity*, or *Modeſty*. So again in the Conferring of Rewards, to beſtow leſs than was agreed for, hath as much of *Injuſtice*, as to give according to Proportion is juſt: Yet to beſtow more largely than was agreed for, is not, on the other hand, *Injuſtice*, but rather *Liberality*. So alſo, in the way of Buying and Selling; the over-weight that is thrown in to get a Cuſtomer's good Will, altho either in Weight or Meaſure, it exceed the Bargain, yet ſurely this has nothing of *Injuſtice* in it.

III. Moreover unto *Prudence* (which doubtleſs is a Moral Vertue) there is only *Imprudence* to be oppos'd, which is the Defect of *Prudence*. So to *Sincerity* is nothing oppoſite but *Inſincerity*, or at large *Hypocriſie*, which exceeds or falls ſhort of the Perfection of *Sincerity*. So *Patience*, *Continence*, and *Suffering*, do only go lame (as we ſay) on the one ſide, as namely, by *Impatience*, *Incontinence*, and by *Effeminacy*: So *Temperance* by *Intemperance*. And therefore to put (which ſome do) a ſort of *Inſenſibility*, to anſwer as an oppoſite Vice on

the other ſide, is quite without Reaſon. For (as *Andronicus* notes from *Ariſtotle*) 'tis ſcarce *within Reach of Human Nature to be Inſenſible to ſuch a Pitch:* And if any Man were ſo, this would look much more like a Diſeaſe of the Body, than a Vice of the Soul.

Lib. 3. Cap. 12.

BUT ſhould it happen, that the Power of the Soul could be ſo far extended, as to be able to weigh down, and even extinguiſh the ſenſe of every Corporeal Pain and Pleaſure; this certainly were ſo far from being a Defect in the Soul, that it would rather amount to a wonderful Vertue and Perfection. And to abuſe ſuch Perfection would argue either Inſincerity, or Imprudence. However, if any Man will needs call it an *Intemperate ſort of Temperance*, I will not much contend in the Matter.

IV. AS to *Fortitude*, it ſeems properly enough placed between *Boldneſs* and *Timerouſneſs*; *Liberality* between *Niggardize* and *Prodigality*; *Truth* between *Arrogance* and *Diſſimulation*: Nor do we deny, but that ſomewhat like to this Equality, may happen in ſome few other Virtues. But this we think worthy of ſpecial Notice, That even from the Inſtances given, 'tis not very apparent that Virtue, according to it's moſt Internal *Eſſence*, is a *Mediocrity*. We rather ſuppoſe that according to the Definition given, it is ſome Intellectual Power is the *Cauſe* of that *Mediocrity*, which we obſerve as well in our Actings as our Sufferings. For in theſe Caſes ſuch *Mediocrity* appears: But as to Virtue her ſelf,

ſelf, ſhe muſt not pretend to go farther than in what barely is Juſt.

V. NAY Virtue is rather an Extreme; And this not only as to it's Well-being and Beſt Eſtate (which *Ariſtotle* himſelf conſents to) but we call it an *Extreme* even as to it's Eſſence and Definition. For how can Virtue, as to it's Eſſence, be a *Mediocrity*; when *Mediocrity*, as we ſaid, is only what we ſeek for, and adhere to, in thoſe Objects about which Virtue is converſant; namely, in thoſe Actings and Sufferings which befall us? Wherefore ſince Virtue is, according to it's own Nature, the beſt of Bleſſings that Mankind is capable of, and the moſt excelling Power and Perfection of our Souls; it cannot be better Defin'd than in ſtyling it, *The very Triumph and Inauguration of Human Nature; or its Supreme Good.* And 'tis no more than what is due to the Eſſence of Virtue, that it ſhould bear this high Preheminence: Wherefore it ſeems defectively ſaid of *Ariſtotle*, That Virtue was only an Extreme as to its Well-being and Beſt Eſtate, but not according to its Eſſence. For even that Beſt Eſtate muſt of neceſſity be Part of Virtues Eſſence, and both concur to the Top and Complement of our Natures: Which is no more, than what the *Pythagoreans* have every where obſerv'd. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 6.*

VI. WHEREFORE that Philoſopher treads much more carefully, where he makes Virtue to conſiſt in *Finding* and *Electing* a *Medium*, than when he makes Virtue it ſelf *Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 9.*

that *Medium* or *Mediocrity*. For this is just as if one should call the *Instrument*, that is fram'd to find out two Middle Lines which hold a continued Proportion, to be the very Lines themselves: Or to say that a Pair of Compasses, which find or make the Centre of a Circle; are the very Middle or Centre it self.

VII. LASTLY, When his Followers declare Virtue to be this *Medium*, they understand it in respect of two Things, which are *Homogeneous* or consonant to such *Medium*. For so *Aristotle* does illustrate it by Examples of *Arithmetical Proportion*, as well in Magnitude as Numbers: Altho after all, he seems herein rather to have found the *Medium Rei*, than the *Medium quoad Nos*; I mean that which is rather true in Speculation than in Practice. But his Affecting to make it *Homogeneous*, is hereby manifest, That, while he calls Virtue a certain *Medium*, he makes it to partake of either Extreme. Thus *Andronicus* (his Paraphrast) calls Virtue, *The Middle of the Two Extremes falling short on the one side and exceeding on the other*: Even as it appears in *Fortitude*, which to a certain Degree may be term'd *Confidence*.

BUT this can never hold: For while he thus turns Confidence into Virtue (which still is defin'd to be a Thing absolutely good) if we suppose that such his Confidence were a Virtue to the Degree of three, it would follow, That such Confidence would doubly excel, if rais'd

to

to the degree of six. But by such Logick, Vice would become better than Virtue; which must never be understood.

Wherefore we suppose, that Virtue is not the *Medium* it self, but rather the Finder and the Chuser of such *Medium*. Nay, we affirm, that such *Medium* is not singly discovered by the degrees of more or less, or of Excess or of Defect; but is also determin'd by other prudential Circumstances, even as *Aristotle* himself declares: namely, *That the true Medium in Virtue, and that which is its very best, must be ascertain'd with regard unto Time, and to Occasions, and to the Persons with whom, or for whose sake we act, and to the manner of acting.* So by this 'tis plain, that to pursue all Cases under the notion and fancy of a Mediocrity, were merely superstitious, if not altogether vain. *Ethic. Nicom. lib. 2. c. 6.*

VIII. I think it, for my part, sufficient, of what Virtue seeks out and electeth, be that which is *Rectum* or *Right*. 'Tis very true, that this Right it self seems also to be a certain middle thing; just as a Line, which is drawn upon another streight Line at Right Angles, is equally the *Medium* of all others, that can be drawn from the same Point, and that unequally vary from such Line. Wherefore the *Pythagoreans* were wont to say, *That Good was Uniform*, and *Evil Multiform*. And *Andronicus* is positive, *That this Right is something, which is of a Simple and Uniform Nature.* *Magn. Moral. l. 1. cap. 25. Nicom. l. 2. c. 5.*

IX. Let us also add, that this *Rectitude* (which Virtue pursues in all things) is termed *Equal*, and a thing which holds *Congruity* and *Proportion*. *For things congruous are also equal*, as in Geometry is manifest. So that all these things point at a *Mediocrity*: For what is greater or less than another, is not congruous. And therefore that ought to be the *Medium* which is neither more or less; and which is also called *Equality*.

Andronicus, l. 5. c. 4.

Upon the whole Matter, let us agree how far Virtue consists in a *Mediocrity* or *Medium*. Tho not that she her self is that *Medium*; but that our Souls do, by her Aid, elect that which is congruous, or in the Middle: For thus only can that Sentence be true and solid.

X. But now the Difficulty remaining will be, to establish something, unto which this *Rectitude* and *Congruity* (which Virtue every where seeks) is to conform. *Aristotle* says, *That what is congruous to Right Reason is right*. And again, *That the Medium, in every thing, is what Right Reason declares to be such.* And so in his Definition of Virtue, *That 'tis bounded with Reason*: And he adds also, Even *as a prudent Man shall determine thereof.* As if by those Words he would stop any farther Inquiry, what kind of thing this Right Reason was, by which that which is right and congruous should be try'd.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 1.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 6.

Now, according to *Aristotle*, *Right Reason is that which is conformable to Prudence.* But then he himself elsewhere defines *Prudence*,

Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 5.

dence, To be a true Habit, exerting it ſelf in what happens to a Man good or bad, according to Reaſon. But ſurely this ſounds very odd, and is no better than a trifling Circle, to define Right Reaſon by Prudence, and Prudence again by Right Reaſon.

XI. HOWEVER, if there be but Recourſe had to that Definition of *Prudence*, which we before have delivered, the point will be fully reſolv'd: For it will from thence appear that whoever is *prudent* is alſo of a Mind ſo cleans'd and defecated, that the Light of Truth is not eclipſed in him, either by Paſſions, or any corporeal Impediments. And, for this Cauſe, let no Man wonder, if *Right Reaſon* be ſtyl'd, *That which is according to Prudence:* For if the prudent Man, as to Life and good Manners, have it not, it can no where be found. *Ariſtotle* (in his *Ethicks* to *Nicomachus*) is of the ſame mind. *For the good Man* (ſays he) *judges all things aright; and Truth is viſible unto him, where-ever it be; and good things appear both proper and pleaſant in every ſhape. And 'tis very poſſible that a good Man grows more excellent, if, while he finds Truth in others, he has cauſe to think that he himſelf was the Rule and Meaſure thereof. But as to Plebeians, they tumble into Error for Pleaſure-ſake, as counting that real Good, which is really otherwiſe.*

The ſame Author has other Paſſages to the like intent: For he makes *Temperance, the only true Guardian and Conſervator of Prudence:* And that the ſober Man is only wiſe, in all that concerns

concerns Probity of Life. *He does not think that the Motives of Pleaſure, or of Pain, can influence or pervert our Opinions, as to the Doctrine of a Triangle, and it's having ſo many Angles as are equal unto two right ones, or the like: But as to Manners, and the Conduct of our Life, thoſe Motives have, as he believes ſtrange Influence.* Nay, he ſuppoſes, that whoever is led by his Paſſions, *and the Senſe only of Pleaſure or of Pain,* is led as a blind Man that has loſt his Eyes; *and in whom the very Principles for his Direction are extinguiſh'd.*

Eth. Nic. l. 6. c. 5.

XII. Let us therefore here applaud this wiſe Philoſopher, for that Variety of Truth and of Utility, which redounds from this Advice. For 'tis plain from hence, that our Minds, being thus purg'd from Vanities and Paſſions, can, as in an inſtant, diſcern not only all that is worthy and valuable in human Affairs, but what is noxious or of no account. Next, we may gather from it that ſome things are valuable and worthy, even in their own Nature: ſince if they were not at all, and had no Being, they could never be ſeen. But ſince they are ſeen and beheld by a clear and perſpicacious Mind, 'tis of evidence they are ſuch in their own nature, as they appear to be.

L. 1. c. 6. § 12.

Laſtly, to waſte time in diſputing, whether any thing be (in its own Nature) laudable, before we take pains to reform our Minds in the way preſcrib'd, is not only Labor loſt, but a ſort of Frenzy. And if we ſhall conclude that nothing is of its own nature honeſt and

and laudable, when at the ſame time we live in Vice and Wickedneſs, this is to be downright impudent; for we ought firſt to try, and then to give our Opinion. We have touch'd this point before, and therefore we need not dwell upon it any longer here.

XIII. THERE is now but one thing more, to clear before us all the Difficulty that remains. For whereas it may ſound as if we give up our prudent Man to Inſpirations and to Enthuſiaſm; while we contend he cannot in any other reſpect be wiſe, than as his Mind is reform'd and purg'd: and that it muſt alſo needs hence enſue, that whatſoever a Man ſo purg'd, ſhall afterwards imagine, muſt therefore be according to Right Reaſon, or Right Reaſon it ſelf, merely becauſe he thinks ſo: And that, in ſhort, there muſt be no other Meaſure, or Principle; but that his Imagination ſhall be as the Standard of Congruity and of Right.

Therefore it is neceſſary (as *Andronicus Rhodius* ſpeaks) firſt to inquire and find out, *What is the Mode and Standard of this Right Reaſon? And what that Principle in human Affairs that is juſt and congruous?* For ſurely that alone is Right Reaſon, which to ſuch Standard, Mode, and Principle, can be apply'd; and this muſt be ſome Primitive Good, which is not only moſt ſimple, but moſt excellent, and a true *Baſis*, *Norma* and *Standard*, for all the reſt.

XIV.

XIV. Now while I am in this high purſuit, I call to witneſs all that is holy, that in my Senſe, there cannot, in the whole compaſs of Nature, be found a greater Good than is that *Love*, which (to free it from all other Imputations) we call *Intellectual*. For what can more fill, elevate, and irradiate the Soul than this intellectual Love? Surely nothing is more exalted or Divine, nothing more raviſhing, and complacent, nothing more ſharp in diſtinguiſhing what in every Caſe is decorous and right, or more quick in executing whatſoever is laudable and juſt.

L. 1. *c.* 2. §§ 5, &c.

L. 3. *c.* 8. § 8.

Since therefore this is the moſt high and the moſt ſimple good; it ought in preference, to be the Rule and Standard of all the reſt; and nothing ſhould paſs, or be accounted, for Right Reaſon, which from this Divine Source and Fountain did not take its Birth.

XV. And what is all this *Intellectual Love*, we ſo deſcribe, but an inward Life and Senſe, that moves in the *Boniform Faculty of the Soul*? 'Tis by this the Soul reliſheth what is ſimply the beſt; thither it tends, and in that alone it has its Joy and Triumph. Hence we are inſtructed how to ſet God before our Eyes; to love him above all; to adhere to him as the ſupremeſt Good; to conſider him as the Perfection of all Reaſon, of all Beauty, of all Love; how all was made by his Power, and that all is upheld by his Providence. Hence alſo is the Soul taught how to affect and admire the Creation, and all the Parcels of it;

Vid. Margin. ſupra.

as

as they ſhare in that Divine Perfection and Beneficence, which is diſperſed through the whole Maſs: So that if any of theſe Parcels appear defective or diſcompos'd, the Soul compaſſionates and brings help, ſtrenuouſly endeavouring, as it is able, to reſtore every thing to that ſtate of Felicity, which God and Nature intended for it. In ſhort, it turns all its Faculties to make good Men happy; and all its Care and Diſcipline is to make bad Men good.

XVI. THEREFORE I ſay, this moſt ſimple and Divine Senſe and Feeling in the *Boniform Faculty of the Soul*, is that Rule or Boundary, whereby Reaſon is examin'd and approves her ſelf. For if ſhe offers or affirms any thing that is contrary to the Senſe and Feeling, 'tis ſpurious and diſhoneſt; if congruous to it, 'tis Orthodox, fit, and juſt. So that we need not invent any other *external* Idea of Good; or follow thoſe, who vainly dream of remoter Objects; when as this inward Life and Senſe points ſingly at that Idea, which is fram'd not from exterior things, but from the Reliſh and intrinſick Feeling of the *Boniform Faculty* within. And altho this Idea be but ſingle and alone, yet from thence ariſe all the Shapes and Modes of Virtue and of Well-doing: And 'tis into this again, that all of them may, by a due and unerring Analyſis, be reſolv'd. For as all Numbers ariſe from Unity, and by Unites are all meaſur'd: ſo we affirm, that by this *Intellectual Love*, as from

V. Marg. ſupr.

from a Principle the moſt pure and moſt abſtracted of all others, all the Modes and Kinds of *Juſtice*, *Fortitude*, and even of *Temperance* it ſelf, are to be meaſur'd: for nothing is ſo detrimental to leſſen and extinguiſh this Love, as is the Exerciſe and Infection of ſenſual Delights.

XVII. Now, in the laſt place, if any ſhall object that we have done amiſs; and that all this ſplendid Fabrick of the Virtues is by us laid on a weak and tottering Foundation: As namely in Paſſion, ſuch as they may ſuppoſe our *Love* to be. Let them for their better Information, know, that this Love is not more a Paſſion than is Intellection it ſelf, which ſurely they cannot but believe to be very valuable, and very Divine. 'Tis very true we may as to this point (with *Des Cartes*) allow, that all Intellection has ſo much of Paſſion, as it is the Perception of ſomething imprinted from without. However, as this Perception, which is made by Intellection, is not from the Body, but rather from the Soul, exerting and exciting her ſelf into ſuch Action: So neither is this Love from the Body; but either from the Soul it ſelf, or elſe from God above, who calls and quickens the Soul to ſuch a Divine *Effort*. And tho this Perception may, if they pleaſe, be termed a ſort of Paſſion, yet 'twill derogate no more from the Dignity and Excellency of it, than from Intellection it ſelf: Which, becauſe 'tis an Act of Perception, may on that account be alſo termed a Paſſion.

XVIII.

XVIII. Yet when all is ſaid, perhaps this Love, which we inſiſt upon, may not ſo truly be termed a Paſſion, as acknowledg'd to be the Peace and Tranquillity of the Mind: nay a ſtate of ſuch Serenity, as hath no other Motions than thoſe of Benignity and Beneficence. So that this Love may rather be thought a firm and unſhaken Benignity, or Bounty of the Soul; ſuch as has nothing more perfect, or more approaching to the immortal Gods. I mean hereby that State of the Bleſſed Spirits, unto which we ought all to aſpire: and ſurely without this Love, thoſe very Spirits would not be as Gods, but as a Race of Devils. And therefore we may conclude this Love, to be the moſt perfect, and the moſt Angelick Thing of all others; far excelling even Intellection it ſelf. And, in truth, more aptly deſerving thoſe lofty Words, which *Ariſtotle* beſtows upon the Speculative Intellect; where he ſays, *That according to ſome Doctors we are not to converſe with human things, altho we are Men, nor with things tranſory, altho we are mere Mortals; but, as much as poſſible, we ſhould affect to live as do the immortal Gods: And this, by performing every thing in ſuch ſort, as conforms to that Principle, which is the moſt excellent thing within us.* Now *Andronicus* (his Paraphraſt) declares, *This moſt excellent thing within us, to be the Intellect.* But I beg leave to call it rather by the Name of *Intellectual Love.*

Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. *c.* 7.

L. 10. *c.* 9.

Thus

Thus I end a Point, on which ſome may think I have inſiſted too long: But the whole will ſhew our Senſe of Virtue; and of its kinds; and how it may be ſaid to conſiſt in a *Mediocrity*; and what alſo is the *Norma* or Meaſure of ſuch *Mediocrity*. The next Step will be touching *Good* that is *external*.

CHAP. X.

Of Good Things, which are External.

I. 'TIS not only ſuch Things as are placed without a Man, that we call *External Goods*; but whatever is placed without in reſpect to Virtue: I mean without which Virtue may conſiſt in its Perfection, altho ſuch things may indeed paſs as Ornaments to her, and as neceſſary Complements unto Happineſs. And theſe are threefold; either in reſpect of the *Soul*, of the *Body*, or of *both*. We will touch upon ſome particulars herein; and ſee how far they help, or how ſhort they fall, as to the compleating of Happineſs.

II. THINGS which relate to the *Soul*, are the *Dexterity* or *Subtilty of the Wit*, *a vaſt and faithful Memory*: Alſo *Science*, *Art*, and *Sapience*.

To

To the *Body*, *Strength*, *Agility*, *Comlineſs*, and *Health*.

To *both* theſe, as they conſtitute Man, *Wealth*, *Liberty*, *Nobility*, *Authority*: And laſtly the *Friendſhip* and *Favor* of *many*.

Of all theſe we may ſay in ſhort, that they are Good, and more to be deſired than the things that are contrary to them: And yet that ſeveral of them are of ſuch ſlender Account, that their Abſence does no more obſtruct the Perfection and Integrity of Happineſs, than Mountains and Valleys do ſpoil the Roundneſs of the Earth, whoſe Magnitude makes thoſe ſmall Inequalities of no conſideration. Scarce do thoſe things add unto Happineſs while preſent, or retrench from it when abſent; inaſmuch as they hold no Proportion with complete and perfect Virtue.

III. I would fain know what great matter is gotten by *Subtilty of Wit*; if a Man be otherwiſe prudent, if his Mind be firm and unſhaken, if he have Love towards his Neighbor, and Good Will for Mankind?

I find *Antoninus* the Emperor, when he blamed his Parts for want of ſufficient Activity, could yet conſole himſelf with this Reflection, *That a happy Life was made up of very few things*; *and that, altho a Man were neither Logician nor Philoſopher, he might yet be generous, modeſt, a Lover of his Country, and obedient to God.* On the other hand, to hear one lament his Unhappineſs, for want of ſuch *high Subtilty*, or *Dexterity of Wit*; is little other, L. 7. § 67.

than if a Man shou'd complain he was not able to walk, because not able, as some Jugler, to dance upon a Rope.

IV. As to a strong and retentive *Memory*, which holds all fast, how many an honest Man is there that has it not? For, as *Antoninus* said before, so *Aristotle* also says, *That those Noble and Divine Things, wherein Happiness did consist, were very few.* Nay rather that it was but one certain thing, by which the Discrimination was made of things honest or vile, even as all Variety of Colors are judg'd of by the Eye. And hereto may refer that of *Plato*, *That Truth was contain'd in a very narrow Space.* For the good and perfect Man is not so much actuated by a List of Precepts gotten without Book, as by living inwardly, and printing in his Mind a single and sincere Sense of Things. From this alone, he will be able to know whatever Duty lies incumbent on him; just as, by one Candle, a Man may see all the variety of Objects before him: And as all Colors of the Rainbow do arise from the Sun, so indeed the Distinction of all Duties have but the same single Source.

But for *exterior* things, and such as are not reducible into this Diviner Sense: Let it suffice, if your Memory be as that of an old Man, who (as they say) does not easily forget whatever he takes to heart, and lets nothing go that may much afflict him if it be lost.

V. As to *Science*, *Art*, and *Sapience*; we do not conceive they are so very essential unto

to Happineſs. For tho *Ariſtotle* ſays, *That Science is about neceſſary Matters, and ſuch as are not ſubject to Alteration*; Yet this our Happineſs does not conſiſt in thoſe immutable Things, but in the ſingle Conſtancy of Mind, and in a ſteady Reſolution to proſecute, in all our Actions, that which is ſimply and abſolutely the beſt. And therefore, in that admirable Table of *Cebes*, they who thus purſue Virtue, are admitted within the ſecond Pale; while others have no admiſſion at all into the *Palace of Safety*, neither the Men of Logick, nor of Figures, nor of Geometry, nor Aſtrologers, Poets, Orators, or Muſicians: But all alike, even as infamous or uſeleſs Fidlers, are excluded and ſhut without. *Andronicus, l. 6. c. 8.*

VI. That Happineſs, which is due to human Nature, is a plainer Thing, and a more common Good, than to be calculated only for Philoſophers and Artiſts. Wherefore as *Science* is not to be counted a part of Happineſs, ſo neither is that *Art*, which *Ariſtotle* defines to be, *A rational fabricating Habit.* And by which he ſhews, it belongs unto Artiſts or Artificers. *Ethic. Eudem. l. 5. c. 4.*

VII. Much leſs ought *Sapience* to paſs for ſuch an Eſſential; ſeeing *Her Objects are Things ſingular, ſtupendous, difficult, and even Magical*: Such as *Anaxagoras* and *Thales* of old are ſaid to have ſtudied, and which *Ariſtotle* upbraids as unprofitable, and little availing to the Happineſs of human Life. But as to *Magical Things* here ſpoken of, his Meaning appears

Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 7.

by his defining in that place, *Sapience to be the Skill and Understanding of those Things which in Nature have the chiefest Excellence.* And a while after, *That there were other things, which by Nature were far Diviner than Men; as those illustrious and conspicuous Objects, whereof the World was fram'd.* 'Tis these therefore are those *Magical Matters*, that are called Objects of *Sapience*, and which are reputed more *Divine and Excellent than Man.* But yet for any Science herein, 'tis so far from being necessary to Happiness, that *Aristotle* will scarce allow it to be useful.

VIII. Now altho perfect Happiness, which is that Pleasure that ariseth from a Sense of Virtue, and a Conscience of *Well-doing*, may want *Science, Art*, and *Sapience*; yet we must also affirm, that such *Intelligence* as, by *Adronicus*, is defin'd, *To be the Knowledge of Principles*, can by no means be separate from Happiness. For 'tis in truth impossible that a Mind, which is purified and influenced by true Prudence, can be so blunt or stupify'd, as to admit any Doubt concerning the Principles of Science.

Lib. 6. c. 7.

IX. For what concerns *Bodily Endowments*, we may venture to say that *Strength*, and *Agility*, are more the Happiness of the Bull, and of the Squirrel, than of a Man. Nay a brawny and robust Habit is so far from adapting Men to Virtue, that the Sense of refined Things is often dull'd and suffocated thereby. And it would be as unreasonable to expect

expect that all good Men ſhould be Robuſt and Agil, as to compel them all to be Racers, or good at Fiſty-Cuffs.

X. As to *Beauty* or *Comlineſs*, the plain Truth is, it has a Charm; for it draws Favor, and ſtrangely turns the Minds of the Beholders: and even Virtue it ſelf is indebted to the Ornaments it beſtows,

Gratior eſt pulchro veniens de corpore Virtus.
Beauty, when with Virtue joyn'd,
Gives a luſtre to the Mind.

Yet after all, 'tis but a poor Ingredient of ſolid Happineſs. It ſeems rather to be another's good than our own. If we had not a Looking-Glaſs, we cou'd know nothing of it. Whereas internal Beauty needs no ſuch help, the Mind is ſatisfied of it ſelf, and 'tis a continual Feaſt.

XI. HEALTH, I confeſs, is one of the chiefeſt Bleſſings, and 'tis certainly neceſſary to complete Happineſs; at leaſt ſuch a Proportion thereof, as may exempt the Body from Torture, and the Mind from Rage and Diſtraction. For whatſoever ſhall either extinguiſh the Operations of the Mind, or compel them to Evil, and there detain them, muſt either deſtroy Happineſs, or make it very imperfect.

XII. AMONG the *good Things of Fortune*, whether *Liberty* or *Wealth* be beſt, has been a Doubt. I for my part have ſtill preferr'd the firſt; eſpecially ſince *Wealth* implies ſomewhat of abounding, with which a good Man may well

diſpenſe. Wherefore the Loſs of Wealth would in no degree afflict me like that of Liberty, ſo as a Competency were but left for Life. And I ſhould think it more Gentle, as well as more Tolerable, to be depriv'd of thoſe things which are ſuperfluous to Happineſs, than to be truſted with too much. For if the top of human Felicity conſiſts in Virtue, 'tis much if it be not damnified by Temptations which Plenty draws us into.

In the Caſes even of *Want* and *Servitude*, they ſeem nothing dreadful; if they are but ſo qualified, as not to hinder the Mind in the Exerciſe of Virtue, nor to extinguiſh the Senſe of that Pleaſure, which a pious Soul takes in ſubmitting to God. For to him, who gives up his Will and Affections to a Conformity with the Divine Providence, there are certain Raptures of Joy, which a Senſe of that Obedience, and that Reſignation affords him.

L.2.c.10. § 19.

XIII. As for *Nobility*, that this is not needful for Happineſs ſeems herein evident, that 'tis but a Shadow of Anceſtors Virtue, which is caſt upon Poſterity. And if this Shadow be any Thing; how great then is Virtue it ſelf, which can ſo gild, and for Ages to come ſo glorifie, a Race of Men by her mere Reflection? Surely where Virtue her ſelf is preſent (whoſe Rays could do ſo much) what Bleſſings will not this great Parent of ſolid happineſs beſtow? He that has Virtue, will ſtand in want of Nobility no more, than does the Sun of

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that Light, which is borrow'd from him, I mean, the Light of the Moon.

Wherefore bare *Nobility* makes but little towards Happineſs: But if the Virtue alſo of Anceſtors ſhall deſcend upon their Poſterity, then indeed it has equal, if not a greater Force towards Human Felicity, than if Virtue were deſtitute of that Help.

XIV. But if *Nobility* be not neceſſary to a happy Life, much leſs is *Empire* and *Authority*. For no Man will hold, that Princes only and Magiſtrates are happy; ſince the Number of them is ſo few, in reſpect of other Mortals: ſince alſo they are vexed with Cares, and incompaſs'd about with Dangers.

XV. Lastly, As to *Friendſhip*, it muſt be confeſs'd, that Favor, and the good Will of Men, adds a wonderful Complacency to Life, as well as Security. And indeed Virtue can hardly ſtand without it; eſpecially if ſuch *Friendſhip* be attended with perfect Sincerity, and with a certain ſweetneſs of Behaviour and Benignity of Mind. Beſides all Men of Probity are in a ſort confederated; and being by Virtue, as by a Mark of Diſtinction put conſtantly in mind of the Relation and Conſanguinity which ties them together, they look upon themſelves as obliged, to cheriſh and aſſiſt each other.

But if it be a Man's hard Hap, to live and converſe only among the wicked, we muſt then depend upon the Protection of the Laws. For, as *Ariſtotle* rightly takes notice, *the Rules* *Lib. 1. c. 7.*

of Policy and the Doctrines of Morality, do all aim at the ſame thing. And *Andronicus* handſomly expounds it, ſaying, *That the ſame Advantage is ſought for, as well from every ſingle Man, as from the City or Government.* So that a good Man will want but little as to ſolid Felicity, if he may get what belongs to him even by Natural Right. Nor does that celebrated Example of *Damon* and *Pythias* ſeem more to refer to *Friendſhip*, than it does to *Juſtice* and *Equity*.

Wherefore Virtue, and eſpecially among good Men, or in a good Government, ſeems not to want, or ſtand in need of more Favor, than ſhe is able to prevail for, upon her own Account.

XVI. HOWEVER, that I may diſguiſe Nothing, it is manifeſt, that Iniquity is ſometimes interwoven in the very Texture of the Laws, and in thoſe more eſpecially that have regard unto Religion. And it often happens that for the Cauſe of Truth and Virtue, we fall into the Diſpleaſure and Hatred of Men: For vicious Minds can no better endure the Truth of Virtue and of Truth, than vitiated Eyes can endure the Sun. Of this poor *Socrates* found ſad effects; and ſo have innumerable others, as well *Chriſtians* as *Jews*. In this Caſe, 'tis certainly more adviſable to converſe but with a few, and thoſe of the moſt approved Integrity. But if there be no faithful Companions of this ſort, there is no other Remedy left, but to withdraw, and embrace Solitude:

Solitude: *Which however,* (in *Ariſtotle's* Opinion) *no Man can be contented with, but either he becomes a God or a Beaſt.* Yet, in my Sentiment, a good Man, even in this State, ceaſes not to be joyful, and happy: for tho he be not a God, yet he bears about him ſomewhat that is Divine; And, while he can feel and contemplate the Joys thereof, he can want nothing that is eſſential to true Happineſs. *Politicorum, l. 1. c. 2.*

XVII. But if it ſhall happen that Men will ſtill be malevolent, and by their ill Nature give Diſturbance even to this Peace and Retirement: Here, I confeſs, there wants not only the Friendſhip of Equals, but rather Patronage from the powerful, which might avert this Malice, and retort the envenomed Darts. Yet if none of theſe may be had; let the good Man, fill'd with the Conſcience and Senſe of God, betake himſelf to the Armor of *Patience, Fortitude,* and *Magnanimity.* Let him revolve on that of *Epictetus, Now begins the Fight, and the Olympicks are now at hand:* And let him ſuffer every Fortune, and Life it ſelf to be raviſh'd from him, rather than not perſiſt and overcome. *Enchiridion. c. 75.*

XVIII. Now if any Man ſhall here ask, In what condition is our good Man left, when fallen from all Felicity, ſtrip'd of Friends, and deſtitute of all Protection? Let him remember that this Queſtion has not a bare reference to want of Friends, but involves all Calamities, and the higheſt Deſolation that Mortals are

are ſubjected to. In this Caſe we may conſider what *Ariſtotle* has ſaid, in the Words of his Interpreter *Rhodius*, *'Tis true, Misfortune afflict the juſt Man, and force him to ſtagger, and diſable him in many of his good Works. However as he bears all with equal Temper, not ſtupify'd or inſenſible, but with a magnanimous Soul; the very Splendor of Virtue ſhines out in the midſt of all his Suffering. For ſince Happineſs has its being in the Operations of Virtue, and that ſuch Operations do govern the Life of him that is happy; 'tis impoſſible that any happy Man can be made miſerable, becauſe he will never engage in what is odious and vile.* He alſo adds, *That the happy Man looks not that all things ſhould flow in according to his Wiſh, but he makes the beſt of his preſent Fortune. And hence it is that he can never be made miſerable, tho he fall into the greateſt Miſeries: For it can only be ſaid of him in reſpect of Fortune, he will not be baſely happy.* But the Words of *Ariſtotle* himſelf are a little more dejected, where he ſays, *That a Man cannot be call'd happy, if he falls into the Calamities of King* Priamus. And yet, even in this Eſtate, he will not allow him to be call'd miſerable.

L. 1. c. 17.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 1. c. 10.

XIX. But altho this more moderate Saying of *Ariſtotle* may have place in ſuch Calamities as do accidentally befal us; yet where we ſuffer for Virtue's ſake, and by the Iniquity of the wicked, the Reaſon is far different. For if Man, in his greateſt Sufferings, do not abandon God and Virtue, neither ſhall

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he be abandon'd by them. The Sharpneſs of ſuch a Conflict is ſo far from impairing his Happineſs, that it ſeems rather to augment and carry it higher: For the Operations of Virtue, in which the very Life of Happineſs does conſiſt, are propagated and exalted by ſuch Conflict. 'Tis not to be doubted, but where Patience is ſo invincible, the Mind is attended and ſupported by ſome Motions, which are not only generous, but plainly Divine. And let us not think of *Socrates*, that it was for vain Oſtentation, but from his Experience of the World (from clear Divination, and a ſolid Fortitude of the Mind) that he pronounced thoſe undaunted Words in *Epictetus*; *If the immortal Gods think fit to have it ſo, even ſo let it be. And tho my Accuſers*, Anytus *and* Melitus, *can deprive me of life; yet can they do me no hurt.* *L.2.c.10. § 12.* *L.3.c.10. § 15.* *Enchiridion. c.79.*

And this in brief as to *External Good.*

THE

THE THIRD BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Of Free-Will.

I. WE have hitherto treated about the way to know *Happineſs*, or rather *Virtue*; which is the principal part of Happineſs, if not its full Perfection: The next thing is about the way to attain it. And in this part we ſhall be the rather brief, ſince what is hitherto delivered goes far to that End: And we are not willing to have that ſwell'd which we only call an *Epitome*. So then we ſhall here expoſe what may look like Heads of Meditation in the *Search of Virtue*, rather than any extended Treatiſe of it.

II. BUT before we can well enter into this Province, there is a thing called *Free Will*, of which it is needful previouſly to ſpeak: ſince till this be clear'd and aſſerted, all Exhortation to Virtue ſeems but in vain.

Ariſtotle

Aristotle has sometimes propos'd a Famous Question, (but *Plato* in his *Menon* handles it more largely) and it hath affinity with this our Subject of *Free-Will*; as namely, *Whether Vertue gets into Men by Custom, or by Nature, or by some Divine Fate* (which is the same as *Good Fortune?*) There are some Men extremely scandaliz'd at the Affirmative Part of this Question; as thinking it a derogation from Humane Nature, to make Men at this rate necessarily Good, and to deprive them of all *Free-Will*. For they judg a Thing voluntarily done, to be of far different Merit from what happens by Compulsion: Which yet (I confess) sounds to me; as if God, who is Good, should be the less Adorable, because he cannot be Naught. For I will presume that whoever is Good, either by Nature or the Divine Fate, is also endowed with so true and efficacious a Sense of Honesty, that he can no more go against this Sense, than that a sober Man should stab himself with a Dagger.

Ethic. Nicom. l.10. c.10. *Eudem. l.7. c.14.* *L.1. c.3. §.7.*

III. Were there but a Race of such Men; they were of all others the most fitted for Heroes; and as deriving Virtue from the Gods: Tis of such that *Homer* speaks,

——— ——— *Nec eum esse putares*
Mortali Genitore satum, at Genus esse Deorum.

You'd think a Man of such Heroick frame
Not made below; but that from Heaven he came.

Aristotle

Ethic. Nic. com. l. 7. c. 1. Aristotle quotes this very Verse in his Description of *Heroical Virtue*; and thinks such Virtue more given from Above, than the product of Human Industry. My Opinion is, That if all such Force or Power from above were United; and either by Impression or Inspiration fix'd in the Mind at once; it might properly be called *Virtue*. For, according to our Definition, Virtue is a *Power* or *Energy*, not a *Habit*. And tho *Habit* be a sort of *Power*, arising from Exercise and Custom; yet this very Way and Circumstance of acquiring Virtue, is nothing material, as to the true Nature of it. For if this *Power* or *Energy* be got within us, and operates in our Souls as by a Native Spring or Elasticity; what matter is it, whether it came by repeated Actions, or by Inspiration?

L. 1. c. 3. §. 1.

IV. But forasmuch as the Blessings of this Kind come rarely (if at all) to the Lot of any; we need not over-labour the difficulty of this Point. We need not study Admonitions for such sorts of Men, who by Nature or some Divine Fate, are already so well and so necessarily inclin'd: but rather press and convince the necessity of Virtue unto other Mortals; who, while they may exercise the Liberty of their Wills to either side, should be urged and excited by all that can be said, to incline their Wills to that side, where Right Reason, and a Sense of their Duty, calls them.

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V. They must, above all things, be told of that Excellent, and almost Divine Pre-eminence which they enjoy. For while all other Creatures have their Senses ty'd down to the service of the Body, or some particular Delights; they can mount aloft, and like enabled by a *Liberty* in their *Wills*, to shake off, or gradually destroy those ill Desires, with which they are beset; and, by the help of Heaven, to assert that Liberty, which is most suitable to a Creature made by God's Image, and partaker of Divine Sense.

VI. And, as this is a most true Perswasion, and hath wonderful Power among Men, to draw them to Virtue, and also to corroborate their Minds against the Allurements or Assaults of Vice; Let those Men be asham'd who have so tamper'd with Mankind to perswade the contrary. This (in truth) has been vigorously and studiously attempted by Mr. *Hobbs*, in his Book, *Of Liberty and Necessity*; but we think his principal Arguments are all laid low, in our Treatise of the *Soul's Immortality*, unto which we therefore refer. *Lib. 2. Cap. 3.*

VII. In the mean time, I cannot here forbear to take notice, that where, among other Motives, he conceives to have Man's Will necessarily determined to any profligate Action; He owns, that in his Opinion of *Necessity* takes place among the rest. But certainly, if that false Opinion have such Force, as to what is Vicious and Bad; it follows, That the true Opinion, touching Liberty to fly from Evil, deserves *L. 3. c. 1. §. 25.*

equal

equal Force at leaſt, as to Virtue and good Life: And therefore, that a Perſwaſion, ſo efficaciouſly contributing to our Advantage, ſhould be adher'd unto, and ſtrongly contended for by us.

VIII. But to make the truth of this Opinion more manifeſt; Let us take Notice what this *Liberum Arbitrium* or *Free-Will* is; and then Demonſtrate that there is really ſuch a Principle within us. Firſt, Liberty of the Will, which the *Greeks* call *Autexouſion*, ſeems almoſt to imply, The *having a Power to Act, or not Act within our ſelves.* Now in that *Free-Will* is a Principle of Acting within one's ſelf, it ſo far agrees with what the *Greeks* call *Hecouſion*, which is the ſame as *Spontaneum*. And which (as *Andronicus* defines it) is that, *Whoſe Principle of Acting is wholly in the Agent.* *Lib. 3. Cap. 1.* Yet what he ſtraight ſubjoins in the ſame Chapter, ſaying, *That in what a Man Acts, as mov'd thereunto by himſelf, he is Lord and Maſter of Doing it, or letting it alone.* This I think is not altogether ſo exact.

For a Man may Act out of his own meer Motion; that is to ſay, from ſuch inbred Principles of Virtue, and by ſo ſtrong and efficacious a ſenſe of Honeſty, as not to be able to act otherwiſe, or to draw his Will to any different Thing. For inſtance, an Honeſt Man has Power indeed, by his Wit and bodily Force, treacherouſly to deſtroy an Innocent Man, and even one that has well deſerved of him. But can that Honeſt Man do

do this Thing? No, God forbid! He dare not let himself do it. For that vigorous and lively sense of what is Honest, and with which his Mind is tinctur'd and possess'd, can by no means permit him to execute so horrid a Villany. Now as such a Person, tho never so much sollicited by Promises and Rewards, starts back, and (in the sense of *Antonine*) stops all his Faculties of Motion, and does not resign himself to so base a Fact; this doubtless is entirely *from himself*, and none else is the Cause, why *that* Advantage is not taken. However, I say, he is not, in this Case, so much Master of his Forbearance, as that it is in his power not to forbear. I grant (indeed) that if he would, he were able to commit so wicked a Thing; but that he is able to Will it, or bring his Will unto it, is what I utterly deny.

IX. We say therefore there is some Difference between having *Free-Will*, and being a *Voluntary* or *Spontaneous Agent*. The former is more restrain'd and particular, and obtains in fewer Cases; the latter is more large and general. When we say that a Man has *Liberum Arbitrium* or *Free-will*, we add a particular Difference to the general Notion of *Voluntarineſs*, that is to say, We suppose he is such a voluntary Agent, as can Act and not Act as he pleases: Whereas to the being a voluntary Agent, simply or generally speaking, there is no such Difference required. It is sufficient to denominate

Andronicus, *Lib.* 3. *Cap.* 2.

nate any Agent to be such, whose Principle of Action is in himself, and who understands and takes cognizance of his own Actions and the Circumstances that relate to them: That, in the mean time, it may not be in his Power, every time he Acts, to Act otherwise than he does.

This now being the Notion of *Spontaneous* or *Voluntary*; we see plainly what is the Opposite to it; namely, every thing that proceeds either from *Ignorance*, or *Outward Force*. Whatever Action is done from either of these Principles, must needs be inspontaneous and involuntary. For in the one Case (that of *Force*) the Agent does not act from his own Principles, but is compelled from without: In the other Case (that of *Ignorance*) tho he act from his own Principle, yet he has no Notice of the Moral Circumstances of the Action, which if he had known, he would not have done that Action.

X. But now as to *Liberum Arbitrium*, or *Freedom of the Will*; what we call by that Name is only that sort of Spontaneity or Voluntariness in us; which is so free and undetermin'd, that it is in our Power, to Will or Act this way or the other way, as we please. This (I say) is properly *Free-Will*; and it supposeth a free Election or Choice in our selves: And accordingly *Andronicus* (from *Aristotle*) defines it to be, *A deliberate Wishing or Appetition of those Things, which are within our Power.* For those things (says he)

Lib. 3. *Cap.* 4.

are

are the subjects of Deliberation, whereof every one is Master to do them, or to leave them undone: And these are those very Things, which he declares to be within our Power.

Now this Power of not Acting, when it regards those things which are Base and Dishonest, is a great Perfection; But when it has respect to things that are Noble and Honest, 'tis a great Imperfection. For 'tis in the very next Degree to Acting dishonestly, to be able to incline the Will towards an Action that is vile.

However, to know we are able, and possess'd with a Power to abstain from a vile Thing (tho possibly we do not abstain) this is a sort of Perfective State, and of high Consequence for a Man to discover in himself whether he have it or no.

Now that such a real Power is planted in Man, of being able to abstain from doing ill, tho he fails at some times to exert that Power, is very plain from the Instances that follow.

XI. We need not bring hereunto any other Help, than what was noted before, in the Chapter about the Interpretation of the Passions. For as we feel the Checks of Conscience after doing some things which were doubtingly Acted, and without mature Deliberation: Even from hence it is manifest, that we sometimes Act so, as that to have Will'd and Acted otherwise, was in our Power.

And this Power, of abſtaining from Ill, is that very Thing, which is truly called *Free-Will*.

XII. The Reaſon alſo of *Repentance*, is cloſe of Relation hereunto. For when we are captivated by ſome Appetite, and commit what we know, and are very ſenſible, is againſt the Dictates of Honeſty; 'tis of theſe things we are afterwards ſaid to Repent. 'Tis not ſaid, We lament ſuch things as *Misfortunes*; which they ought in reaſon to paſs for, if either by Fate, or a neceſſary Chain of Cauſes, we were always deſtin'd or irreſiſtibly determin'd to them, and that it had never been within our Power or Capacity to have avoided them. For no Man Repents himſelf of his *Misfortunes*, but of his *Sins*; becauſe theſe are committed by his own Crime, when he might have abſtain'd, and done otherwiſe. But to Repent of *Sins*, which were never in our Power to withſtand; is as if a Man ſhould greatly lament his Improbity and Malice, or undertake ſome ſharp Penance, for not having been Created an Angel, or elſe born a Prince. As to the like Effect we have hinted before.

Lib. 2. Cap. 3.

L. 2 c. 1. §. 15.

XIII. But, in the laſt place, To what purpoſe do we reprehend ſome Men for what they act, pardon others, and have pity on the reſt; if Mankind be deſtitute of *Free-Will*: If it be not given him, to turn away from what is Vile, and to embrace what is Laudable and Juſt: For we might, in point of Juſtice, inſiſt upon it, that if Men are tyd

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to Sin, and do it by *Neceſſity*, and cannot otherwiſe act; there is both Pardon and Commiſeration due unto them: Alſo by how much a Man's Sins were crying and flagitious, by ſo much would they become the more worthy of ſuch Pardon and Moral Pity. But ſince theſe things are repugnant to common Senſe, and the inbred Characters of our Mind; it follows of Neceſſity, that we muſt acknowledg ſome Actions, at leaſt, of Man to be *Free:* that is to ſay, that they ſpring from ſuch a Principle, as we have out of *Ariſtotle* deſcrib'd, and which we call *Free-Will.* And we hope no Man will doubt hereof, when we ſhall have ſatisfi'd the Two Principal Objections, wherewith the Champions of the other ſide do ſo loudly, and with ſuch Clamours contend.

Chap. II.

Two Principal Objections againſt Free-Will *are Propos'd and Anſwer'd.*

THE firſt Objection ariſeth from God's Fore-knowledg; which (they ſay) muſt take away all Contingency, and, in Conſequence, the Liberty of Man's Will. *L. 1. c. 11. §. 5.*

The ſecond is taken from the Nature of Good, altho but Apparent: For as often or

as long as any thing seems Good or Excellent to any one in the Circumstances he then is in, his Will is necessarily compell'd to embrace it, because there is no Motive either to divert him, or suspend his Assent. For since the Will of Man is so fram'd, as to bend this Way or that, according to the Weight and Importance of the Object; it seems impossible it should not bend, where most Reason compels, and when nothing is in the other Scale to counterpoise it: Nay, if something should be in the other Scale, yet still that Good which is most Apparent will certainly outweigh. For there is no Reason to be rendered, why a Man should be prevail'd on by a lesser Good, more than by no Good at all: Since if, in the Scale of Reason, that which is Less should weigh down that which is Greater, then a Less than that, till it came to Nothing, would preponderate; and also our Reason and Election would thus be mov'd by Nothing: Both which are absurd to Believe.

Wherefore the Will evermore inclines to that Good which is most apparent; and upon that account 'tis necessarily determin'd to *One Thing*: Whence it comes to pass, that we have no such thing as *Free-Will* in us, and that we could never have acted otherwise than as we have already done.

II. As to the first of these Objections, the Answer is not hard. 'Tis true, we cannot otherwise think of God's Fore-knowledg, but to be every way clear and perfect, and without possibility

ssibility of Error, as to those Objects about which he judges or does pronounce. And surely he does always judg and determine of things according as they are; that is to say, of a contingent thing, that it is contingent; and of a necessary thing that it is necessary. Whence it comes to pass, that those things, which are contingent and proceed from a Free Principle of Acting, they are allow'd to be such by God's Consent. For we ought not to confine God's Omniscience within narrower Bounds than we do his Omnipotence, which all Men acknowledg to be able to do whatever does not imply a Contradiction.

And therefore, to dispatch this Difficulty in a few words: We say that the Fore-knowledg of contingent Effects, which proceed from a free Principle of Acting, does either imply a Contradiction, or it does not. If it does imply a Contradiction, then such Effects are not the Objects of God's Omniscience, nor determin'd by it, or rightly suppos'd to be determin'd at all. But if it do not imply a Contradiction, then we actually confess, that Divine Prescience and Man's Free-Will, are not inconsistent, but that both of them may fully stand with each other. Therefore by neither way, can any sound or convincing Argument be drawn from God's Fore-knowledg against the Liberty of Man's Will.

III. As to the other Difficulty, the whole sense thereof falls within this Proverbial Saying, *Nemo est lubens Malus, aut Beatus invitus*; that

Ethic. Nicom. l. 3. c. 5.

that is, No Man is willingly Wicked, or Happy against his Will: Or else into that saying of *Socrates*, *Omnis Improbus ignorat*, That no Man was Wicked, but through Ignorance. Which sounds as if the Will of Man wanted nothing, but the Knowledg of what was Good and Virtuous, to force him to imbrace it: Nay, that the Will was so fram'd, as not to be able to resist that Good, which it did but once understand. Now if this were true, there would not need so much Exhortation to the love of Virtue, as to the Study of Wisdom; Nor would the Liberty of Man's Will consist so much in Pre-election, as in Counsels and Deliberations: and these to be still so Govern'd, as that nothing should prove repugnant to some Excellent End.

IV. WHEREFORE inasmuch as we find that Idea of the chief End, which is termed *Beatitude* or *Happiness*, to be but confusedly apprehended by us; 'tis every Man's Duty with principal Care to find out, in what this chief *Happiness* doth consist, and how we may attain it: Yet whether all this be plac'd within every Man's Reach, is a very hard thing to determine.

We see, the Bulk of Mankind are like those; who, falling sick of a Disease and not knowing how to cure themselves, ought to be visited by others that are in Health, and from them take Remedies and Advice. So the Generality, that see little of themselves, while they are dazled by false Lights and the

bare

have Apparitions of Good, can never discover, What is the Ultimate Good, and what the most Excellent Object of Human Life. *For* (as *Aristotle* observ'd) *all men seek after Apparent Good; nor are they Masters of their own Imagination; but every Man frames a different Good to himself, according to his Complexion.* *Ethic. Nicom. l. 3. c. 5.*

V. 'Tis in the Third Book of his *Ethicks*, that the *Philosopher* proposes this Question; and yet he does not otherwise clear it, than by granting, That it was some time or other in the Power of those, who now are Blinded, to have beheld what was truly Good; and that Men are not less willingly Bad than Good: But this does not directly satisfie the Objection. Also he is pleas'd to expose it with more Words and Ornaments than is usual with him, as in manner following, *That no Man is to himself the Cause of doing Ill, but that such Things are done by Ignorance of the End, and as Hoping he shall thereby attain what is Best for him. That the Desire of the End falls not within our Choice: but that it imports every Man to be so born, as Naturally to See and Discern that what he chooseth is truly Good: And he, who has this Felicity by Birth, is as it were Inspir'd, and much oblig'd to Nature. For he shall possess that High and Excellent Good, which could never have been had either by Purchase, or by Instruction, had it not come by Birth-Right. And thus to be born, and under so benign a Planet, is the true Perfection of Ingenuity.*

Since

VI. SINCE therefore this *Natural Talent*, or *inherent Aptitude*, which is so capable of Virtue and the Sense of all Good Things, is antecedent to all our Industry (as being the Gift of Nature, and not the Reward of our Care and Diligence) if a Man be destitute hereof, 'tis manifest that the Duties and Performances, requir'd by Virtue, are not in his Power; Neither can the soundest Admonitions find Effect or Obedience with him, unless he be awak'ned by Stripes and Force, or unless he be reform'd by something of Miracle from Above. But whether any are so utterly depriv'd of this *Natural Aptitude*, or by what Fate it befals them, if they are so; is to me so hard and perplexing a Question, that I had rather wholly decline it, than involve my self within such Mysteries of Providence.

VII. HOWEVER, as to those, who are so endow'd as to have some Native Foretast of this high and Excellent Good; it seems to be plac'd within their Power, either to acquire to themselves a clearer and more extended Knowledg therein, or else to let that by degrees extinguish which already they have. Into which Error, if they shall unhappily run; 'tis with the same reason they may be said to be *Willingly wicked*, as of the Intemperate man, that he throws himself *Wilfully into a Distemper*. And of whom *Andronicus* speaks in this sort, *Before the Man fell sick, it was in his own Power to have preserv'd his Health:* *L. 3. c. 6.*

But

when Health is lost by Incontinence and Debauch, it is not in his Power to Recover it. So a Man may throw a Stone to the Bottom of the Sea, but being cast thither he cannot recover it: However the Stone was willingly cast by him, 'twas not in his Power, either to Cast, or to have withheld it.

VIII. As for those Men, who throw off all Distinction of Things Honest and Vile; who have no other Sense than of the *Animal Life*; who consider only for themselves, be it Right or Wrong; who think that *Good* is but of one Sort, and this only referable to Animal Content (or if, perchance, they think Good to be various, yet still they fix and appropriate all to themselves;) In such Men as these, I do confess, their Will is perpetually determin'd to what is the most apparent Good. They enjoy no more Liberty than Brutes, whose Appetite is necessarily ty'd down to the greater Good: For they have but one single Principle of Acting, and 'tis but one Sort of Object that is before their Senses. And in this single Case 'tis confess'd, that the Second Objection has its Force.

IX. But when we consider, how there is a double Principle in the greatest Part of Mankind; the one *Divine*, and the other *Animal*. How that the Voice and Dictate of the *Divine Principle*, is ever for that which is simply and absolutely the Best; and Virtue propoleth, in every of our Thoughts or Actions, that which is most conforming to the Eternal *L. 1. c. 6. §. 4.*

Eternal and immutable Law of Reason: Which (in *Tully*'s Opinion before mention'd) is the common Standard both to God and to our selves. When also, on the other side, we consider that the *Animal* Principle dictates nothing to Man, but what to himself is either good, pleasing, or advantageous; that is, what may be grateful to himself alone, tho it never so much violate that Law, or Universal Reason of things, before spoken of. I say, that from the Conflict and Opposition of these two Principles, we have a clear Prospect, what is the Condition, and what the Nature, of that Free-Will whereof we treat.

L. 1. *c.* 6. § 4.

X. This is a thing, which all Men have experience of, that at some times, and even then when we behold clearly what were best and most consonant to the Divine Law; yet we do not excite our Minds to it; or put on that Courage, which we know we have, to pursue so fair and so fit an Object; but yield and go on where-ever the Stream of Pleasure, or of our own Utility, will carry us. But certainly we have the more to answer for herein; as at the same time we are inwardly conscious, it is in our Power to over-rule all external Motions of the Body. And that, if we would obey such Power, and abstain from acting, there would nothing of that Guilt ensue, which for Self-Interest or Concupiscence we too frequently incur.

XI. In the mean time, while such Men as these do still go on, and still delude them-

selves

lives with Apologies for their Sloth and Immorality (as either truſting to the Divine Goodneſs for Pardon, or elſe putting off their Amendments to a further Day) 'tis manifeſt, that altho they do perſiſt to ſatisfie their ill Desires, and poſtpone their Repentance to future time: yet are they convinc'd, it were far better, if already done; and that 'tis equally now, as well as hereafter, within their Power to do it. And this is enough to ſhew, how plainly, even theſe confeſs the *Liberty of Man's Will.*

XII. And thus is it made evident, that 'tis not neceſſary, that Man's Will ſhould ſtill be carried on to the greater (that is, to the more excellent) Good. For it may, according to the Liberty it hath, deſert what is abſolutely the beſt; and either cloſe with what is moſt grateful to the Animal Life, or ſuffer it ſelf to be captiv'd by it, for want of exerting the Power and Faculties it hath.

XIII. And here I do as freely confeſs, that were there no other Life or Law in us, than to reliſh and purſue what were moſt for our particular Pleaſure, and not that which is the moſt ſimple and moſt abſolute Good, which aſſuredly is ſome Divine Thing, and by Nature congruous and conſonant to that Eternal Wiſdom, which has fram'd and does preſerve the Univerſe) it would be hard to prove, that we had any Free-Will; or that our Will was not neceſſarily determin'd to ſome one thing, which, in

in all Deliberations, appear'd to us for the best.

XIV. But, on the other side, it is plain and manifest to me, that this Divine Law is not perfectly in us, as the Animal; and that Right Reason is that Law (and it is a high Gift and Blessing of God unto mortals) by which we are taught, and stand bound, to prefer publick Good before our private, and never to make our own Pleasure or Utility to be the Measure of human Actions. And whoever he be, that thinks himself justly discharged from the Obligation of this Heavenly Law; I am bold to affirm, he deserves to pass for the most vile, as well as most contemptible, Creature upon Earth.

XV. Thus much of *Free-Will*, and with what Brevity and Perspicuity we are able. For what concerns the chief Arguments, or rather Sophisms of Mr. *Hobbs*; we have sufficiently refuted them in our Treatise *Of the Immortality of the Soul*: Whereunto the Reader is already refer'd. So that we now pass to those Theorems or Precepts, which are useful in the acquiring of Virtue.

Lib. 2. *c.* 3.

CHAP.

Chap. III.

Theorems, which are of general Use, in the Acquiring of Virtues.

THE *Theorems* or Precepts, which are subservient to the acquiring of Virtue, are either *General* or *Special*.

And the *General* are reduc'd to three Heads.

I. To prove that we ought to labor after Virtue.

II. That 'tis in our Power to attain it.

III. To add a few efficacious Precepts to that End.

I. That *we ought to pursue Virtue, and fly from Vice*, is a thing clearly manifest to us by the Sense and Dictate of Conscience. Moreover that we are obliged to perform all the Duties of Virtue, is plain, from that Law of Reason, which God has implanted in us; for our Intellect, or Right Reason, which is in us, is a superior thing; and all other Faculties are, by Natural Right, subjected to its Obediences. But the Law of Virtue, and of Right Reason, is altogether the same. For Virtue seeks nothing in every Action, but what is simply the best, and that which to Right Reason is most consonant. And since this Law of Virtue, and Right Reason, is not any positive or arbitrary Thing, but of a Nature eternal and immutable; we cannot therefore

fore doubt, but we are bound to obey its Precepts and Directions by an eternal and indiſſoluble Obligation.

III. FURTHERMORE all Men are bound, by the common Law of Nature, to do what appertains unto them; I mean, thoſe things which are conſonant to their own Natures. So that Men ſhould live like Men, and not as Brutes; but certainly if Life wants the Fruit of Virtue and of Right Reaſon, 'tis not manly but merely brutal.

Whatever is in us, beneath Virtue and Right Reaſon, muſt not (as *Plotinus* ſays) be reputed to be of us, but rather as a certain *Brutal Addition*, ſavoring of the Lion or the Bear, which is to be ſubdu'd, and made obſequious to the true Nature of Man. For we only are that thing, which is moſt eminent in us, and by which alone we excel other Creatures. So *Andronicus Rhodius* declares, *Every Man to be that, which is beſt and principal in him; and that he who liv'd according thereunto, is rightly ſaid, to live unto himſelf, and to enjoy moſt his own Life and Being.* But he noted a little before, how abſurd a thing it would appear, for any one to reject his own Life, to chuſe that of another. This he calls *A wild and horrid Choice*; and thinks them guilty of it who prefer Concupiſcence unto Virtue: ſince they exchange thereby the human ſtate, for that which is low and irrational.

L. 10. c. 9.

IV. BESIDES, if every Man be a Debtor to himſelf, and to his Concerns; and is bound by

by Foreſight, to put off and diſappoint all great Misfortunes: Surely we ought to cultivate and embrace that Virtue, without whoſe Aid we can neither avoid the Calamities of this Life, or the Pains of a Future. That *Hell*, I mean, which is threatned not onely by true Religion, but by the very Philoſophy of *Plato*, and of others.

V. Lastly, Altho we ſhould not ſeem ty'd by Duty, to chuſe that which was beſt for our ſelves (becauſe no Injury, as they ſay, can be done to a Willing Man) Yet ſeeing we are not born by Chance, but made and created by God above, doubtleſs we are his own by Right of Creation. And, he having an unlimited Juriſdiction over us, we are bound to do all thoſe Things, which by his Divine Laws, he has required of us.

And ſurely his Divine Law is no other, than Eternal and Immutable Reaſon; which being Right is evermore one and the ſame, even as the Figure of a Triangle or Circle, that changeth never. This is what the Almighty has put into us: And, in the Words of *Hierocles*, *'Tis to preſide over the Soul, as it were a Domeſtic God.* 'Tis the Judg and Oracle we are to conſult in all our Actions. For as nothing is dictated from thence, but the mere Tranſcripts of the Divine Will: So the Top of all is this, that we ſhake off whatever is vicious, and apply our ſelves wholly to that which is Virtuous and Good.

VI. 'Tis to the like Effect, what the ſame *Hierocles* does (in his Comment on the *Golden Verſes* of *Pythagoras*) declare: Namely, *That God, being not only the Legiſlator who makes the Law, but the Judge alſo whoſe part it is to Expound and have it Executed; does not only enact what is Good, but knows how to eradicate all that is Evil. That the whole Scope of the Law refers to that which is congruous unto God, and profitable to Man: And that this was to be effected not onely by Weeding and Rooting out of all Vice, but by putting the Soul under ſuch a Diſcipline of Juſtice, as might purge her from contracted Evils, and reſtore her to the Uſe and Exerciſe of Right Reaſon.* Wherefore ſince this Eternal Law of Right Reaſon has regard to a Judge and Legiſlator without us, one ſo Powerful, and to whom by the Right of Creation alſo we are ſubjected; I affirm that it is not allowed unto us, to be Miſerable; But we ſtand oblig'd by Law Inviolable, to aſpire unto Virtue, and to true Felicity.

VII. But that it lies not onely on our Part to aſpire unto Virtue, but is plainly in our Power to attain it, has been before made out: Namely, becauſe we are endow'd with a Free Will, and are told by Natural Conſcience, That in what we have done amiſs, it was in our Power to have done otherwiſe. 'Tis manifeſt, we have it in our Power wonderfully to corroborate and extend this Faculty; and that either if we abſtain from Indifferent

rent things, when they ſeem greatly to de-
ight us; or elſe ſubmit unto others, merely
ecauſe harſh and unpleaſing; that ſo, by
egrees, we may conquer all our Averſions to
hem.

For it ſeems plainly in our Power, either
o move, or to reſtrain, this *External Engine:*
Altho perhaps in thoſe Interior Motions,
which old Philoſophers call the *firſt Eruptions*
of Nature, our Authority is not ſo Abſolute.
But however it be, that Variety of Deſires, as
well as of Averſions, creep eaſily upon us;
Yet 'tis, in a manner, at our own Diſcretion,
either to turn away from ſuch Objects as are
Tempting, or to converſe with thoſe that are
leſs Grateful to us.

Did we but, in Things Indifferent, purſue
this Courſe ſo far as Health and Good Man-
ners would allow; 'Tis ſtrange how ſoon
we ſhould find the increaſe of Power in our
Free-will, and all things, as it were, in our
Liberty, and at Command. And did we not
over-eaſily humour our Cupidities and Aver-
ſions, they would ſoon grow faint, and Reaſon
have the Aſcendant over them all.

VIII. But there are yet other Arguments
to Evince, That it lies almoſt wholly in us,
to become Men of Probity and Virtue. For
it is manifeſtly in our Power to be Sincere;
ſince here I mean nothing elſe, by *Sincerity*,
than a conſtant purpoſe of doing all that is
in our Power to the obtaining of true Virtue.
For that we ſhould not be able, to do whatever

is in our Power to do, is not leſs than a Contradiction: And therefore 'tis in our Power to be *Sincere.*

IX. Now let every Plain and Sincere Man (for his Comfort) know, That he is fortify'd, and girt about with a ſpecial Degree of Providence; And that even God is at Hand to aſſiſt all his Endeavors, juſt as *Hercules* (in the Fable) put his Shoulder to the Wheel, to help the poor laboring Countryman with all the ſtrength he had. For Nature is every where repleniſh'd with Divine Aſſiſtants, and Good Spirits; ſuch, I mean, as ſeek out proper Objects, on whom to caſt their Eyes of Favour. And being true Champions of undefiled Simplicity, they delight to be Miniſterial to Souls that are Sincere. They do by Good Offices diſintangle ſuch Men from the Snares of this World; and lift them from the Impurities of Life, to a ſtate of Safety that is unblemiſh'd. But for Men of Wavering and inconſtant Minds, thoſe they reject: And paſs them over, juſt as Artificers do in Work, thoſe Materials, which are either untractable or unſound. The ſaying of *Hierocles* is not onely true in reſpect of Subſtances, but alſo of Qualities: Namely; *That the Law of Providence was as Extenſive as all the Being of the Univerſe.* But if it be to be taken, in general, of all other Men, what he ſpoke but a little before: Namely, *That Juſtice and Order had, for the Adminiſtration of our Affairs, appointed, That the Immortal Gods, who*

L. 3. c. 10. §. 16.

walk before us, ſhould Meditate of our Condition, and not onely cauſe a Diminution of our Sins, but think how to recal us again unto themſelves. Alſo that they regarded us, as Relations that were laps'd, and were even ſollicitous for our Reſtoration. How much the more aſſured then may we be, that God, and his Holy Angels, will aſſiſt the Sincere and Faithful Souls! Inaſmuch as there is no Bulwark founded upon Vice, that can reſiſt his Power, without being ſoon overthrown, or ſhatter'd into Duſt.

X. ADD hereunto, That God himſelf vouchſafes, by ſome Inward Motions, to communicate and deal benignly with us. For as ſoon as we advance to the Knowing what appertains to Virtue, and become *Maſters of the Divine Senſe*, there is a certain Power above all that is Human, that aſſociates with us and gets into us. But as, when Men yield themſelves to Animal-Complacencies, and are dipt in the Impurities of Nature; they afterwards run headlong to every pernitious thing, and ſeem fatally ty'd down by ſome Chains that are Inviſible, ſo as when Remorſe prompts them to return, they cannot ariſe: So, on the other ſide, thoſe who, with Sincere Affections, do even pant and thirſt after Virtue, They on the ſudden are caught up by *that Intellectual Spirit, which repleniſhes every Thing*; They are animated and ſupported by it, and finally therewith join'd in the ſtricteſt aſſociation of Love. So that, to conclude in the Words of

Lib. 3. Cap. 10. §. 16.

L. 1. c. 6. §. 8.

Marcus Antoninus.

Plato, They are as Men rapt up, and inſpir'd by ſome Divinity; and they are eaſily and ſpontaneouſly led on to every Good Work.

XI. THIS alſo is the Senſe of what we quoted before, out of *Antonine*: Namely, That we ſtood bound, not onely to conſpire with the very Air that ſurrounds us, but to concur with that Intellectual Power, which comprehends All. *For* (ſays he) *this Intellectual Power, was no leſs diſpers'd, and even extended to every Man, who was prepar'd to Imbibe it, than was the open Air to him, who had Lungs, and a Deſire to Breath it.* 'Tis plain, we want nothing for attracting this Power unto us, but that Sincere Love, by which we are taught the true Reliſh of Virtuous Things. For 'tis thus alone we can grow upwards, and have Conjunction with God himſelf; Since Virtue, being the Divineſt of all Things, has moſt Power to aſſimilate us unto Him. Thus *Hierocles* pronounces (in his ſaid Commentary on the Verſes of *Pythagoras*;) *That if an Inſpir'd Senſe be but ſufficiently fix'd and eſtabliſh'd, it gives us a Conjunction with God: For it was neceſſary that a Like Thing ſhould be carry'd unto its Like.* L. 8. §. 54.

I wou'd therefore now ask, Whether any thing, in the Duties of Virtue, can be too hard for us, if we are but United to ſo Great and Potent an Ally? Or how can we doubt of God, and his Holy Providence, while his Grace, his Life, his Energy, are felt ſenſibly in us? For it is God's Life, rather than our own;

ern; if by putting off our Selves, (that is, our Animal Affections) we contend and pant after that alone, which is eminently Good: and which onely belongs to God, who equally conſults the Benefit of the whole Univerſe. Wherefore we are not to diſtruſt, but that, being aſſiſted by ſo ſtrong a Principle, and ſo prevailing a Guide, we may in the End attain unto the Perfection of Virtue.

XII. We muſt not, in the laſt place, here omit, That there are ſome Methods for the more eaſie accompliſhing of this Work: Such as, *Seriouſly and frequently to Meditate of our Diſſolution; the certain End of this Frail Body; And alſo of the Immortality of our Souls.* For 'tis impoſſible that this ſhould not, in a large Meaſure, extinguiſh all thoſe Deſires and Appetites, which center in the Body; If we but think how ſoon the Viſible Man, and this Corporeal Shape we carry about us, muſt crumble and be ſhatter'd into Atoms; how all the preſent Furniture of this Fabrick, ſuch as Wealth and Honor, and all the Luxuries they attract, muſt ever and for ever be ſnatch'd away and rifled from it. Who then would not, in due time, conſider how to place a very moderate and indifferent Value on ſuch periſhable Things, and ſtrive to wean himſelf, by degrees, from the Dominion and Inſolence of this Fleſh! This is the onely Way to bring the Soul to thoſe Operations that are Pure, and to thoſe Pleaſures that are Divine;

having no Reference or Dependence at all on Carnal Things. And this indeed was the Top of all *Plato*'s Philoſophy, which made him therefore ſtyle it, *The Meditation of* Death.

Hiſt. Nat. l. 7. c. 50. XIII. 'Tis true, *Pliny* perverſly enough intimates, as if this were, *To Die by Wiſdom*: But that, which is the moſt perfect Wiſdom, muſt not be call'd *a Diſeaſe*. For who is the Wiſer Man? He that forecaſts what may hereafter happen; Or he that, by plunging into Luxury and the Train of Evils attending it, ſhall firſt ſubmit, and then be Oppreſs'd? Let Virtue therefore be that Mark, which is evermore in our Sight: Since ſhe alone is Immortal, even as the Soul; nor indeed has the Soul any other proper Ornament or Perfection, but Virtue. Nay, ſuch is the Affinity between her and the Soul's Immortality; that, for the moſt part, there is a kind of Senſe and Perception of Immortality engendred in us, as ſoon as the Soul grows virtuous.

XIV. In the Second Place, let us conſider, *How conſummate and even ineffable that Pleaſure is, that fills and poſſeſſes the Soul in Virtue.* For ſeeing the Diſtemper and Lapſe of the Soul, is from a ſtate of Virtue into that of Vice; it cannot otherwiſe be, but that, when ſhe is call'd back to her Primitive Condition, there muſt be Raptures of Joy, at ſuch Reſtitution. For the Philoſophers make *Pleaſure*, in its very Definition to be, *The Reſtitution to a Natural State.* But

But ſurely, the moſt Natural State of that which partakes of Reaſon, muſt be Virtue: inaſmuch as Virtue is nothing elſe, but a conſtant Aptitude and Propenſity to the Dictates of Right Reaſon.

To which we may add what is noted by *Ariſtotle*, That this Pleaſure is ours by a ſort of Propriety; and therefore it muſt be both Joyful and Excelling: *For that which is moſt appropriate to the Nature of every Thing, is the trueſt and moſt Natural Delight.* But unto Man there is nothing more proper than Right Reaſon: And therefore that Pleaſure, which ariſeth from a conſtant Dedication of the Mind thereto, muſt in many Conſiderations excel the reſt. *Andronicus, l.10. c. 9. Ariſtot. cap. 7.*

XV. In the third Place, we may here ſuperadd, *That this Life of Virtue, and this Pleaſure reſulting from it, is the moſt Divine of all other Things.* For a Soul, that is got thus far, has nothing farther to wiſh, unleſs out of Vanity, to aim at ſomething which is more perfect than even the Deity it ſelf. But alas, that which is a Creature cannot be God: For all that he can have muſt be by Participation, and through the help of Virtue, which (as all confeſs) is a ſort of Divine Nature and God-like Life. For the Creature, as he is Animal, can onely follow what is grateful to the Appetite: 'Tis, as he is the Image of God, that he proſecutes that which is ſimply and eminently the Beſt.

Where-

Wherefore as to this Point, *Hierocles*, while he owns both Life and Pleaſure ariſing from Virtue, to be perfectly Divine, does dexterouſly play the Philoſopher in ſaying, *Since therefore Life, which conforms to Virtue, and ſo carries a Divine Similitude, muſt needs be Divine; and that which abides in Vice, muſt needs be Brutiſh and Atheiſtical: 'Tis manifeſt, that the Pleaſures of a Good Man are Imitations of Divine Joy, becauſe his Mind is Aſſociating with God; Whereas that which is ſtyled the Pleaſure of a Wicked Wretch, is onely a Commotion that is altogether ſtupid and Brutal.*

In Aurea Pytagoræ Carmina.

And hereto alſo refers, what the ſame Philoſopher ſpeaks of that *Reaſon*, which is the Rule of Virtue, ſaying, *That to obey Right Reaſon, and to Obey God, is the ſame Thing: For a Rational Being, that ſufficiently partakes of Natural Illumination, Wills and Covets the ſame Things, which the Divine Law ordains. And a Soul, that is fram'd according to God, falls into the ſame Determinations with God; and, by contemplating that Light and Majeſty which is Divine, does the ſame things, which God in like Circumſtances would do.*

XVII. Many things of the ſame Force, occur in ancient Writers, and more eſpecially in *Antoninus* and *Cicero*; which from what has been cited will eaſily be believ'd. We ſhall therefore add, out of the firſt Book of *Tully de Legibus*, onely that ſhort ſaying, Namely, *That Virtue was in Man the ſame as in God.* But if the Caſe ſtand thus, What can be a more

more Natural, or binding Conjugation between them, than this is? 'Tis also referable to the pleasure of Virtue and of the Divine Life, what the same *Cicero* says elsewhere, in advising a Man to consult his own *Delphic* Oracle, that is, *The Knowledge of Himself and of his own Soul:* For thus the Mind, being made sensible how exempt it was from Vice, and how conjoin'd to the Divine Nature; it might be filled with Joys that were unspeakable. *Tusculan. Quæst. l. 5.*

XVIII. The truth is, there was little need, thus to heap up, and with the Authority of the *Ancients* thus to adorn, what, as we have so often affirmed, was by the very Nature and Definition of Virtue so sufficiently manifest. For to prosecute what is Simply the Best, and not what is most grateful to the *Animal Nature*, has still been inculcated to be something Divine, and manifestly elevated above the Animal State. Wherefore we must not barely confine our selves to the Best Principle we find about us, but must live up to that, which our Nature, at its full improvement, is most capable of; and that which is truly and really Divine. And this is what ought to be esteem'd the Supreme Pleasure, the Chief Good, and Ultimate End; In which our Soul, as in its highest Perfection and Felicity, ought only to Acquiesce.

XIX. Such Reflections as these, can scarce ever fail to inflame our Minds in the Study of Virtue. And there are yet some farther things

things which may facilitate, and guide us in the ſame courſe. Among which the firſt Rule of *Antoninus*, is, *That we never meddle with any thing raſhly, or without due Conſultation.*

XX. ANOTHER is of *Epictetus*, *Never to act any Thing againſt our own Conſcience*; But that, as well in Small Matters as in Great, we preſerve it ſound and unſhaken. And to this End let another Precept of the ſame Philoſopher be ſtill before us, *Quicquid videtur Optimum, id Lex eſto tibi inviolabilis.* Whatever appears unto you to be Beſt, let it be unto you as an Inviolable Law; For he that once learns (tho even with the aſſent of Conſcience) to reject a Greater Good, for the ſake of a Leſs; 'tis odds, but in time he may learn, even for the ſame Reaſon, to throw off his ſmall Reſidue of Good, and ſo plunge himſelf totally into Vice. For that part of Good, which he firſt refuſed, was equally as good as the Remainder, which he may alſo as eaſily part withal. Wherefore we muſt both early and diligently watch againſt all ſorts of Depravity: For a preſent Sin makes way for a Future; and every Sin we commit makes a Link of that Iron-Chain, by which we are ty'd down to inextricable Sorrow, and to Darkneſs that will have no End.

Enchiridion, c. 75.

XXI. THE third Rule is, *That whatever Work we ſet about, let it appear we do not forget Virtue in the doing of it.* There is a double Manner of proceeding in every Buſineſs, not onely

only a Right Way and a Wrong; but a Gentle and a Rough; a Violent Way and a Moderate. Wherefore 'tis of no small Moment, in the course of our Life to hit upon the Best; and that commonly is the Best, which favours most of Moderation, Grace and *Decorum*.

XXII. Fourthly, *That we do by Ardent Prayers contend, that God would pour into us a sufficiency of strength, for the Acquisition of Virtue.* No Mortal ought to be asham'd to Beg, and to accept from Him so Divine a Gift, from whom he had also his Being. For we dare Affirm, that whoever pretends to Virtue, without Imploring it at God's Hand, will only catch the empty Shadow thereof. thereof. *Cicero* observ'd, *That no Man could be Great, but as Illuminated by some Ray, or Inspir'd by some Breath from Heaven.* And if nothing be of a more Heavenly Nature than Virtue, 'tis then impossible to have it without the Help of God. *De Naturâ Deorum, l. 2.*

XXIII. Nor must any Man wonder, that we annex Prayers unto *Moral Philosophy*; since we have already made Piety an Essential part thereof. *Epictetus*, *Plato*, *Antoninus*, and other Philosophers, have done the like. And here let us observe the words of *Hierocles*, who has in this Part exceeded the rest, *'Tis not enough* (says he) *with Promptitude and Vigor, to enterprize that which is Laudable, as if the success were wholly in our Power, and without need of assistance from God. No, we must Implore* *In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina.*

Implore the Divine Aid; and not onely Implore it, but endeavour also to Obtain by our Industry, what we ask in our Prayer. For otherwise we make Virtue as it were a sharer in Atheism and Hypocrisie; or else render our own Prayers Ineffectual. The first of which by its Impiety would take away the very Essence of Virtue, and the latter by Stupidity would extinguish the Nature of Prayer.

Let us hereunto add that saying out of *Socrates* mentioned by *Xenophon*, *That every Undertaking should begin with a Recommendation thereof to the Gods*; and that of *Cicero*, *That the Rise and Source of all our Actions be founded with the Immortal Gods.* Likewise that of *Plato* in his *Timæus*, *That whatever work we take in hand, be it great or be it small, never to begin without first Invoking of God.* And lastly that excellent Saying of *Epictetus*, as to the Government and subduing of the Affections; He says, *This is in truth a great Conflict, and a work merely Divine. Wherefore think upon God, and call upon his Holy Aid and Assistance; just as the poor Mariners do, in a sinking Condition, upon* Castor *and* Pollux. *For what greater Tempest can there be, than what ariseth from violent Imaginations, such as toss and distract Reason, and by which it is in danger of shipwrack?* As this Sentence is of moment to the Point in hand; so it appears how many of the other Philosophers insisted upon fervent *Prayer*: For we do not onely hereby acknowledg him, who is the Fountain of all Virtue;

Xenophon de Administratione domesticâ.

De Legibus l. 2.

Arrian, Comment. l. 2. c. 18.

Virtue; but we own, that 'tis God onely, that can Bleſs, and Crown all our Endeavours for it with Succeſs.

XXIV. HOWEVER 'tis not here underſtood, that thoſe are the moſt Efficacious Prayers which are the Longeſt, or the Loudeſt, or the moſt Eloquent; but rather thoſe ſhort and frequent Ejaculations, which the Soul, after long and convincing thoughtfulneſs, ſends up to Heaven: Such, I mean, as are attended with ſighs and a vehement Yerning after God and Virtue. For by ſuch pious Anxiety, we exerciſe and rarifie the Blood and Spirits; we pour into them new ſupplies of pure and hallow'd Air; we corroborate and augment our inward Sentiments of Heaven, and ſend up our Prayers, as in a Chariot of Light or Fire. So that as, in theſe fervent and holy Pantings, we do (in a ſort) draw God into the Soul; we do, in like manner, breath back nothing but that which is Celeſtial and Divine.

XXV. THE fifth and laſt Precept is that of *Pythagoras, That we fail not every Night, before we take Reſt, to ſum up the Actions of the paſt Day.* Thus if we have done any thing well, we may give God the thanks and glory of it: But, if otherwiſe, then to repent of the Miſdoing, and by this means daily fix and ſettle in our minds a reſolution of acting in every thing according to the moſt perfect Rule of Virtue.

Mollia

Mollia nec priùs obducat tua Lumina Somnus,
Exacti quàm ter reputâsti Facta Diei:
Quid lapsus feci? Quid rectè? Quid boni omisi?

The obſerving of this Rule would work a ſtrange Reformation in our Manners; and kindle in us great Reſolutions to Virtue.

Chap. IV.

Things which contribute to the Attaining of the Primitive Virtues.

I. What we have hitherto deliver'd, for acquiring Virtue in the general, is in Truth, if proſecuted, of that Effect, that it looks ſuperfluous to deſcend unto Particulars. And yet we will touch theſe alſo, tho in a very few words.

As to the Three Primitive Virtues, this we admoniſh, if not repeat, That no ſort of Virtue can either be acquir'd or practic'd, or even well thought on without them. Wherefore the entire poſſeſſion of theſe *Three Firſt*, is indiſpenſible.

II. Prudence is the Firſt of all; And how this is to be compaſſed, does by its Definition and Explication (in the *Second Book*) ſufficiently

ſufficiently appear. But as it reaches and preſides, as far as things of Action or Contemplation can go; let us, in our way, refer to the firſt of theſe that ſaying of *Antoninus*, *That we Critically examine our preſent Imaginations, leſt any thing creep in, that is not throughly weigh'd and underſtood.* This he again inculcates by another great Rule; namely, *That whatever falls within our Imagination; we ſhould ſtill frame ſome Definition, and paint out the Lineaments thereof. That ſo we may behold it naked and intire, and what it is in its whole Eſſence, and in every Part.* And this ſurely is the great Buſineſs of *Prudence.* For how elſe are Men carry'd away, or come to be diſappointed, in what they ſhould avoid or purſue; but for not looking round, and not taking into conſideration both the Whole and the Parts? They catch things at firſt ſight, and from ſome few parts, which *Pleaſe* or *Diſpleaſe*, determine the Fate of all the reſt. Thus they become very groſs Accountants; For while they compute and raſhly caſt up what in bulk or value is but part of the Thing (as if it were the whole) they are not capable of Judging; and only diſcover that Precipitation is the Root of moſt Miſtakes. *Lib.* 2. *Sect.* 54. *Lib.* 3. *Sect.* 11.

It were good therefore, to obſerve the Advice that *Epictetus* gave him who was ſo very intent to conquer at the *Olympic* Games: Namely, *That he ſhould well revolve in his Mind, what things were Antecedent, and what Conſequent to that Enterpriſe; and then ſtick*

close to the Work. And to this belongs what he adds in the following Chapter, *O Man, first consider what the Work is, and then thy own Nature, if thou art able to support it.* For if these be not adjusted, we shall quickly pass as vain Projectors, repenting that we ever set forth, and sharing in the Contempts and scorns of the Unfortunate.

To this kind of Prudence we may refer that most Excellent Admonition of *Epicharmus, Be thou sober, and remember to Distrust; For these Things are the very Nerves of Wisdom.* And, as consonant hereunto, let us add this Advice of our own, *Never much to believe either Fortune or Men: but to trust in God and Virtue which can never Change.* For Men differ, in a few Days, even from themselves; and their Wills and Counsels are not to morrow the same.

III. But as to the Second Branch, about things Contemplative; let the searcher of Wisdom take these few Rules.

To suspend his Assent till the Thing be clearly and distinctly understood.

That whatever Things may be, in their own Natures; yet to afford them in our Reasoning no other place, than as they are manifest to the Faculties of our Mind.

That the inward and naked Essence of a Thing cannot be known, but onely its Essential Attributes, or its Essential Properties.

That

That Eſſential Attributes muſt immediately be in, and belong to the Subject: Nor ought any Phyſical Reaſon be ask'd, or can be given, why they are in it.

That the Idea of every Thing, does conſiſt of certain Eſſential Attributes.

That to the perfect Knowledg of any Thing, ſuch an Idea or Notion thereof is requiſite; as is not onely clear and diſtinct, but full and adequate: ſo as to comprehend all thoſe inſeparable Attributes, which appertain unto it. For 'tis poſſible, either by Induſtry or by Neglect, ſo to think of a Subject, as not to think of any of thoſe Attributes, which in truth are inſeparable from it: And this, I fanſie, *Des Cartes* has done, in his Notion of the Human Soul; while de *Defines* it *onely by Cogitation.*

Laſtly, To diſtruſt him, whoſe Mind is not yet refin'd; To credit no Maſters, or any Faculty whatever, except Reaſon, ſolid Experience, and the Intellect (which is the Wardrobe of Common Notions.)

IV. As to the Second of theſe Great Vertues, which is *Sincerity*; you may, as to Men, weigh it in this Ballance. To obſerve if you treat them in the ſame manner, as you would be willingly treated by them: And mind ſtill what is ſaid by *Cicero, That there is no one thing ſo like or ſo Equal to another, as are all men to one another.* Whence 'tis manifeſt, that, while Circumſtances are the ſame, we are mutually obliged in the ſame manner to treat each other. *De Legibus*, l. 1.

But as to God and Virtue, your *Sincerity* will appear, if you ſo debaſe your ſelf, and all you have, in reſpect of them; that you even deſire to give up Liberty, Fortune, and Life it ſelf for their ſakes. Now, if you feel within you a Reſolution of this Force, you may then conclude you are come to the perfection of Patience. But for poor wretched Creatures as we are; ſhould we, on the other hand, prefer and eſteem of our ſelves above God and Virtue; It were ſo lewd and ſo abhorrent a Crime, that this thought alone (if we could but think it) were enough to conſtrain us to be *Sincere*.

V. Nor is the Argument for *Patience* of leſs weight. Since the Juſt, who die for the Cauſe of God and of Virtue, are not onely Crown'd with Immortality, but their Soul adorn'd with Glory; which is a double Reward. And it will contribute not a little to this Virtue; if here we take in, what before was adviſ'd for augmenting the power of *Free Will*; namely, That we ſet our ſelves vigorouſly to abſtain from all thoſe things, which to the Corporeal and to the Animal Life are moſt grateful: Alſo that, as far as Health and good Manners will permit, we enure our ſelves reſolutely to harſh and unpleaſing things. For if we but firmly maintain theſe Characters, we ſhall ſoon find enlargement in our *Inward Faculties*: We ſhall excite within us not only joy, but a new greatneſs of Soul, and feel our ſelves in a ſtate to enterpriſe

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very thing that is Honourable. We ſhall not account we have loſt, but only chang'd our Delights: ſeeing the Soul, by a ſenſe of Adhering unto and Reverencing the Precepts of Virtue, ſhall attain a Joy not Corporeal, but diſtinct and peculiar to it ſelf, and be even raviſh'd with the Fruition thereof.

Chap. V.

How the Three Principal Derivative Virtues may be acquir'd.

I. AS for *Juſtice*, *Fortitude*, and *Temperance*: We ſay firſt, that the principal part of *Juſtice*, which is true *Piety*, will in the Minds of Candid Men ſoon take root, if they but take the Image of *Impiety*; and ſee how Rude, how Barbarous, and how void of all good Nurture it is. For does any Man among us neglect a Benefactor to his Face? Do we not rather load him with Honours, and make our Acknowledgments as profound, and as anſwerable to his Bounties, as we can? How then ſhall we put that upon God, which even among Men is not permitted without Shame? This alone, unto a generous Mind is motive enough, and a ſufficient Spur unto *Piety*. But for others, let them take warning, leſt by Ingratitude they forfeit all Title to Fa-

vour: Let them, in time, consider that Divine Vengeance will be as diligent to find them out, as they are now drouzy and regardless towards their Creator. Yet as to the manner of Worship, let this be a Rule to all, that we so adhere to God's outward and publick Service; as not to omit our inward and private Devotions, which are certainly the dearest Part.

L.2.c.2.5. We have already observ'd, That the internal Worship is a true *Imitation of God.* And this Opinion is not a little inforc'd by what the *Pythagorean* in *Hierocles*, says, *That we then worship God in the best manner, when we bring our Minds to a Resemblance of him; Since what a Man loves he endeavors to Imitate.* And a little after, *That costly Oblations bring no Honour to God, if they are not offer'd with a Godly Mind. That the Sacrifices of the Wicked are but a Stubble to the Fire, and their Holy Donatives serve onely but for Booty to the sacrilegious.* And as for a Temple, he adds this short Description thereof, *That there is not on Earth a fitter place for God, than is a purified Soul.* And to this Sense, he brings *Apollo* himself, pronouncing the Similitude between Heaven and a Holy Mind.

Æquè Animis sanctis, atq; ipso Ego lætor Olympo.

I do not greater pleasure find
In Heaven, than in a holy Mind.

III. But, having quoted thus much, let us not omit what the ſame Author more elegantly and at large, ſets forth: to wit, *That the wiſe Man is the onely Prieſt; He onely is acceptable to God, and He onely knows how to pray unto him. For he onely knows how to Worſhip God aright, who is arrived to Divine Knowledge; He, I ſay, that offers himſelf for a Sacrifice; that converts his Soul into a Divine Monument; and whoſe Mind is prepar'd as a Temple, for the reception of Heavenly Light.* Here 'tis to be obſerv'd that the Man whom *Hierocles* calls *Wiſe*, *Ariſtotle* calls *Prudent*. But both are in reality the ſame, as being endow'd with Virtue: For Virtue, which is true and rais'd up to Perfection, and which becomes thereby the Image of God, is certainly God's beſt Worſhip. Yet this Inward Gift never contends againſt thoſe Rites and Forms in Religion, that are decent and eſtabliſht by Law.

IV. As to the other Branch of *Juſtice*, which is *Probity*; and commonly call'd by the Name of *Juſtice*, in a ſtricter Senſe: This ought to be much in the care of all pious Men, as 'tis a Branch of that Piety, which is a principal part of Virtue; and which had been demonſtrated (in our *Second Book*) to be the beſt way of God's Worſhip. For *Probity* is the Bond of Society, and of all Human Concerns; and the whole World is in a manner ſo ty'd together and ſupported by it, that if this Pillar were ſhaken, the ruin of all muſt follow. Wherefore all Men are bound *Lib.* 2. *Cap.* 5.

to defend it, and to regard it even as an hallowed Thing.

V. But if any Man who for barely containing himſelf within the bounds of Human Law, ſhall thereupon pretend unto the Character of *Juſt*; we ſhall venture to call this rather *Dexterity* or Artifice, than true *Juſtice*. For ſuch an one feels no Concern as to the Publick Good; his thoughts are all about himſelf; and *Juſtice* (which conſults the good of others) has no part in his Meditations; ſince they are bounded and limited by Self-love. So that if a Man of this frame ſhould but live to ſee the Laws laid by, he would ſtart immediately into another ſhape. He, who but yeſterday was according to the letter of the Law, a very preciſe Elder, turns either *Libertine*, or as ravenous as an Evening Wolf. Wherefore let him, who deſires to be truly Juſt, not believe that he is already ſo; unleſs he finds that, if there were no Laws, he could contain himſelf, and ſtill be Maſter of the ſame Deſires.

VI. As to *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, we may here repeat what before we offer'd concerning *Patience*. *Hierocles* calls them all, *The Adamantine keepers of the Soul:* If you diſcharge them, ſhe preſently is betray'd to all Temptations and Calamity. But how neceſſary *Fortitude* is, will appear by that Excellent ſaying of *Andronicus:* Namely, *That ſome things are ſo Diſhoneſt, as not to afford the Ill-doer the leaſt ſhadow or pretence of Excuſe.*

In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina.

Lib. 3. Cap. 1.

And

And therefore that a Man muſt vigorouſly withſtand theſe things, and not onely indure Torment on ſuch account, but even immediate Death.

Wherefore there is no Argument that more helps a Man to ſtudy *Fortitude*, and how to acquire it; than to conſider how miſerable we are without it; 'tis elſe in the power of every inſolent Superior, either by Threats or by Oppreſſion, to make the timorous Man as vile and as obſequious as he pleaſes. And what greater torment or ſervitude can there happen to an ingenuous Mind, than (with Guilt and Confuſion) to own, that, as ſoon as the terror of any great miſchief looks towards him; he ſhall not onely ſhrink from Truth and Virtue, but even contribute to betray them both.

VII. As for *Intemperance*, the very Diſcredit of that Pleaſure were enough to deter us from it. He that conſiders the Dignity of Man, and the great things he is born to, muſt be aſtoniſh'd to ſee, at how mean a rate he often ſells them all! The poor Fly is not more eaſily taken in the Cobweb, or the Fiſh deluded by the Bait, or any other Beaſt fetter'd in a Toil, than is poor Man, whom luſts and paſſions have ſubdu'd. Every *Libertine* calls him away, and every impure Raſcal leads him about; till at laſt he grows abject and more contemptible than a Beaſt. For Pleaſure, which feeds and vitiates the Senſe, does alſo by degrees prey upon the Mind:

Mind: It puts out the Light, and breaks the force it had. Nay, when at last nothing but *Fortitude* is left him (that Sentinel, or Out-guard, without whose vigor and fidelity no Virtue can be safe) even here Pleasure attacks him, and like a raging Strumpet that has had success, comes on with Impudence, and will not quit her Hold, till she drives us into utter destruction. So that what *Cicero* said, is no less true than common, *That, in the Region of Pleasure, it was impossible for Men to hold any Commerce with Virtue.*

De Senectute.

VIII. Nor does *Intemperance* onely benumb and bewitch the Mind; but the Body also is miserably shaken and obnoxious to many cruel Diseases by it: So that *Abstinence*, even on Health's account, deserves our highest Care. 'Tis not that here we should assign the Weights and Measures of *Temperance*, but onely speak of what is relative to Health, and to the good state of the Body and the Mind; Since we know that in robust Bodies, which are over-fed, the faculties of the Mind are very often incumbred, and oppress.

IX. Wherefore *Temperance* is so to be cultivated, as more to intend the plenty and purity of the Animal Spirits, than the extension of the Body. Thus that Oracle of *Zoroaster* advis'd, *Let not the Spirit be defiled, nor the superficies be made gross.* Which refers to that of *Hierocles*, who calls this Spirit, by the name of a *Thin-Vehicle*, and a *Body Immaterial.* Adding also this, *That we take a vigilant Care of our* Organ,

L. 2. c. 2. §. 3.

In Aurea Pytagoræ Carmina.

Organ, *and skilfully fit it to Philoſophical purpoſes.*

X. THIS then is true and *Philoſophical Temperance*, if we ſo far ſubdue the bulk and powers of the Body, as that they may not be able to ſtifle or extenuate the Senſe of excellent Things. And above all, *That the Internal Spirit be not pamper'd and incraſſated*, which is what *Hierocles* calls the *Spiritual Vehicle*. His Opinion being, *That our Internal Man is compos'd, and made up, as well of this Vehicle as of the Soul.* Wherefore the *Pythagoreans* made great work about the *purifying of the Spirit*, or *Vehicle*, as by the following words of *Hierocles* appears: *We muſt* (ſays he) *by the exerciſe of Virtue, and the recovery of Truth and Purity, take care of thoſe things, which appertain to the Luciform Body; which is, what the Oracles declare to be the Tender or Aerial Vehicle of the Soul. But the care of this Purification muſt extend even to Meats and Drinks, and whatever elſe concerns theſe our Mortal Bodies. For the Luciform Spirit reſides therein; it was that which gave Life to this, when it was inanimate, and is the Conſervator of its preſent Frame. This indeed is that Immaterial Body, which is Life it ſelf, and which gives and ingenerates material Life; 'Tis by this that our Mortal Bodies, which conſiſt of Life Irrational and Body Material, are made up: And thus an Image is compos'd of the Internal Man, who is built out of Rational Subſtance, and Body Immaterial.* *In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina.*

XI. IN

XI. In all which High Words, he intimates, that in our care concerning the *External Man*, which is our *Corporeal Frame* or *Bulk*, we muſt be ſure to bring no Detriment or Contagion to the Internal: But that the regulation and meaſures of our Diet as to meat and drink, and what elſe concerns this Mortal Body, muſt refer to the health or ſafety of the Inward Man. The End being, that this Thin and Lucid covering of the Soul, which muſt ſurely be ſome Aerial or Ethereal Veſtment, be kept free from all ſervile Commixtures with our polluted Carcaſe. And hereto the ſame *Hierocles* adds, *That foraſmuch as to this our Luciform Body, there is another Mortal Body congenerate and affix'd; We are to preſerve the former in all Purity, and to diſcharge it (as much as is poſſible) from all Intercommoning or Combinations with the Latter.*

XII. The truth is, that all this Doctrine about Cleanſing and Purgation even of the Soul it ſelf (and ſo the whole Buſineſs and Import of Virtue) points but at this, that there be Cleanlineſs in the Inward Man, and that the vigor of it be ſuſtain'd. For ſo the ſame great Interpreter of the *Pythagorean* Wiſdom does a while after explain the Matter, ſaying, *That the purification of the rational Soul, was done with concern, and had reference to the Luciform Vehicle; Meaning that the Vehicle was thereby to be render'd more Lightſom and Elaſtic, ſo as it might not afterwards retard the ſuperious flight of the Soul. That the ſaid Purification*

was

was best effected, by divorcing our Thoughts and Meditations from Terrene Objects, and lifting them by degrees unto things Immaterial. That all Turpitude was to be suppres'd; and that we should prohibit all sordid Intercourse of the Body Material, for fear the Luciform Body should be Tarnish'd and contaminated by it. That if there were a Vigilance in these Particulars, then might this Spiritual Vehicle acquire new Life and Vigor; it might be endow'd with Celestial Vivacity; and at length enter into a Conjugation with the Intellectual Perfections of the Soul.

All this can Purification do, when but steer'd and conducted by Virtue; It can Recollect, Resuscitate, and even inspire with heavenly Energy, that subtile and attenuated Chariot of our Mind; that inward Organ, which will afterwards remain its Habitacle, and a Consort inseparable to all Eternity.

XIII. I confess, these things sound as lofty Flights, and yet they are the Documents of the famous *Hierocles*; by which we are taught, that the greatest pitch of Philosophical *Temperance*, is, *To preserve this Vehicle* in a congruous temper to the purity of the Soul; that the *Inward Man* be not defil'd by the Sense of Gross Contentments; Not impotently hurry'd on to concur with Flesh and Blood; nor anxious for Joys that have no manner of Foundation. We are rather admonish'd by such *Temperance*, how this Luciform Vehicle, this inhabitable Lightning, which is also a Body distinct; may be preserved Free, Vigorous, and Immaculate.

This

XIV. This is the very Doctrine, which the ſame Author mentions from that Golden Verſe of *Pythagoras*,

——— ——— ——— *Tum ſingula penſa*
Aurigam mentem ſtatuens ex parte ſuperna.

Which he thus explains, That *Pythagoras* ſpeaks here firſt of the Mind as being a Rational Power; Next he calls it *the Driver of the Chariot*, as it directs and governs, not only the Corporeal Body but the Luciform. That this *Driver* which is indeed the Soul, does not onely with a ſharp Eye look out, to diſtinguiſh the way, and keep within the paths of Virtue: but it holds the Reins with ſteddineſs, both to embrace and to reſtrain her dear and Luciform Companion; and all, with Intention to direct its Proſpect wholly towards Heaven, and to make it thereby grow into a Similitude of the Deity. This is an apt and cloſe Alluſion to the moſt perfect and Philoſophical *Temperance* or *Continence*, which allows not that any Corporeal Pleaſures ſhould pierce into the Inward Man. For it repreſents the Soul, as holding a ſtrict Rein againſt all Commerce that might obſtruct the Diviner Joys which ariſe from a Senſe of God and Virtue. And this doubtleſs is the perfect Scope, the trueſt Meaſure, and the higheſt Improvement of *Temperance*.

But

XV. But how far distant from this Perfection such Men are, who wallow in Gluttony, Drunkenness, and the impurities of Lust; let them consider, and compare their Cases, who are accountable herein? Let this be their sad *Memento*, that while it was in their power to resemble the Gods, they rather chose basely to degenerate into Beasts. How much Happier had they been under any Severity of Life (even that ancient Discipline, that afforded Nature but a bare Rescue or Support) than by delicious Hours, in Chambering and Luxury to blunt the Sense of all Sublimer Things! How will they Mourn at last, that, by the treachery of Vice, they have undermin'd the very Platform of their Souls, and betray'd that faithful Out-guard, I mean, *Fortitude!* Which, in all Events, should have been the bold Champion and Conservator of all their Virtues.

Let thus much serve in Brief, as to the acquisition of the Primitive Virtues; and those also which are the Principal of the *Derivative*.

CHAP.

Chap. VI.

Of Acquiring the Reductive Virtues; And first of those, which refer to Justice.

I. AMong the Virtues call'd *Reductive*; those more especially shine out, which have reference to

Justice: As { *Liberality, Magnificence, Veracity, Gratitude, Candor, Urbanity, Fidelity, Modesty, Humanity, Hospitality, Friendship, Civility, Affability, Officiousness.*

Liberality is not to be neglected: Since, on the one Hand, we shew thereby, that our Souls are not contracted to the bare admiration of Wealth; Nor our Minds, on the other hand, so stupid, as not to understand the true Use and Ends thereof.

Magnificence is prais'd by its own works; since these bring Benefit to the Publick, Ornament to the World, and Variety to the Histories of the Time.

II. Veracity must be our constant Inmate and Companion: For 'tis the worst of Characters to be a noted Lyar. There is no Quicksand, or infected Air, more frightful to the Traveller, nor any Wizzard more dangerous to be met withal, than an accomplish'd Lyar.

Lyar. He will lead you, like a Ghoſt, into dangerous Paths; and, when you are wandring quite out of your Way, he will be ſure to leave you in the Dark.

However, 'tis ſtrange to ſee how the Maſters in this Talent, will yet ſet up for Men of *Prudence*. They are indeed wiſe enough to know that every Vice muſt bear a virtuous Name; and that Fraud and Cunning, will never ſtand alone. 'Tis as with Strumpets, who affect to be ſeen at Church among the Matrons: but as they are the more abhorr'd herein for their Impudence, as well as Vice; ſo ought it be with theſe plauſible Circumventors. There is even a Sect of theſe, who alſo ſet up for Wits; they think there can be no greater Excellency than in the way call'd *Bantering*: Surely the Man muſt be very dull, that cannot Deceive, if he but reſolve to Lye. Yet as he that will deceive when he can, ſhews a Mind that is vile and abject: So the truly prudent and generous Man, is he that will be Honeſt in the dark: He that will be as juſt, when 'tis in his power to be otherwiſe, as if it were not. But whoever notes the Events of things ſhall ſee, that Knaves and Hypocrites are expos'd to ſhame, and end their Lives obſcurely; whereas the juſt and vertuous ſort endure, and their Reputation ſtill ſhines forth as at the Noon-day. Every counterfeit thing muſt be ſhort-liv'd.

Fidelity is much to be cultivated; and how could Human Society conſiſt without it: ſince

to keep Promiſes, and to reſtore what is depoſited with us, are the Top-branches and conſpicuous parts of *Juſtice*.

Hence alſo we may be convinc'd how much it imports us to conſider well of *Gratitude*. For every good turn done us is, as it were a Pledg depoſited in our truſt and keeping: And ſurely he that repays it not back, as ſoon as he can, is guilty of *Infidelity*. Nay, *Gratitude* is ſo remarkable a part of *Juſtice*, that whoever has the heart to violate this Bond, is thought capable (might he do it with Impunity) of trampling on all the Laws of the World. Now who would incur this Character, or draw himſelf under ſo diſmal a Guilt? There is certainly no Monſter that a Man ſhould more abhor, than this Monſter of *Ingratitude*.

III. As to the ſhew and expreſſion of *Candor* in our Converſe with Men, there are great Motives for it. Firſt, Becauſe the Errors of moſt Men are Errors of Ignorance: and yet, even among theſe Errors, their Minds often labour to bring forth Truth and good Works; a Birth which indeed we ought kindly to aſſiſt, by interpreting favourably all their Actions, and affording them the very beſt appearances we can. For we do, by this ſoft Temper, help on Peace, and the cementing of Men's Minds towards a bond of Unity: which is ſo worthy a part, that all Men ought to endeavour it.

IV.

IV. For *Urbanity*, we muſt not be ſo Moroſe, as not to hear and bear the Jeſts of others (and ſometimes tart ones too) altho we are not good at Jeſting our ſelves. In truth, he that is dexterous in Raillery, has found a Remedy to laugh away his Labour, and a very good Sauce againſt the fatigues of Life. For tho it was not Nature's Intention, to fit us onely for Sport and Paſtime; Yet theſe, doubtleſs, are lawful in their ſeaſons, juſt as ſleep, and other Refreſhments, to the Body and the Mind: provided always that things of Moment are not obſtructed by them. 'Tis to this ſenſe that *Cicero* ſpeaks in his *Offices*, *That the ways of Jeſting are very different: the one, Sawcy, Ruſtic, Impious, and Obſcene; the other, Elegant, Candid, Ingenuous, and Pleaſant.* And ſurely, 'tis this laſt which is recommended to us. However, if ſomething herein ſhould drop, ſo quick and pleaſing to the Company as to cauſe Laughter for the ſmart which it reflects; he that feels it (being a good Man) will not ſo much vex to ſee, that ſmall defects are inſulted over, as have cauſe to rejoice, that his greater Virtues are at the ſame time applauded: For he hears the worſt that can be ſaid of him, ſince Adverſaries are ſtill known to ſhoot their longeſt and ſharpeſt Arrows. And here we refer to what (in our *Firſt Book*) was ſaid of the *Interpretation of Paſſions*; which may farther illuſtrate this Point. But if ſome rude and ill-natur'd Man ſhall perhaps bear-over-hard upon us, and both jeſt

L. 1. *c.* 11. § 2. 3.

and ſting together; We muſt then do what we can, to cure the ſubject matter, and draw out that Core, in which his Darts are fix'd.

V. MODESTY muſt attend all our Actions; 'tis the Flower, the Beauty of *Juſtice*, and even its chief Perfection: This we have already ſet forth, and it needs not be repeated. *L. 2. c. 8. §. 11.*

But *Humanity* does challenge a moſt principal regard among all the other Virtues. We are all, as it were, linked in one common chain of Equality; nor is one man to think himſelf ſo very preferable to another; when, in things of Paſſion and of Reaſon, in Death and Immortality, we ſeem all to ſhare alike. He therefore that contemns another, and forges that way of Treatment, which *Candor* and *Humanity* demands, he ſeems to give Sentence againſt himſelf. For 'twill be as lawful at another time, and when Circumſtances are alike, to refuſe to him thoſe common Perquiſites of Human Nature; ſeeing in his turn he refuſed them to others. So that whoever arrogates to himſelf a great Preheminence above his Fellow-Creatures, does but expoſe his Vanity, and takes pains to be Ridiculous. Let no man, of how mean a Condition ſoever, if he be a good Man, and has not by his Follies loſt all Title to the Rights of Human Nature, be treated with Contumely. 'Tis the ſaying of *Heraclitus*, *Enter, Gentlemen, even here the Gods inhabit*: Which may truly be ſaid of the pooreſt Man living, ſo that his

his Heart be but ſound and Juſt. For (beſides that Prerogative, which is common to Mankind) ſuch an one ſhould be regarded with Love and Tenderneſs, and as it were ſome Creature that were even Holy and Divine.

VI. For *Hoſpitality*, it will ſtand leſs in need of Recommendation, as 'tis a manifeſt part of *Humanity*. It ſeems to be moſt needful there, where Strangers are liable to be ill us'd by the Natives, and where they want the things of Accommodation they were us'd to find at Home. Theſe therefore we ſhould ſtrive to Help and Succour, in all they can need at our Hands: Not forgetting that even Holy Angels are thus employ'd, whom we ought to imitate. For they, during this Earthly pilgrimage of our Souls; do ſeaſonably ſtep in, both to relieve and ſuccour us, when we are moſt diſtreſs'd.

VII. For what concerns *Friendſhip* and *Friends*, theſe are carefully to be Acquir'd; and not barely as Ornaments, but as Bulwarks in Human Life. If you light on ſuch as deſerve your fervent Love; place it rather on their Virtues, than their Perſons, which are both mutable and 'mortal. Let not your *Friendſhip* conſiſt, in ſoft and unprofitable ſtrains; nor in vehemency of Paſſion, which would bring many a ſtorm and diſorder to your Mind. But let the Character of it be *Sincere* and *Conſtant*, and ſuch as fulfills all the Duties appertaining thereto, with a chearful and officious Benignity.

VIII. LASTLY, As to *Civility*, *Affability*, and *Officiousness*; these are all to be regarded, not onely as Credentials, which procure us Fame and good Will: but they very often become the very Essential Knots of that Peace and Friendship which we enjoy. Therefore let no Man neglect, and much less despise these smaller Virtues; which often, as smaller Wires, sustain much weight. We do by them live more pleasantly among our Neighbours; our security becomes the greater and our Favour and Credit with Men is thereby increas'd. And who wou'd not wear such things about him, as make him welcom where-e'er he comes, and cost him nothing the Carriage?

CHAP. VII.

Of Acquiring those Virtues, which are referable to Fortitude.

I. THESE are the Virtues, which appertain to

Fortitude: { *Magnanimity, Generosity, Lenity, Constancy, Diligence, Vivacity, Presence of Mind, Stoutness, Virility or Manhood.*

'TIS

'Tis the praiſe of *Magnanimity*, that is does not diſquiet the Mind with minute or numerous Cares; but rather lifts it up to the Ambition of doing great and excellent things, whereof the number can be but ſmall. They that know the Dignity of Humane Nature, and what it is capable of, think it loſs and derogation to be ingag'd in Trifles. So that as nothing is higher or greater than God and Virtue, 'tis in the Veneration of theſe Objects, our Minds and Wills are by this Virtue confirm'd and underprop'd; And by it we are alſo reclaim'd, from wandring into things which are but mean and vulgar.

Moreover, what we did before attribute unto *Magnificence*, is equally applicable to this Virtue: Namely, that the great Acts and Atchievements hereof, redound to the ſervice of the Publick; and adorn both the World and the Chronicles of the Age.

II. The benefit and prefection of *Generoſity*, appears in this, that a Man is not govern'd herein by popular Applauſe, or the Itch of common Glory; but acting ſincerely and with Conſcience, towards Virtue and true Beatitude, his Mind is ſatisfi'd and corroborated in his Work. Nay, altho the Malice and Clamour of all Mankind were broke looſe againſt him, yet he will ſtand firm to Virtue, and maintain Truth with an unſhaken Courage.

'Tis very true that often, in the purſuit of Virtue; as well the deſire of Fame and Glory, as the fear of Shame and Reproach, have their benefit and Effects. But when Virtue is once attain'd, and that we are in the actual poſſeſſion thereof, then thoſe things are but as mere Scaffolding, to be remov'd or burnt.

III. THIS Virtue is therefore of the more high Account, as it is the true Guardian and Sentinel upon all the reſt. It ſhould eſpecially be cultivated by young Men, whom either Nature, or an honeſt Ambition, has excited to excel their Fellows. For the blundering Men, and the Vicious, make a ſtrong Party in the World, and they conſpire how to ſcoff the Induſtrious out of Countenance. And it comes to paſs that many a Good-Natur'd Man is by ſhame run down, and laugh'd into a compliance with thoſe things, which yet he does inwardly deteſt. But let ſuch honeſt Candidates remember, that if this Trick could have prevail'd on all that went before them, never had any Man been Eminent, or attain'd to Glory: That as it is ſtout both to bear, and even ſcorn at, Reproach for Virtue's ſake; ſo it is mean and cowardly, to humour thoſe, who either craftily tempt, or haughtily expect, that you make up part of their Train in their unlawful ways. There want not, in the World, Companions and Aſſociates of a better ſtamp, tho not ſo numerous, or ſo eaſily met with in the Streets: but

but they are worth the ſearching for. And as to the other ſort of Men, who are ſo Impudent, as to become mere Advocates for things that are Vile: Remember, in ſhort, the better advice of *Pythagoras*,

——— ——— *Summè reverere Teipſum.*

IV. LENITY, or a Calmneſs of Mind, is even in this Regard extremely valuable, that it is a ſort of Buckler againſt the Scoffs and Injuries of all Men. This was noted by *Marcus Antoninus*, in that Famous Saying, *That Lenity was an Invincible Thing, provided it were Genuin, and not Counterfeit, as ſome grave Scorners make it.* No Shield is ſo availing to the Mind's Tranquillity, as is this Calmneſs, and true Lenity: Nor does any thing require it, or ſupport it more, than to reflect that few Men ever offend us either in word or deed, but it ariſes from their Ignorance. Wherefore the *Stoicks*, and followers of *Socrates*, were wont of ſuch men to ſay, *Sic ille opinatur*; ſuch is his Opinion. And *omnis improbus ignorat*, A wicked man knows not what he does. *Lib.* 1. §. 18.

V. CONSTANCY we muſt have; for elſe we ſhall ſeem to act at hazard; and to have neither Reaſon nor Virtue for our Guide.

——— ——— *Semper, qui bonus eſt, bonus eſt.*

He who is truly Good, is always Good.

But

But he that is now Good, and then Bad, is not govern'd by ſteady Principles, but the laſt Impreſſion governs him.

VI. LASTLY, *Diligence* is a certain chearful Servant or Sollicitor, that attends upon all the other Virtues, and muſt therefore be careſs'd. We may call it even the Maſter and Moderator of all our External Actions; Inaſmuch as it knows how to excite our Bodies, and all the parts thereof, to ſuch Activity, as the duty and buſineſs of our Life requires.

VII. THE Reſidue of thoſe Virtues, which refer to *Fortitude*, have ſo cloſe an Affinity with theſe, which we here explain, that it were needleſs to ſet them off with any new Teſtimonial. For they are as the very Offſpring of *Diligence*, *Conſtancy*, or *Magnanimity*.

CHAP.

Chap. VIII.

Of Acquiring those Virtues, which refer to Temperance; *And about exciting the Divine Love.*

I. THERE are Referable unto

Temperance, { *Frugality, Humility, Austerity, Modesty.* *Andronicus* also adds *Slender and uncompounded Diet, Umblameable Gesture*; and, *A Contented Mind.*

Of which that about *Slender-Diet* and *Contentment*, are as it were the Sorts and Methods of *Frugality*: even as that of *Gesture* is of *Modesty*.

II. Frugality has this Commendation, that 'tis the Parent, or at least the Companion of Sobriety; As also a Cure against Diseases and Poverty. 'Tis attended by Consideration and Prudence; lest that, spending profusely and living beyond our Stocks, we be disabled not onely from entertaining our Friends in a frugal way, but driven to live wholly upon them: which of all Conditions were the most miserable. So that, in Contemplation hereof, we may affirm, that true *Frugality* has an Eye unto Generosity it self; and that there is an Honest Greatness of the Soul, concern'd in the true Conduct of this Virtue.

III The

III. The ſame Reflection is fortifi'd by what *Andronicus* ſays of thoſe bordering Virtues that refer to this. For he, who can content himſelf with eaſie Food, and has no deſires of Sauce or Cookery, is much out of Fortune's reach, and does not eaſily fall within the Injuries of Men. This Virtue ſets him as in a Tower above others, and he is ſeldom captivated by any: For as it is God alone, that needeth nothing; ſo he that is contented with feweſt things, approaches neareſt unto him.

IV. In the next place, *Auſterity* or *Gravity*, together with *Modeſty* and the Virtues ally'd thereto, are to be had in much Regard: For they do not onely adorn our Life and *External Behaviour*, but really preſerve the Mind both chaſt and unblemiſh'd. The firſt glimmerings of Vice, and that very ſhadow that begins to play in the Imagination, is by thoſe Virtues not onely reprehended, but immediately ſmother'd and ſuppreſs'd.

V. Yet is there no ſort of Virtue more to be purſu'd than *Humility*: Since there are no two Plagues ſo deſtructive in Human Affairs, as are thoſe of *Ambition* and *Avarice*. Hence ariſe Treachery to Friends and Country, the Maſſacre of Princes, Deſertion of Truth and Religion, Frauds (not to be nam'd) both againſt God and Virtue; In ſhort, All, that can ſpawn from Injuſtice, hath its Original from this Source. Wherefore it may well be doubted, Whether the fear

fear of torment on a Rack, or of Death it ſelf, have ſo much power to drive Men into Impiety, as that inordinate Thirſt, which ſome diſcover in the purſuit of Riches, Honour, and Domination? Conſequently, whether even *Fortitude* it ſelf be ſo ſtrong a Bulwark as Humility proves? By which we retreat, as into a Harbor, where the noiſe and ſtorms of the World fly over us; and where we are neither tempted, nor diſtracted with the dazling vanities thereof.

VI. The word *Humility* ſounds low, and may ſeem deſpicable among the Virtues: Yet is it ſo conſpicuous a branch of true and ſubſtantial Wiſdom, that even *Lucretius* (who did not much trouble himſelf in ſuch matters) was not barely acquainted with it, but has very Elegantly painted it out, in the Verſes following: *De rerum naturâ, lib. 2.*

Sed nil dulcius eſt, bene quàm munita tenere
Edita doctrinâ ſapientûm templa ſerena;
Deſpicere unde queas alios, paſſimque videre
Errare atque viam palantes quærere vitæ,
Certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
Noctes atque dies niti præſtante labore
Ad ſummas emergere opes rerumque potiri.
O miſeras hominum mentes! O pectora cæca!
Qualibus in tenebris vitæ, quantiſq; periclis,
Degitur hoc ævi quodcunque eſt! &c.

Which

Which are thus Tranſlated by Mr. *Creech*:

But above all, 'tis pleaſanteſt, to get
The Top of high Philoſophy, and ſit
On the Calm-peaceful-flouriſhing Head of it:
Whence we may view Deep, wondrous Deep, (below
How poor-miſtaken Mortals wandring go,
Seeking the Path to Happineſs: Some aim
At Learning, Wit, Nobility, or Fame;
Others with Cares and Dangers vex each Hour, (Pow'r.
To reach the top of Wealth, and Sovereign
Blind, wretched Man! in what dark paths of (ſtrife
We walk this little Journey of our Life, &c.

But I am not ignorant, how Men of this Perſwaſion, and whoſe Minds are thus elevated, are not only ſlighted, but even laugh'd at, by moſt others: They are counted a ſort of *Virtuoſo's*, that live upon Air, and do not comprehend Subſtantial things.

VII. Yet, under the Correction of theſe Grandees, I would fain know, What is it that the High and Mighty do more enjoy than others: who, having Fortune enough, yet chuſe to employ but what alone is uſeful and of Neceſſity. Do the Rich or Powerful eat or drink with better Reliſh, than even that Man that labours the whole Day, and mixes

Temperance

Temperance with his Sweat? Is their Sleep more ſound, or Health of Mind or Body more robuſt? If this commonly be otherwiſe, why may we not ſuſpect, that ſuch Potentates, and Men of Wealth, are alſo as much troubled with vain Imaginations, as Men that are devoted to Virtue, and the Sciences? If theſe muſt be accus'd for catching at the Air, and feeding on refin'd things; What get thoſe others, from their Heaps and Luxuries, but even Fogs or Vapors that attend them? But whether a thick Air, or a thin, do moſt conduce to Health, is a Queſtion we may put off for the preſent. In the mean time, take what *Horace* ſings, in ſhort,

Si ventri bene, ſi lateri eſt pedibuſq; tuis, nil
Divitiæ poſſunt Regales addere majus.

Is your body ſound and clean
From the Colick, Gout and Spleen?
You may be happy tho you're poor,
Greateſt Wealth can give no more.

Now if the Rich who abound, and the Poor who have no want, are hitherto equal in what concerns the Functions of the Body; 'Tis plain, they only differ in things of Fancy and Conceit. Wherefore if the Diſpute ſhall be, which of the two Fancies or Conceits are beſt, Whether of thoſe who gape after Wealth and Honours (which are ſuperfluous) or of thoſe who adhere to Virtue and true

Horace's Epiſt. l. 1. Epiſt. 12.

true Wiſdom; let the By-ſtanders determine and give the Prize.

VIII. LASTLY, That this Exhortation may not be defective in any part, let us, above all things, recommend the Divine and *Intellectual Love*, as being the Rule or Meaſure of all other Virtues. Let us, as we hope to copy aright, and to keep proportion in our Ways and Actions, never fail to have this Divine Original before our Eyes.

L. 2. c. 9. §. 14.

And as *Humility* and *Temperance* are the two Powers of our Soul, that moſt contribute to procure and preſerve this heavenly Perfection; So, on the other ſide, 'tis bodily Pleaſures, and an unbridled Paſſion for Wealth and Honour, that extinguiſhes the Senſe and Appetition thereof. For the Soul, in her own native Conſtitution, would reſemble a bright and Celeſtial Flame; but theſe terrene and ſordid Ardors do utterly contract and ſuffocate her Light. So that, while ſhe ruſhes forwards, in paths of Darkneſs and of worldly Temptations; 'tis not poſſible but Offences will come, and that ſhe muſt have much to anſwer for, both in reference to Honour and to Juſtice.

He therefore that will keep alive this *Veſtal Fire* of the Divine Love, in the Temple of his Heart; let him be Humble and Temperate.

IX. As for thoſe, who with Sorrow bewail, that as yet they cannot feel any thing of this Ethereal Heat; let them addreſs to God

God with Prayers and Ardor, for that he is the Giver of all things. However, as bare words and Wiſhes have but cold Effect, unleſs we teſtifie by Life and Converſation, the dignity of that *Internal Life* which we pant after and aſpire to; So, the better to accompliſh our Wiſhes herein, let us obſerve the following Helps.

Let us be watchful, to fly from all the Traps and temptations of Pleaſure.

Never to hurt any Man out of Hatred or Malice.

That we help, and adminiſter to the Poor, as we are able.

To ſuppreſs our Anger, when Men either injure or revile us.

To deſpiſe no Man for being of low Fortune or Degree; but where Honeſty and Poverty meet, there even to ſhew Reſpect.

To requite Evil with Good, and to turn off ſharp and bitter Sayings with others that are more Benign.

To take no Revenge of our Enemies, even then when we may ſecurely do it.

That no Mans Friendſhip be ſo rated by us, as to forſake Truth and Virtue for it; or to prefer it to the Publick Good. That is, That we be not drawn to that which may pleaſe our ſelves or the deareſt Friends whatever, on any ſenſual Account; but to conſult our Conſcience, Whether the matter in Queſtion be laudable and juſt, and then to purſue it with Faith and Perſeverance.

X. Thus you have, what we judg'd neceſſary for acquiring of Virtue, as well in particular as in the general. Wherefore let us cloſe all with that ſhort Document of *Pythagoras*: who adviſes thus, *That we fervently embrace and wed theſe Things; That we frequently meditate upon them; That we diligently put them into practice; For theſe will at length ſo eſtabliſh our Feet in the paths of Divine Virtue, as never to ſlide or ſtumble, and never to deviate, or be ejected from them.* And ſurely to attain this Perfection in Virtue, is to attain the moſt perfect Happineſs, that Man's Nature is capable of.

It now onely remains, that we ſpeak of Acquiring that Part, which conſiſteth in *External Good.*

Chap. IX.

Of the Acquiſition of External Good.

I. We have already explain'd, how very ſmall a proportion of *External Bleſſings*, are abſolutely needful to *Man's Happineſs*. It now remains to inquire, If *Happineſs* can (in any ſort) appear more perfect and exalted, by the addition of all that we have ſtyled *External Bleſſings*: Inaſmuch as Moral Virtues may

may not a little contribute to the Acquiſition of them all.

II. We ſhall firſt repeat the chief of them; and then ſhew how ſome Virtues, if not all, do help to compaſs either the very *Bleſſings themſelves*, or at leaſt *Things Equivalent* to them, and ſuch as perhaps we ought juſtly to value beyond them. *Lib. 1. Cap. 1. Sect. 3.*

III. As for the firſt two great Branches herein; namely, the advantages of the *Soul*, and of the *Body*, 'Tis manifeſt that Virtue bids fair even to their particular Acquiſition, or at leaſt to their augmenting and conſervation. This appears firſt in reference to the Soul, as in the *Subtilty* and *Dexterity* of Wit, Fidelity and Vaſtneſs of the Memory: Alſo in *Science*, *Art*, and *Sapience*.

For is there any thing in Nature can more contribute to theſe Bleſſings, than that Philoſophical Temperance, we have already deſcrib'd? When, on the other ſide, 'tis as plain, that the ſharpeſt Wit in the World, grows blunt, and is made even ſtupid, by Luxury and Exceſs.

IV. Look upon *Memory*, and obſerve how ſtrangely 'tis fortify'd by *Sobriety*, and *Temperance!* How 'tis extended by Exerciſe, which is the fruit of *Diligence!* But by *Drunkenneſs*, or by *Luſt*, or *Drowſineſs*, or *Neglect*, it withers, and comes to nothing.

V. 'Tis true, that neither Virtue, nor Morals do promote us in Mechanical Arts, or indeed in Natural Philoſophy, or the Mathe-

maticks. But consider, I pray, how far these contribute towards *Wit* and *Memory!* How great the Power of *Diligence* is towards every Attempt! And 'tis manifest that, for getting the Mathematicks, there must be a certain *Gentleness* and *Patience* of the *Mind*, to adapt a Man to that Study.

VI. But the Highest Gift of all Moral Philosophy, must ever be allow'd to be that *Prudence*, which has been so accurately describ'd already; and which has certainly a marvellous influence, as well upon all Intellectual Habits, as for the acquiring of *True Wisdom*. And her inseparable Consort is that *Philosophical Temperance*, we have spoken of before.

Let no Man hope, without these two Virtues, ever to attain the knowledg of *Things Divine*, which is the onely *Sapience* or *True Wisdom*. For, as *Plato* has it in his *Phædo*, *What Pretence can the Impure Man have, to the things that are Pure.* And whereas the Philosopher was there contending, as if no Man could obtain pure and sincere Virtue, that had not first laid by his Body; What shall we say of those, who think much to shake off, but the very Filth and Vices of their Bodies? Men, that think a little Industry, and obstinate perseverance of the Mind, will find out Truth, without any necessity of parting with their darling Crimes? But whether this be not the voice of a Fool, or of a mad Man, is not hard to determine.

VII. Who-

VII. WHOEVER can be Faulty in this kind, appears to me, as a Bleer-Ey'd Man; whom nothing will content, but to be gazing at things distant, and to see them both clearly and distinctly. He refuses all Remedy for his Eyes, but resolves by obstinate and peremptory staring to find out the Mark. Thus he goes on, till, instead of seeing better, he every Day grows more blind: Whereas, if he consulted the Rules of *Prudence* and of *Temperance*, he would know both the Necessity, and the way, of first curing his Sight.

VIII. Is there any Man living has Self-sufficiency enough to Contemplate God, the Soul's Immortality, and Divine Providence? Or to consider of these things solidly and sedately, without some sort of Separation or Abstraction of the Soul from the Body? That is to say, in *Plato*'s Style, *Without such a Meditation of Death, as seems to divorce us from Corporeal Affections?* Or, can any Man, without some such Translation, be (as it were) rapt up into that State of *Divine Love*, which can onely fit him for Truth, and expound the Oracles and Mysteries of things, which are otherwise Inscrutable? For by how much all Sensual and Corporeal Impressions are extinguish'd in us, by the application of that *Prudence*, and of that *Philosophical Temperance* we have mention'd; by so much do we grow Citizens of that Intellectual World, and ascend into the Regions of Heavenly Light.

Wherefore, *Sapience*, or the knowledg of Divine Myſteries, is the true Off-ſpring of that Virtue, which is entire, abſolute, and conſummated.

IX. As to thoſe Bleſſings which refer *to the Body*, ſuch as *Strength*, *Agility*, *Health*, and *Comlineſs*. 'Tis true that *Strength* is not ſo much the Gift of Virtue as of Nature; tho 'tis as true, that the preſervation of it is owing to Virtue. Nay, 'tis not improbable, but that a Body, in declination of Health, may, by hardſhips, exerciſe, and ſome Fatigue, become more vigorous and robuſt.

For *Agility*: This may not onely be as the Pupil, but even the Child of Virtue: Since *Temperance* and *Diligence*, do commonly wear down the bulk and excreſcence of the Body, and rather furniſh a Stock of Spirits, than of Fleſh. In which caſe, *Agility* muſt ſucceed of courſe.

X. But the moſt high and conſpicuous gift of Virtue, is that of *Bodily Health*; which as it may be owing in part to every Virtue: ſo more eſpecially to *Temperance* and *Piety*. I think it was the *Chaldean* Oracle did thus pronounce;

Ad Pietatis Opus vegetum ſi extenderis Ignem
Mentis, & hos fluxos ſanabis corporis Artus.

Would you the beſt Phyſician find
For a craz'd Body, or afflicted Mind?
Try what the power of Piety can do,
It heals the Mind, and cures the Body too.

For

For a purifi'd Mind goes a great way to the purging and purifying of the Body: it darts upon it ſome Rays, which have great effect, and which corroborate the powers thereof. Whereas, if the Soul be taken up by conſuming Cares and Cupidities; If Hatred and Malice make all things ghaſtly and ſour within: How can it be, but that the Body muſt alſo droop, the Health wither, and the Force decline?

If therefore ſuch Dilapidations can ariſe from the remote impreſſions of the Mind; What will not thoſe more immediate ſtrokes accompliſh; I mean, Eating long, and Drinking deep and daily, and the inſolence of an ungovernable Luſt?

XI. The Diſeaſes of the Body are, for the moſt part, from the Vices of the Mind; and even the Off-ſpring of ſinful Parents do often inherit their Infirmities, as well as their Acres. But there is no Remedy ſo powerful, for ſuch an Incumbrance, as a ſevere application to Virtue and Piety. For as Juſtice had a Being before all the Vices of the Mind; ſo was Health more ancient than all the Sickneſſes of the Body. Thus is one brought in, by *Maximus Tyrius*, to pray, *O Health, the moſt Ancient of all the other Goddeſſes; What would I give to enjoy thee, but the little remainder of my days!* Certainly, no Man can better pretend to ſuch a Wiſh, than he who is ſincerely Vertuous and Devout.

XII. And as bodily Health is thus gotten and ſuſtained by Virtue; ſo does Virtue confer Comlineſs and *Decorum* to all the Parts. For *Beauty* is but as the Fruit, or flower of Health, nay, 'tis very Health it ſelf; juſt as Virtue is the very health and beauty of the Soul. For where this preſides, the inward motion of the Spirits throws joy into the Countenance; and ſuch ſparkling through the Eyes, that the Beholders are drawn into love and admiration by it: Even the whole Body, when actuated by a beautiful Soul, is pleaſing in all its Geſtures. *Antoninus* ſaid, *That a good Man could not conceal himſelf, if he did but open his Eyes; For his Benignity and Probity broke out, and reveal'd him to all Beholders.* *Lib.* 10. *Sect.* 15.

XIII. On the contrary, we may eaſily obſerve the Criſis when a Man is falling from his native Innocence or acquir'd Virtue, and is warping towards Vice and Immorality; He carries a ſort of Traytor in his Countenance, who reveals all he is about. For tho the ſhape and colour of his Face may look the ſame to vulgar Eyes, yet a ſharper ſight will find a fading and declination in all the Finer Parts: that which once was freſh and florid, is now withering; that which ſparkled, is hardly bright: the Air it ſelf of the countenance, made up of quick and congruous motions reſulting from every part, and as it were darting Life, is now ſtupid and irregular. Alas, thoſe inward Spirits, that ſupported all, are ſick, and their activity is but counterfeit!

So

So that, as now the whole contrivance of the Meen and Geſture is grown Artificial, it will in a ſhort time, become alſo Impudent. But this is not the Face of Virtue, or the Image of that *Moral Beauty*, we have hitherto ſet forth.

XIV. For we alſo affirm, that thoſe, who are contending for Virtue, and who ſeriouſly aſpire to the puriſi'd ſtate of the Mind; One may even in their Eyes and Aſpects behold a Light and Comlineſs growing on, as a Prelibation of what they ſeek. Nay, where the Face is pale, and waſted by (perhaps) too fervent a purſuit of Virtue and true Wiſdom; Yet, even in ſuch paleneſs and Conſumption, the Beholders ſee a certain Complacency and good Nature which is venerated by them. Wherefore, we conclude, no Man wants bodily Decoration, where that of the Soul is not firſt wanting: for 'tis the Soul that governs thoſe Inward Spirits, on whoſe ſupply and regularity, all that is exterior depends.

XV. Thus far we have ſhewn, how much Virtue contributes to the getting of ſuch benefits, as make either for the Mind, or for the Body. It now remains, to find what help ſhe gives in acquiring the good things that relate to Man, as he is compos'd of both: I mean, thoſe Accommodations of *Liberty*, *Riches*, *Nobility*, *Friendſhip*, and ſuch like. Now theſe being Things of that ſort, which are commonly call'd *the Gifts of Fortune*; we are not to expect, that they hold ſo cloſe and neceſſary

ceſſary a Conjunction with Virtue, as what we have already mention'd. However that even theſe things alſo are by Virtue moſt eaſily acquirable, is no hard task to demonſtrate.

XVI. First, As to *Liberty*, 'tis plain how every Nation ows to their Virtue and *Fortitude*, that they are not over-run, but preſerv'd from the ſlavery of Invaders. And, even in the ſtate of Priſoners and Captives by War, how many Inſtances have we in the *Roman* Comedies, that, for the *Fidelity*, *Diligence*, or *Prudence*, found in ſuch Captives, their Lords have afterwards made them Free. How much our *Liberty* is preſerv'd, by the obſervation of Laws and *Juſtice*, need no otherwiſe be expounded, than to obſerve, how Traytors to their King and Country, Thieves and Murderers, are put in Chains, Condemn'd, and diſpatch'd.

XVII. But ſhould a worthy Man, and for Virtue's ſake, be thrown into a Dungeon (which yet rarely happens) he muſt not be thought as totally depriv'd of *Liberty*. 'Tis true, if there were Power enough, to ſequeſter him from God and Virtue, this were ſufficient to make any Man tremble, and to make every Jail look horrid. But of this ſort none are capable but men of Impiety, and the Profligate. How vainly therefore do the Oppreſſors menace the Virtuous, with a ſolitary, or even a naſty Jail? Can any Man, that is comforted and aſſiſted by the *Divine Preſence*, think of

of his Ill Accommodation? Or he that has the Feaſt of a *good Conſcience*, and the Miniſtration of all the Virtues attending him, think himſelf much alone?

XVIII. After all, ſeeing *Liberty* is nothing but the power of Doing as you pleaſe: 'Tis plain, a good Man can be *Free*, whether in Priſon, or in Chains. For we affirm, that he evermore acts according to his own Will and Pleaſure, who has reſign'd both to the Divine Providence, and never wiſhes any other thing may happen to him, but even that which happens. This conformity of the Mind, is highly expreſs'd by the Philoſopher *Antoninus*, *O thou vaſt and Beautiful Univerſe, created and ſupported by God, let every thing be delightful to me, that is pleaſing and congruous to thy ſelf.* *Lib.* 4. *Cap.* 23.

XIX. As to the bearing of Honor: Who can imagine any one more qualifi'd for Publick Truſt, than the Honeſt Man? Are there not a whole train of Virtues, that both adorn and ſupport him? As, namely,

Juſtice, Magnanimity,
Faith, Conſtancy,
Munificence, Prudence,
Fortitude, Vigilance: And the like.

And is there any part of the World, where Men are choſen to Publick Office, but under theſe Characters? At leaſt under the pretence and Notion of ſuch: So as all the Salalaries, the Praiſes, and the Proſtrations, that are

are pay'd them, come in on this Account. Now where (in truth) the Men are even quite otherwiſe: yet you may reckon them as the Statues and Images of good Men, and as adorn'd with their Names and Inſcriptions. And while Worſhip and Veneration is thus pay'd them, we may ſuppoſe, that thoſe good Men, whom they perſonate, receive it, as it happens in the caſe of abſent and inviſible Gods. So that no Man has more a Title to Honours, than the Man of *Probity*: For either he, or his Repreſentative, is univerſally Honour'd by all Men.

XX. As to the gathering of *Riches*, you will ſay that a Man of *Probity* is out of his way. For that *Fraud*, *Rapine*, and *Treachery*, *Adulation*, or *Breach of Truſt*, and the like, do chiefly contribute to the *Heaping* of *Wealth*, and are the moſt compendious ways of procuring it. But we are of Opinion, 'tis a very fooliſh Bargain, to pay for any thing ten times more than 'tis worth: And we cannot but think, this is the Caſe, when a Man ſhall barter away his Virtue (even the ſmalleſt grains thereof) either for *Wealth*, or for *High Place*. There are, as we think, certain Gifts conferr'd by Virtue, which (doubtleſs) have power enough, to bring in *Honeſt Plenty*, and ſufficient *Wealth*: I mean, *Diligence*, *Fidelity*, *Frugality*, *Temperance*, and the like. It was *Cicero*'s Exclamation, *O wretched Man, that knows not what an Inheritance it is to be Frugal!*

XXI. As

XXI. As for the Attainment of *Nobility*: Whoever call'd in doubt, that there was any other Source thereof than Virtue? Or that *Nobility*, and Virtue, were not evermore the ſame? But of this, we have ſpoken more largely before.

XXII. In the laſt Place, as to all *Friendſhips*; 'Tis viſible, how much they depend on Virtue: Since no Genuine *Love*, or ſincere *Friendſhip*, can be Cemented without it. The reſt is all Spurious; Whether it be a Combination, in order to ſordid Gain, or Companions of Joy, that amuſe themſelves with light and tranſitory things.

'Tis Virtue alone that attracts and retains true *Friendſhip*: *For* (as *Lælius* ſpeaks Elegantly in *Tully*) *She, when ſhe Exalts her ſelf, when ſhe expoſes her Light, when ſhe beholds and approves the ſame quality in others, ſhe moves preſently towards it; and, by a ſort of Coalition, joins to her ſelf that which was before in another: And that this is the true Generation of Love and Friendſhip.* He farther adds, *That Friendſhip is nothing elſe, but to Love without Intereſt or Deſign.* And (in his Book *de Naturâ Deorum*) he does a little adorn this Senſe, by theſe further words: *If we turn our Friendſhip to our own Profit, and not to his, whom we pretend to love; this will not be Friendſhip, but merely Traffick on our own Accounts.* *De Natura Deorum, l. 1.*

Hence 'tis plain, that there is not, in this Mortal State, a greater Bulwark than Virtue: for ſhe carries a Charm with her; drawing Men

Men on to Love and good Will: And then 'tis impoſſible, but all their Aſſiſtance, and good Offices, muſt attend us.

XXIII. YET here let us obſerve what comes to paſs about *Truth*: Which, tho it certainly makes one in Virtue's Quire; yet 'tis reputed a ſort of Foe to *Friendſhip*, and as producing rather Hatred and Ill-will. But to me it has ever been a ſort of Riddle in Human Affairs, and deſerving laughter; to ſee how the generality of Men hate the voice of that very *Judge*, unto whom however they perpetually ſeem willing to appeal.

Certainly no firm and durable *Friendſhip*, can ſubſiſt any more without *Truth*, than without *Faith* and *Simplicity*, which are the Pillars of all true *Friendſhip*. *Cicero* ſays, *Neither the Double-minded, nor the Changeable Intriguer muſt be rely'd on for Fidelity*. And let us add to theſe, the Men of Darkneſs and great Reſerve. He that does even moleſt his Friend with *Truth*, has leſs to anſwer for; than a flattering Paraſite, who is obſequious to every Vice, and can indulge, or abet his Friend to his utter deſtruction.

To Men of ſincere Virtue, this *Truth* never comes amiſs: for every prudent Admonition, that is not attended with Scoffs or Contumely, is a Sermon they hearken to with Wonder and Delight. For, as they grow better by it; ſo they have teſtimony of what is very Rare, namely, perfect *Virtue*, and perfect *Friendſhip*, together.

XXIV. IT

XXIV. It were eaſie for me, I confeſs, to be more copious, and dwell longer upon ſuch Particulars: But theſe Hints will be enough to inculcate, How much Virtue imports to the Acquiſition of all *External Goods:* And that, againſt the Changes and Chances of this Human Life, there is no other true Sanctuary but Virtue.

CHAP. X.

Of that Good, which is External, Supreme, and Eternal; according to the Mind of the Philoſophers.

I THERE now only remains one *External Good,* which alſo is *Eternal.* To Heaven it is that we all *Aſpire,* and to the Society of Bleſſed Spirits: And there is no other Path, or Stratagem, can lead hereto, but Virtue. This is ſet forth in that of the Oracle, touching the Ghoſt of *Plotinus,* and its paſſing to the Happy State.

——— *Ad Cœtum jam venis almum*
Heroum blandis ſpirantem leniter auris;
Hèic ubi amicitia eſt, ubi molli fronte cupido
Lætitiâ replens, liquidâ pariterque repletus
Semper ab Ambroſiis fœcundo è numine rivis.

Unde

Unde ſerena quies caſtorum & dulcis amorum
Illecebra, ac placidi ſuaviſſima flamina venti.

Which may be Engliſhed thus:

And now you're come to th' Happy Quire
Of Heroes where, their bleſſed Souls retire
Where ſofteſt Winds, do as ſoft Joys inſpire:
Here dwells chaſt Friendſhip, with ſo pure a flame,
That Love knows no ſatiety, or ſhame,
But gives and takes new Joys, and yet is ſtill the ſame,
Th' Ambroſian Fountains with freſh Pleaſures ſpring,
And gentle *Zephyrus* does new Odours bring.
Theſe gifts for Inoffenſive Eaſe are lent,
And both conſpire to make *Love* Innocent.

II. THAT holy Vow and Profeſſion, which was made by *Cato* (in *Tully*'s Book *de Senectute*) has reſemblance with this very Deſcription. For he ſays, *I repent me not of having Liv'd, becauſe I have lived ſo, as never to have thought I was born in vain; and I depart this Life, not as from my Houſe, but as from an Inn. For Nature has not here afforded us an Habitation, but barely a reſting Place. O glorious Day, when I ſhall haſten to the great Aſſembly of bleſſed Souls, and be delivered from this Croud, and from that Dungeon, wherein I live!*

Cicero de Senectute.

III. THIS

III. THIS Opinion *Cicero* (in his Treatiſe *de Conſolatione*) repeats as his own, ſaying, *I am none of thoſe, who believe the Soul can die with the Body; and that ſo great a Light, kindled by Divine Nature in the Mind, can be extinguiſh'd: but rather, that after ſome certain ſpace of time, it will return to Immortality.* Now this by him is ſo expreſs'd, as if our preſent life were a ſort of a death to the Soul. And the ſame (in his *Somnio Scipionis*) is elegantly affirm'd by *Africanus*, when *Cornelius* aſk'd him, *If his dead Friends ſhould live? Yes* (ſays he) *they truly live, who are extricated from the Chains of the Body, as from a Priſon: For your Life, as you ſo call it, is Death.* Many are the paſſages of this Force, up and down, in *Cicero*: Not to ſpeak of what might be found in *Plotinus* and *Plato*. *De Conſolatione.* *De ſomnio Scipionis.*

IV. Now inaſmuch as the hope of Immortality, was ſo plain and conſpicuous of old, even to mere *Pagans*: How could we (poſſibly) exclude it from *Moral Philoſophy*? For by this it appears, that whatever external vexations innocent Virtue ſhall, in this Life, ſuffer (whether by hidden Fate, or by the Violence, Envy, or Improbity of wicked Men) there will be a juſt and moſt infallible compenſation for it. Wherefore the Good and the Magnanimous, being exalted by this Hope, look on the World with contempt: They trample upon inferiour things; and cannot regard any human Accidents as culpable, ſince nothing has regard to them, but what

is of Virtue and Immortality. 'Tis to this very Sense, that *Cicero* does elsewhere magnifie the power of Virtue.

V. SOCRATES is memorable for this same Confidence and Hope; since in the strength thereof, he was enabled to undervalue both his Enemies and his Death. He, whom the Oracle of *Apollo* pronounced the *wisest Man*, would memorably in this deserve that Character. For, while he doubted of all other things, as to the Soul's Immortality he was ever fix'd. So *Lælius* testifies of him (in *Tully*) *That he was now of one Sentiment, and then of another, in most other things; Yet as to the Point of Immortality, he always affirm'd, That the Minds of Men were Divine; and that, as soon as they departed the Body, there was a most expeditious return of every just and vertuous Soul into Heaven.*

VI. ON this Contemplation, let every Man therefore resolve, that altho Virtue may (in some Cases) appear to be against our Interest in reference to worldly things; yet are we to stand by it with an unshaken Mind: especially since, after this span of Life is past, there will redound a vast reward and gratification to the Just. Nay, let us rather count, that what we suffer in Externals (as, suppose in Fortune or in Health) is rather to our Advantage: Since, if we make a wise use of our misfortunes, and understand them for kind Admonitions (as indeed they are) by how much we are disappointed, or despoil'd, in out-

outward Things; by ſo much, and more alſo, will the Mind be ſanctifi'd and enrich'd.

'Tis worth obſerving, that all Good, which is *External*, muſt fade and corrupt even as the Body it ſelf: while yet the *Internal Things* are as laſting as the Soul. So that to think, what we ſuffer in Body or Goods, to be a detriment or Curſe, when we are likely to gain by it a more ample and perpetual Recompence; is a ſtrange Error in Accounts.

VII. Nay farther yet. If a Man had bought a thing at ten times leſs than the Value; Would it not ſound odd, to hear him complain, that the bargain had undone him? Even ſo is it with the loſs of *outward Things*: Men murmure at Divine Providence, while yet they acquire ſuch improvement to the Soul thereby, as does not onely govern the Happineſs of this Life, but guide us to a better, for all Eternity to come. Wherefore let no Man be too froward, when the croſſes and vexations of this World come thick upon him; they are the Gifts and Bleſſings of a wiſe God, who beſt knows what Phyſick we need for the Health and Conduct of our Souls.

By theſe Trials it is, that we can only find out the ſtrength and authority of Virtue: Theſe gratings rub off the ruſt and tarniſh of Vice: they ingender *Prudence*, *Fortitude*, *Sincerity*, and all other Virtues: at leaſt they detect our hypocritical and ridiculous Pretences unto them. So that we will conclude, altho theſe Viſitations may ſeem rude and bitter to the taſte, yet

in operation they are wholeſom, and produce Salutiferous effects.

VIII. But now as to ſuch *External Evils*, which can no otherwiſe afflict the Mind, than by Imagination: Or elſe, as *Epictetus* has it, *That things themſelves did not diſquiet Men, but their own falſe Opinions of things.* I muſt needs aver, that Men thus afflicted merely by their *Fancies*, ſo as to make things intolerable, are but poor Proficients in Virtue: It deſerves not the name of Virtue, which is not able of it ſelf, to lay flat all imaginary Paſſions. 'Tis true, it may reaſonably be thought that there are ſome Sufferings above the force of Human Nature; ſuch as bodily Pains, which come by Sickneſs, that neither can be ſmother'd, nor diſſembled; And that ſome Tortures are ſo exquiſite, as to be beyond any conſtancy of the Mind to ſupport.

Enchiridion, c. 10.

L. 2. *c.* 10. §. 18.

L. 3. *c.* 10. §. 16.

However, *Cicero* ſpeaks Excellently hereof (as indeed of every thing elſe) He ſays, *That Pain is a ſharp Adverſary to Virtue; It menaces with burning Torches; It inſults over Fortitude and Magnanimity; and ventures to ſubdue even Patience it ſelf. But thus it would not ſo frequently happen, if the fault were not our own: For Nature her ſelf, if rightly tutor'd and habituated, would prove a ſort of invincible Thing. But we alas (the more is our ſhame) have infected our Minds with Sloth, with Shadows, and Intemperance: Nay, we have ſo ſcribled over our Souls with Notions, and odd Opinions, that no room is left, for inſerting one ſound, or ſubſtantial Truth.*

Tuſculan. Queſt. l. 5.

IX. However

IX. HOWEVER we may obſerve, that 'tis not above the compaſs of Human Nature, to bear exceſſive Pains, when they are willingly undertaken. We have ſtrange Examples what has been ſuffer'd for Glory, or by Cuſtom or Superſtition: Of which the very true Relations are almoſt incredible. As

X. THAT of the *Spartan* Boys (which *Tully* mentions in his *Tuſculans*) who being brought to the Altar, could bear beating, not onely, till the blood guſh'd from their Bowels, but till they actually dy'd: And all this without Crying, or without a Groan. *Tuſculan. Quæſt. l.2.*

That of the *Indian Wives*, who (being many to every *Husband*) have contended, even to the tearing off Hair, which of them ſhould go into the Fire alive, and burn with the dead Man.

That of the *Egyptians*, who would rather be executed themſelves, than kill a Stork, an Aſp, a Dog, or a Cat. *Tuſculan. Quæſt. l.5.*

There are alſo, among the *Turks* and *Americans*, amazing Inſtances of ſpontaneous Suffering; Some on ſuperſtitious Accounts, and others for Oſtentation. And almoſt all Hiſtories do ſwarm with Examples of this kind.

XI. Now, I ſay, if Nature, thus Rude, thus Illiterate, thus Barbarous and unprovided, thus inſenſible of true Virtue or of Excellent Things, could in patience and firmneſs of the Mind, ſo highly excel; What ſhould not true Virtue do? That Divine Thing, I mean, which holds Conjunction with God above;

that is fortify'd with the ſplendid expectation of a bleſſed Immortality. Can, I ſay, this Champion ever give ground? Shall Virtue crouch, where even the barbarous have ſcorn'd to ſtoop? God forbid! And of Virtue, that is perfect and ſincere, let it never be ſaid! 'Tis true, there is a Nice Generation of pretenders to Virtue; ſuch as keep up a general Acquaintance, and fain would be valu'd on the ſcore of ſome Familiarity with her: But if a Storm ariſe, or any Battels are to be fought on her account, they are preſently Men of another Climate, and their trueſt Religion is about Riches, Honour, and ſenſual Delights.

XII. Now ſince we could prove by infinite Examples (if brevity were not in our Care) that 'tis not beyond the reach of a conſiderate Man, to overcome the greateſt difficulties: Let us bend our Souls to the Acquiring this true and perfect *Patience*. This is the Virtue, that ſubdues, and will enable us even to deſpiſe, as well the pleaſures of the Body, as all the ſorrows that can attend it. And let no Man fancy to himſelf, or pretend to others, that he is poſſeſs'd of any Virtue at all, till he has attain'd that *Patience*, which we here ſet forth. For as bare Virtue is a high Reward, yet Happy Immortality is one of the certain Fruits thereof; So let us retain it immoveably, and let us never imagine that we have it at all, unleſs we can hold it faſt.

XIII. Here

XIII. Here some may contemptuously ask, Whether or no this our Philosophy be the shortest way to be Happy? And whether these Rules are the method to enrich a Man's Family, or to make him a Magistrate? And whether this celebrated Virtue and good Conscience, do not rather conduct a Man to the Faggot, or to the Gallowes; even as Examples, without Number, do testifie, in all Ages, and in every Climate?

To this we must take leave to Demur, by laying open the true Nature of Virtue: Which is not a thing calculated for peculiar Places and particular Seasons; but has a general reference to all Times, and to every Place, to procure us Felicity in both. It doth also, on the other hand, enable us either to resist Evils; Or, if they prevail, to bear them with Equality, and resignation.

How far Virtue contributes to the getting of *Wealth*, *Honours*, and the like, has been already shewn. I will onely add that *Honest Poverty* is preferable to ill-gotten *Riches*: And such (I take it) are manifestly ill-gotten and ill-kept, wher-ever Virtue has suffered for it, either in the whole, or in its smaller part. Wherefore let Virtue be your Children's Inheritance: if they have this, they will never stand in need of superfluous Wealth; and if they have it not, you ought not to break your Heart to make them Rich.

L. 1. c. 1. Sect. 3. L. 3. c. 9. Sect. 2.

XIV. As to the Objection, For fear of Burning or the Gallows; take this for granted, that if you want the Armor of *Patience* against all Tribulations and Temptations whatever that may happen, you then carry in your Bosom that Serpent *Cowardise*, which will urge you to betray your Prince, your Country, your Friends, your Religion, and even all together, if it fairly comes in your way. Whereas if *Patience*, do but fortifie and corroborate your Mind; it will embolden you to stand in defiance against those mighty Bugbears. You may, in scorn of them, declare, that the Soul of Man is not to be scorch'd by Fire, nor choak'd by Water; not can the Butchers chop it into parcels: That Virtue cannot, even by Violence, be torn from it, or God himself be separated from Virtue and the Soul.

XV. Besides, this also may be reflected on, that our *Life* is but as a Thing depofited with us by *God*. Now if *God* shall call for his own Pledge, How can we, with Sense or Honesty, refuse so just and potent a Benefactor, or be unwilling to restore back what he lent? But this Pledge is always called for, as often as any Conditions for Life are made us, which cannot consist with that Observance, which we owe to God and to Virtue.

XVI. Lastly, Let us take Comfort in this, That God is not usually wanting to his Children, in their Extremities; that, if the Mind shall retain its Integrity and persevere to

to the laſt, 'tis ſcarce in the power of Torment to interrupt our Happineſs. For the Soul is then as it were abſorp'd with God, and in full proſpect of a bleſſed Immortality. She knows the Flames and Scourges of this World cannot disfigure her: For when their worſt is done, 'tis She finally ſhall Conquer; That ſhe, as a long Exile, is now ſolemnly recall'd to her Native Country: that She is remounting to the Region of bleſſed Souls; and even ſees them, as gazing upon her with joy, and as ſhouting with Acclamations at her approach. *L.2. c.10. §. 18. L.3. c.10. §. 8. L.2. c.10 §. 19. L. 3. c.3. §. 10.*

XVII. O the Joys! O the Triumphs! O what Embraces from that Illuſtrious Aſſembly! What Words, and Welcome, and Elogies, will they beſtow, for what ſhe ſo direfully ſuffer'd, and ſo bravely overcame, in the defence of Virtue and of Truth! How will the Manſions above Eccho and Rebound, with Hallelujah's of that Heavenly Quire! Or how rather, will this victorious Soul, enter with Triumph into thoſe Manſions, where Felicity is never to end! 'Tis in this Happy Station, where Love and Friendſhip are always Young, ſtill Unblemiſh'd, and evermore Sincere. Here Holy Angels, and all thoſe Reſplendent Beings, which are above, do not onely behold the Beauties of each other, but Communicate, and even Diſcourſe, by ſome unſpeakable Way: But this is ſure, that Truth ſhines out in its utmoſt Purity, and Virtue is bright and manifeſt in all they ſay. Beſides, here

here are no Viciſſitudes, all is Peace, all Security, and all things are Stationary and fix'd. In ſhort, here is a Conſummation of the Soul's bleſs'd Eſtate; And it were impoſſible to find it elſewhere.

XVIII. And how could this otherwiſe be, ſince the Mind of Man is as the Image of God, drawn and deſcending from him. And being drawn from God; it covets Heaven, as deſirous to return from whence it came. All Inclinations towards the Earth ſavour of the Body; But as to the Soul, her Habitation is above, and her true Country is Heaven. For as *Cicero* Diſcourſes wiſely of this Matter, *There can no Origination of the Soul be found upon Earth.*

De Conſolatione.

XIX. Wherefore let us admire that Quickning Life; which, when freed from our Earthly Tabernable, will touch and penetrate our Souls with Joy! O that happy State of victorious Virtue, attended and ſurrounded with Triumphs and Content! And ever Happy be that Death and Torment, which ſhall conduct the firm and unſhaken Soul, to Pleaſures that are Ineffable.

XX. Here, we confeſs, are great things ſpoken; and ſo perhaps through this whole Work: Yet we ſuppoſe they are not greater, than what belongs to the true and genuine Deſcription of *Moral Philoſophy*. They are not beyond the Compaſs and Meaning of *Right Reaſon*; nor exceed the Profeſſions and Memorials of the moſt Excellent of the *Heathens*.

XXI.

XXI. HOWEVER, That Religion may not be defrauded of her due Honour, I do here alſo profeſs, teſtifie, and declare, that I think nothing is found in the Writings of the Philoſophers, or commemorated as the Deeds and Sayings of Renowned *Heathens*; But all their Flights and Raptures (whether about *God*, or the *Soul*, or *Virtue*) are owing, either to the very Doctrine, or to the Ancient *Cabala* or Tradition of the moſt Primitive Church of Gods. Or elſe to the *Eternal* Son, that *Logos*, or WORD *of God*; Who has, in all Ages paſt, endow'd every Man with ſome Senſe of *Honeſty*; Tho ſome Men have always been more *Burning*, and more *Shining Lights*, than the reſt.

For this WORD is that *True Light*, which *Enlightneth all Men that come into this World*: even as the *Scripture* has it. Now that *Pythagoras* drew his Knowledg from the *Hebrew* Fountains, is what all Writers, Sacred and Prophane, do teſtifie and aver. That *Plato* took from him the principal part of that Knowledg, touching *God*, the *Soul's Immortality*, and *the Conduct of Life and Good Manners*, has been doubted by no Man. And that it went from him, into the Schools of *Ariſtotle*, and ſo deriv'd and diffus'd, almoſt into the whole World, is in like manner atteſted by all.

XXII. WHEREFORE, as the Virtue, and Wiſdom, and Excellency, of ſo many of the Old *Heathens*, does not a little Illuſtrate the Power

Power and Benignity of the Divine Providence, and the extent of its Gifts: So can these Men, in no degree, either obscure, or derogate from, the Glory of the *Church*. For they, as we said, did but borrow their precious Things, either from the *Church* of God, or from the *Divine Logos* or *WORD*. That *Word* which the old Church (I mean that of the *Jews*) did worship when it shined from the Tabernacle: and which the New Church (I mean that of the *Christians*) still adores in the Human Nature of the *Messias*, as in the glorious Temple of its Residence. *And may it be Worshipped and Adored for ever and ever.* Amen.

FINIS.